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Preface
Climate change, especially the greenhouse effect, has emerged as
perhaps the greatest problem facing the world at the end of the
twentieth century. Rarely before has there been such a consensus
amongst scientists and NGOs that something needs to be done,
even if all the research has not been completed.
In the great climate debates, the mountains have not often
been mentioned, although they occupy 40 per cent of the world's
surface. Mountains and the cryosphere (the frozen regions) play
a major part in the climate and hydrological system, especially
reflecting heat back 10 space and acting as a reservoir of vital
water. The Alp Action programme has pushed mountains up the
political agenda. This short book summarizes for the first time
the possible effects of warming, particularly on the European
mountains. The evidence is frankly alarming, the more so since
it is presented in an unemotional way. The conclusions deserve
careful consideration at the highest levels, for the implications go
far beyond the mountains.
Clearly something must be done urgently, and on a global scale.
This action can start with all of us, who should seek ways of
conserving energy. There is a need for a co-operative effort
amongst all the organizations and individuals concerned with the
problem. There is also a need for dialogue - not confrontation
- between those inside and outside politics. The publicity given
to climate change has created a unique opportunity for raising
awareness and stimulating action. The mechanisms for change
exist in a world where there is a new atmosphere of international
co-operation. The negotiations for a Climate Convention are a
splendid opportunity. The forthcoming World Conference on
Environment and Development will, it is hoped, provide a forum
and a stimulus for a new environmental order in which mountains
will receive appropriate attention.
Alp Action and the Bellerive Foundation are pleased that its
network of outstanding scientists could produce this book and
hope that it will be useful for briefing, education and reference.
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Equally significant is the fact that this project was itself the
outcome of an alliance between industry, scientists and ecologists.
Special thanks are due to Unigestion for their support, without
which the project could not have been attempted. We owe a
debt of gratitude to The Royal Swedish Academy of Forestry and
Agriculture and the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (Austria), who worked with us on the scientific analysis.
I look forward to this network continuing to put before the public
and decision-makers sensible, authoritative information for vital
action.
Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan
President, Bellerive Foundation, Switzerland
Foreword
Air pollution in different forms has been described as the most
serious threat to our environment. Lakes and soils have become
acidified. Forests are damaged over vast areas. Serious warnings
are given about climate changes and the greenhouse effect. We are
dealing with complex chemical stress factors causing widespread
disturbances in ecosystems. There is concern that a continuation
of recent trends wiIllead to most undesirable consequences.
The problem is international, even if each local situation is
different. Strategies to combat undesirable impacts must be set
in the international arena because air pollution crosses boundaries,
as does trade in raw materials for processing.
Intensive and special attention is being paid to the increasing
concentrations of gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, freons
and nitrous oxide in the global atmosphere. But studies are not
enough; there must be long-term energy policies in which the
control of air pollution and environmental protection plays a most
important role. Decision-makers should adapt to the risks inherent
in the management of environmental issues. The public must be
educated about the consequences of climate and inappropriate
behaviour.
The purpose of this book is to produce a view of possible
future interrelationships between climate change and forests in
the high mountains of Europe, the complexities and the necessary
strategies and actions in response to changes. Even if awareness
and knowledge about the possible negative effects of air pollution
have improved in recent years, the messages of this book should
be inserted into the process of global environment protection. We
have to establish an efficient and effective exchange of knowledge
between politics, industry and science. This is surely the common
responsibility in international co-operation.
Lennart Schotte
President, The Royal Swedish Academy ofForestry and Agriculture
Chairman, Board of INSTRA Foundation
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Introduction
This book is not just for scientists and ecologists. It is also intended
for decision-makers, politicians, diplomats, teachers, and for the
interested public. All have tended to neglect the mountains on
their back doorsteps in preference to what are presumed to be
more pressing problems further afield. Not only have mountains
been neglected, but also the effects of climate change upon them.
The present expectancy is of major warming. If the predictions of
the greenhouse theorists are correct, there will be little ice or snow
in the Alps by the year 2100.
Mountains have always had a central part to play in Europe's
history and culture. The prehistoric settlement of Europe and even
the present-day distribution of the great Romance, Germanic and
Slavic cultures was greatly influenced by mountain geography.
People moved along rivers, through the gates between mountain
chains, and sought areas that were neither too cold nor too
heavily forested. In front of the retreating ice were areas of loess
soils, drier, open heathlands and steppes, more easily cultivated
or grazed with prehistoric techniques. As warmer conditions
prevailed, mountain grasslands were used, at least in the summer,
especially by herding cultures.
Europe's mountains - or at least the peaks - are part of the global
cryosphere, those frozen icy, snow-covered regions of the earth,
which can cover about 60 per cent of its surface (see Table 1.3).
But Europe's mountains are much more than snow and ice now
under threat in a warmer world. Their ecosystem embraces forests,
meadows, rivers, fauna, flora and great cultures. The plains
below depend on the mountains for water, energy, agricultural
products and tourism. Already the European mountains are
under extreme pressure, in part because of climate changes.
Forests are dying in drier polluted conditions. The hydrological
system is disturbed. Fauna and flora are threatened. The tourist
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industry is suffering. These problems will certainly intensify in the
future.
This book sets out to provide a succinct summary of probable
future scenarios for the mountains and forests of Europe in
times of climate change, and to outline the responses necessary
in this situation. We do not propose a detailed scientific treatise
but rather a commentary on the political processes surrounding
the use and abuse of the atmosphere. We will not waste time
on complex definitions. The European mountains are simply
defined as the elevated regions from the Atlantic to the Urals,
from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. Europe's mountains and
forests cannot, however, be discussed in isolation from the global
biosphere of which they are part. Therefore, there is discussion
of those factors in the wider natural world and in society which
affect what is happening in Europe. It m"y be that the most
important solutions to the ecological problems of mountain and
forest ecosystems are to be found in faraway centres of political
power and in the behaviour of ordinary consumers. And while the
book focuses on Europe, there are lessons here for other parts of
the mountain world where the problems of industrialization are on
the horizon.
Our book looks to the future rather than the past, but it
is not intended to be a cookbook of guaranteed recipes for
success. At present, there is great uncertainty about the future
of ecological and climatic changes. This uncertainty is especially
true of mountain regions. Trends of warm winters may suddenly
give way to extreme cold. Some have argued that this uncertainty
precludes drastic - or, indeed, any - action. We feel, however,
that the uncertainty presented in the different scenarios and
stories demands, on the contrary, precautionary, preventive and
protective action.
The data come from several different sources. There arc weather
records and vegetation indicators. Use is made here of the Climate
Data Base of IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis, Austria), one of the partners in the project. Secondly,
extensive use has been made of the materials collected by the IPCC
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva).
We begin by reviewing current models about climate change.
Most attention is paid to the greenhouse warming theory, though
there is also discussion of cooler models. and steady-state ideas,
such as Gaia. The "business as usual" model (i.e. assuming more
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or less current levels of energy use) is discussed in depth because
it has been the focus of most scientific interest and also reflects
political expectations and plans. The dynamic mountain situation,
where data and prediction are uncertain, complicates, confuses
and confounds the leading models. We discuss this in Chapter 2
The third chapter spells out the situation assuming the "business
as usual" scenario in the mountains. There is a detailed discussion
of the range of physical and socioeconomic effects, some cata-
strophic and most alarming. Special attention is paid to the effects
on forests in Chapter 4.
The book is not, however, just a catalogue of doom and gloom.
A chapter is devoted to the options that are available and the best
possible strategies. Chapter 6 spells out the international responses
being taken or contemplated. The book concludes with a set of
next steps. In the Appendices, key documents relating to climate
change in the mountains are reproduced.
Throughout there is a running argument that mountains are
an essential - perhaps the most essential - and most threatened
ecosystem vital to the world climate, water supply, vegetation,
wildlife and culture.

Chapter 1
Climate Change: Facts and Theories
At present, there are a number of apparently conflicting theories
about what is happening to the climate both globally and in specific
regions. Two broad groups of theory may be identified: in the first,
the catastrophe group, rapid irreversible changes are perceived;
the second tends to see less a supercrisis than a pseudocrisis:
cyclical or harmonic processes in which there are winners and
losers in different regions and a measure of stability.
We may start with the best-publicized catastrophe theory, the
greenhouse, which Gribbin and others have called the "heat
trap".1 This means leaving aside the interesting, if somewhat
speculative, histories which talk of devastating meteorites or earth
wobbles, though the history of climate change has undoubtedly
included such catastrophic events.
The most widely accepted theory of climate-change causation is
the greenhouse effect, even if there are variants on the theme. The
leading journal Climate Change polled scientists and found that
the great majority believed in i1.2 The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Charge (Ipcq, convened by the World Meteorological
Organization and the United Nations Environmental Programme,
and the Second World Climate Conference agreed that there
is a "natural greenhouse effect, which already keeps the earth
warmer than it would otherwise be". Emissions from human activ-
ities substantially increase the atmospheric concentrations of the
greenhouse gases - carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofiurocarbons
(CFCs) and nitrous oxide. These increases "enhance" the natu-
ral greenhouse, resulting in additional warming to the earth's
surface.3
In the IPCC model of the greenhouse effect, some gases are
transparent to incoming short-wave radiation from the sun but do
not allow it to escape back to space. So the lower atmosphere is
warmed. Table 1.1 summarizes data on the main greenhouse gases
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in the IPCC model, and their sources, though other authorities
give different figures and interpretations.4 The burning of fossil
fuels may contribute as much as 90 per cent of the increase in
carbon emissions.
Also acting as a windowpane is water vapour which, according
to Lindzen,s is by far the most inHuential greenhouse gas (97
per cent). Unfortunately the critical water vapour occurs over
6 kilometres high, where data are scanty and unreliable. Water
vapour may cool rather than heat if there is condensation into
clouds.
Without the greenhouse, the earth would be an icy waste with
a temperature of -30°C. When the shutters are too firmly closed,
the temperature can rise to hundreds of degrees. The earth is
literally between the chill of Mars and the inferno of Venus. Not
everybody, however, agrees with the "consensus". One recent
criticism of the IPCC claimed that the conclusions were "hot air",
a political device to sound ominous when the scientific data were
quite uncertain.6 Others claim that those who "pooh-pooh" the
greenhouse theory are in the pockets of those who want industrial
expansion.
The debate is also concerned with how much temperature rises
are part of natural cycles. The observational evidence is certainly
very recent, basically starting in the mid nineteenth century though
records go back more than three hundred years in England. It is
also incomplete. Some of those records do show some evidence of
natural cycles (for example, twenty years) though not everywhere,
not the same cycles, not all the time.7 These cycles have been
explained by the moon (tidal variations) or solar activity. There
are eleven-year cycles of sunspot activity and changes in solar
magnetic fields after each cycle, as well as longer-term rhythms
(forty years) discovered in Carbon 14 in tree rings. There is some
association between low solar activity and cold conditions - as in the
Little Ice Age in the seventeenth century - or with magnetic fields
- as in the unexplained reversal of the earth's field after the last
Great Ice Age. As sunspot activity increases there is more energy,
but the contribution to radiative forcing (warming) on the earth is
small. Politically influential (and funded) institutions, such as the
Marshall Institute in Washington, have argued for such natural
variation and ridiculed the greenhouse theorists. But nearly all
the world's climatologists and many other scientists working on
the IPCC see the present situatin as unprecedented.s
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Table 1.1: Greenhouse gases and human sources
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Carbon Methane Nitrous Chloro- Tropo-
Dioxide (CR.) oxide Ouorocar- spheric:
(COl) (Nl0 ) bons Ozone
(CFCs)
% contribu-
tion to
"greenhouse 56 14 7 23 a
effect" over
period 195<Hl5
Concentration
of greenhouse 275 ppmv 700 ppbv 280 ppbv zero 15 ppbv
gases - pre-
industrial (b)
Concentration 350 ppmv 1700 ppbv 310 ppbv 0.26 ppbv 335 ppbv
in 1988 (b) (cpc-II)
0.44 ppbv
(cFc-12)
Annual growth 0.5% 0.5% 0.25% 5-5.5% 1%
of concentra-
tions in 19808
Sources of Fossil fuel Rice paddy Fertilizers Manufac- Product of
greenhouse burning cultivation tured for sunshine and
gases Fossil fuel solvents; pollutants:
Deforestation I Rearing of and biomass aerosol spray carbon
land - use ruminants burning propellants; monoxide;
changes (e.g. cows) foam methane;
Land packaging other
Biomass conversion hydrocarbons
burning for nitrogen
agriculture oxides
Fossil fuel
extraction
and burning
Notes: a. contributions of ozone not estimated, perhaps around 8
per cent of total.
b. ppmv is parts per million; ppbv is part per billion.
Source: Commonwealth Secretariat (1989).
8 MOUNTAIN WORLD IN DANGER
The greenhouse effect, however, is very complicated, with a
wide range of feedbacks with positive or negative effects, not all
of which can be measured in computerized General Circulation
Models (GCMs). Feedbacks "feed" on each other, producing
effects which amplify warming or cooling. Such feedbacks may
accelerate catastrophically.
Human factors play an important role in the creation of the
greenhouse effect. The clearance of the tropical forests is associated
with increases in human numbers in poor countries but also with
the ever-increasing consumer demands in the industrialized world
for both wood and hamburgers from grazing beef on cleared land.
The average American consumes forty times as much energy as the
average Ethiopian. The world car park numbers 400 million and is
doubling every fifteen years, so that there will soon be more cars
than poor people. Vehicle emissions are said to contribute over a
third of the greenhouse gases, despite more stringent controls.
Pollution poisons as well as heats the biosphere, most signifi-
cantly through an excess of acidity. Acid precipitations and soils
are blamed for the sickness and premature death of 50 per cent of
Europe's forest as well as for the disappearance of sensitive fauna
and flora.
Some small products of industry have a major effect, the best
known example being chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) used as sol-
vents, refrigerator fluids, aerosol propellants and in plastic foams.
CFCs make up nearly a quarter of the greenhouse gases as well as
destroying the ozone layer which protects the earth from damaging
ultra-violet radiation. Figure 1.1 shows world production of CFCs
and halons - mostly used in fire extinguishers - in 1985. An
international protocol was signed in Montreal in 1987 with the
objective of reducing CFC emissions.
The current emissions of methane (CH4) are dominated by
natural sources (wetlands, oceans and freshwaters). The estimated
contribution from natural sources is 30 per cent of the total
emissions. Each factor - rice production, fossil fuel production,
domestic animals and biomass burning - is estimated to contribute
by 13-16 per cent to the total emissions of CH4• It is calculated that
landfills make a contribution of roughly 8 per cent. Current emis-
sion sources of nitrous oxide emissions (N20) are predominantly
natural too (75 per cent). Nitrogen fertilizers and biomass burning
are thought to contribute by 5-9 per cent each in cultivated land
and fossil fuels by 2-9 per cent each.
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Figure 1.1: Production of CFCs and halons in 1985, expressed in metric
tons
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Source: US Environmental Protection Agency (1988)
The various gases have different relative influences on climate
change. One concept to illustrate this IS the "global warming
potential" model developed by fPee (1990). By using such an
approach it is possible to convert greenhouse gas emissions to
CO2 equivalents. The global warming potentials and emissions by
sector, region and gas are presented in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.2.
The human element, however, is recognized as only part of the
reasons for global warming. After all, the planet has experienced
warm interglacials before there was industrialization. Ice core and
other analyses have shown them to be associated with increased CO2
concentrations. An astronomical explanation of this phenomenon,
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the Milankovitch effect, has been widely accepted. Approximately
every 90,000 years, the earth tilts slightly back and forth on its
axis, allowing the ice sheet to creep gradually forward and then
retreat. The CO2 concentration has been explained by accidental
forest-burning which may also create the cloudy conditions which
favour cooling.
Table 1.2: Global warming potentials
Trace gas GWpa
CO2 I
CH4 21
N 20 21
CFc-11 3,500
CFc-12 7,300
"Global warming potentials following the instantaneous injection of
IKg of each trace gas, relative to CO2 for a 100-year time horizon.
Source: US Agency for International Development (1990).
Even today the human addition to the natural cycle may be
quantitatively small, even if sometimes qualitatively significant.
The human agency adds annually some 7 billion tonnes of carbon
to the carbon flux compared to 200 billion tonnes exchanged
between the atmosphere, living organisms and the ocean. There
is a natural process of regulation and feedback. In the carbon flux,
largely through photosynthesis (particularly forests and oceanic
phytoplankton), there is a reduction in CO2 and a conversion to
oxygen.
However, CO2 is increasing exponentially (Figure 1.3) along with
temperature rises (Figure 1.4). The catastrophic forms of the green-
house theory envisage a runaway effect, as presumably happened on
the planet Venus. Here the atmosphere is almost entirely composed
of CO2 and the total greenhouse effect creates temperatures of
above sooae. As the sun warmed, it is presumed that the Venus water
evaporated, disappearing into space and disintegrating into hydro-
gen and oxygen molecules through the strong action of the sunlight.
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Figure 1.2 Relative contribution of 1985 emissions to radiative forcing
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Source: US Agency for International Development (1990)
Similar feedbacks may take place in the water cycle. As there
is warming, there is more evaporation and conversion to water
vapour, which may amplify the greenhouse effect but also cool the
planet if there is increased cloudiness and precipitation.
Until the 1980s, scientists thought the world would get colder for
a variety of reasons9 but mainly because of clouds from nuclear
explosions, fires or volcanic eruptions. A contemporary minority
ice age theory accepts certain elements of greenhouse causation
but looks for different effects,lo The focus is on the unseasonably
cold winters and massive storms. The point is made that the first
recorded snow fell on Miami in 1977, and since then such cold
waves have become frequent in North America. The northern
hemisphere snow cover has been extending, coming earlier or
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unseasonably, or staying longer. In time snow becomes ice through
intermediate stages such as tim. Once snow lies for a season,
melting is retarded. Even if the snow melts quickly, or comes only
as frost, the crops may be destroyed - especially when, as often
happens, tender shoots are affected. The increased snow cover
reflects back sunlight (the albedo effect), so increasing cooling,
while the mass of the snow weighs down on the earth, causing
earthquakes and volcanoes (the toothpaste effect), which increase
turbidity and coolness.
Figure 1.3: Record of the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide
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Source: World Meteorological Organization (1990).
The ice theories take particular notice of the differential warm-
ing of the tropics in contrast to higher latitudes. Not only are there
more storms as polar air rushes in towards the tropics but more
cloudiness, which flows polewards with the circulation pattern,
falling as increased precipitation, often as snow at high latitudes
or altitudes. According to this theory, something like a 10 per cent
sustained increase in cloud cover could bring on an ice age (see
Figure 1.5).
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Figure 1.4: Record of global mean air temperature change at the surface
of the earth
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Source: World Meteorological Organization (1990).
There is, then, a "cold", not a "hot" greenhouse effect, which
is compounded by the poor state of the forests, especially in
temperate zones which cannot easily soak up CO2, In Hameker's
theory, forest death is explained by the demineralization of soils
due to leaching and erosion. Forest death is therefore a cause
rather than an effect of global warming. But the reversal of the
theory does not stop there. The revitalization of the forests is
triggered by the returning ice, which remineralizes the soils by
crushing rocks, the dust of which is distributed as silt by rivers or
in rainfall.
The ice age theory does at least feature the cryosphere, the snow
and ice portions of the earth's surface. Even now, at what may be
the warmest part of an interglacial, the cryosphere may extend
to 60 per cent of the earth's surface in mid February (northern
winter) (see Table 1.3).
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Figure 1.5: Factors that may bring on the next Ice Age
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Source: Ephron, L. The End (Berkely: Celestial Arts, 1987).
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Table 1.3: Components of the cryosphere
15
Area Ice volume Sea level
(106kmz) (106kmz) equivalent (m) a
Land ice: East Antarctica b 9.86 25.92 64.8
West Antarctica 2.34 3.40 8.5
Greenland 1.7 3.0 7.6
Small ice caps and 0.54 0.12 0.3
mountain glaciers
Pennafrost
(excluding Antarctica):
Continuous 7.6 0.03 0.08
to to
Discontinuous 17.3 0.07 0.17
Sea ice: Arctic c
March 15.8 0.05
September 7.6 0.02
Antarctica d
September 20.9 0.06
February 4.0 0.10
Land snow cover e
N Hemisphere
Early February 46.3 0.002
Late August 3.7
S Hemisphere
Late July 0.85
Early May 0.07
a 400 000km2 of ice is equivalent to Im global sea level.
b Grounded ice sheet, excluding peripheral, floating ice shelves (which do
not affect sea level). The shelves have a total area of 1.62 x 106km2 and a
volume of 0.79 x 106 km 2•
c Including the Sea of Okhotak and the Baltic Sea.
d Actual ice areas excluding open water are 18.4 and 3.6 million km2.
e Snow cover includes that on land ice but excludes snow-covered sea ice.
Source: Barry, R. (personal communication).
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Cloudiness (turbidity), the major factor in cooling, may be
generated by a number of factors. In the 1970s, the work of
the Max Planck Institute and elsewhere showed that even small
nuclear explosions could create enough ashes in the troposphere to
lower temperatures significantly. The USSR Academy of Sciences
produced models which showed that after a nuclear war the earth
might be totally blanketed by a cloud of soot within a month,
and that this cloud might take a year to clear. These studies also
concluded that such clouds might be formed from the firestorms
generated by non-nuclear wars.!l
Other significant sources of ash may follow volcanic explosions
or forest fires. Indeed, one of the earliest analyses of climate
change was carried out by Benjamin Franklin in the 1780s, when
he was Ambassador of the newly independent United States in
Paris. He suggested an association between the cold winters and
cool summers and Icelandic volcanic activity.
The extent to which a nuclear winter, firestorm cloud, forest
fires or volcanic eruptions may occur is not predictable, though UN
and ICSU studies have talked of the possible risk of unprecedented
consequences with temperature drops of 25-300C.l2 Nuclear weapons
have proliferated both horizontally and vertically, despite inter-
national treaties and nuclear-free zones. Every state and terrorist
group may be able to possess the technology and all but the poorest
groups may already have some capability.13 The outcome of the
Gulf crisis has proved that the threat of war is never far away, and
the effects of the immense clouds produced by burning oil wells
in Kuwait have yet to be measured. The Geneva International
Peace Research Institute has recorded over three hundred wars
since World War II. Nuclear power stations, which are vulnerable
to either attacks or accidents, are still numerous despite Chernobyl
and may increase as there is a move away from polluting fossil
fuels. Forest fires are more common, associated with the drier
conditions in some areas resulting from climate change, as well
as the increased incidence of arson. Finally, unexpected events
cannot be ruled out. Nature has reported that the comet that may
have caused the death of the dinosaurs is coming back. The dust
in its tail would be enough to trigger a major ice age. l4
The sophisticated Gaia explanation which has stability rather
than instability as a basic premise relies on biological analysis.
Gaia is the newest phase of cosmological explanations. From
antiquity the universe was explained theologically. After Newton
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the analogy was the machine. Today there is considerable interest
in the notion of the universe as a living being. The focus is not
on CO2 gas but on oxygen, nitrogen, etc. - or rather, the synergy
between organic and inorganic. For Lovelock the atmosphere is
not a "mere catalogue of gases" but a living entity in which
oxygen is the key influence, if not the most abundant gas (21 per
cent compared to nitrogen's 79 per cent). Oxygen tension is the
"electrical supply" for life as it oxidizes with other elements (redox
potential). Lovelock compares the environment to a battery, with
one electrode in the oxygen and the other in the food. Oxygen is
produced from photolysis of water vapour in the upper layers of
the atmosphere and the "burial" of fixed carbon from plants. IS
With low levels of oxygen, as Pasteur showed, there can be only
low levels of life, but too much oxygen is also very dangerous.
If the oxygen levels were to reach 25 per cent, anaerobic life,
which cannot live with oxygen, would decline. The world's forest
could be destroyed by flash fires (as has happened in the earth's
history). Anaerobes are significant in several ways - not only
as the internal fauna and flora within living creatures but also
in the muds and sediments on seabeds, marshes, wetlands and
river estuaries. In both places, through bacterial action, the most
important oxygen-regulating gas - methane - is produced. Nitrous
oxide, like methane, is present only in very minute quantities in
the atmosphere (one-third parts per million) and may regulate
methane, oxygen and ozone. The Gaia argument is that there is
a happy medium of ozone. The holes may be bad, but too much
ozone may preclude ultraviolet light which is beneficial to human
health - preventing rickets, for example. Another nitrogenous gas
made in large quantities in the soil and seas is ammonia, which
controls the acidity of the atmosphere.
By far the most prevalent gas in the atmosphere is nitrogen,
which dilutes oxygen, maintaining sufficient air pressure or density
for a stable climate. The atmosphere is seen as a kind of storehouse
preventing the creation of nitrates which are toxic and, when
dissolved in the sea, lead to excessive salinity inimical to life.
CO2 is a minor gas, even if it is a major gas in the greenhouse
panels, and it is absorbed not only through photosynthesis in
trees and plants, but also non-photosynthetically by heterotrophic
animals. The Gaia conclusion is that harmony is the natural state
of the earth and that humankind must work as part of this harmony
whereby temperature can be thermostatically controlled. The
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general prescription is to have more contact with nature, with the
Gaia Mother Earth, and respect her logic. The Russian scientist
Vemadsky, who provided much inspiration for Gaia, went further.
For him the universe was dominated by a higher sphere than the
biosphere - the noosphere - rather like the mind in the body.
The noosphere allowed the beneficial intervention of the human
intellect. Grinevald sees biospheric theories as a continuing thread
in scientific thought since its origins.l6
The most important recent models have been more pragmatic,
generated by several hundred scientists and policymakers who
have contributed to the IPCC. The IPCC models are important,
drawing on more evidence than any other model, both from
detailed (Euro-American) computer models and historical ana-
logues (Soviet palaeoclimate). More significantly perhaps, IPCC
models have already become the basis for official planning and
policies, and have attracted a wide consensus.
Some of the virtues of the IPCC models, however, are also vices.
The fact that models have been evolved through intergovernmental
channels has increased the possibilities of political pressures.
The fact that there is an overload of sometimes contradictory
information has led to some shifting of the goal posts - with
regard, for example, to temperature and sea-level predictions.
The fact that so many scientists have been involved has increased
bureaucratization, overlap and inappropriate sequences. The
featuring of CO2 in the greenhouse effect (in the political rather
than the scientific statements) has been interpreted as a subtle
pro-nuclear power argument.l7
The IPCC process has been organized around four major
working groups. The first assembled the scientific evidence, the
second assessed the effects, the third suggested responses and the
fourth considered the position of the Third World. The reports of
the latter have depended on the scenarios suggested by the first.
Some consternation was created when late in the exercise in May
1990, Working Group 1 (WGl) significantly lowered its estimates
and made fuzzy the links between emissions, the greenhouse effect
and climate changes. Since it was impossible to re-do many months
of work and calculations, Working Group 2 at least retained the
higher estimates.
WGI is based on the uncertainty principle, even if absence of
evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence. Only two things
are felt to be certain: first, that there is a natural greenhouse effect
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which already keeps the earth warmer than it would otherwise
be; secondly, that emissions resulting from human activities do
substantially increase the atmosphere concentrations of green-
house gases - CO2, methane - the chlorofluorocarbons and nitrous
oxide, enhancing the greenhouse effect and resulting in additional
warming.
Beyond that, WGI "calculated" with confidence that some gases
are potentially more important than others in changing climate,
and that this effectiveness can be estimated (e.g. CO2 contributing
about half the enhanced effect). Secondly, the atmosphere concen-
trations of the long-lived gases (C02, NOx and CFCs) adjust only
slowly to changes in emissions, so that high future concentrations
are already assured. CO2 notably lingers for two hundred years. To
stabilize concentrations at today's levels, emissions from human
sources would need to be reduced immediately by at least 60
per cent. A major factor is that even if emissions in developed
countries may reduce, those in other parts of the world are still
increasing (see Table 1.4). A string of uncertainties are, however,
introduced, including the sources and sinks of greenhouse gases -
all of which change judgements and introduce surprises.
Table 1.4: Sources of C02 emissions from fossil fuels
1950 ('Yo) 1980 (%)
North America 44.7 26.7
Western Europe 23.4 16.5
USsR/Eastern Europe 18.0 24.2
Japan/Australia 2.8 5.8
China/Communist Asia 1.4 8.5
Developing 5.7 12.2
Others 3.9 6.0
100 100
Total 1.6 bn tonnes 5.17 bn tonncs
Source: Commonwealth Secretariat (1989)
Taking all this into account, the WG1 model interprets the rise
of global mean surface air temperature by 0.3°-O.6°C over the last
hundred years and the five global average warmest years in the
1980s as being of the same magnitude as natural climate variability.
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The unequivocal detection of the enhanced greenhouse effect from
observations is not likely for a decade or more. The report sees less
doom and gloom than a situation of winners and losers, and even
that enhanced levels of CO2 may increase the productivity and the
efficiency of its use of water.
As a consequence, WG1 concludes that the average temperature
rises in the next hundred years will certainly be more than those
in the last century, or 1° with doubling CO2 by 2025 (as compared
to their own previous estimate of 3° with doubling CO2), With
controls on emissions, the total rise in temperature could be only
O.l°C per decade. Sea-level rises predictions are reduced to only 6
centimetres compared to 1-2 metres. None the less, this rise is seen
as a major departure from a much slower historical experience and
a real problem because of its rapidity.
The WG1 model was not, of course, pulled out of the air,
but based on extensive observations and recent computer models
(especially from the UKMO). These observations, however, even
of simple parameters such as temperature and precipitation, do
not add up to a total picture. Observation stations are unevenly
distributed throughout the globe. There are many more in the
northern than in the southern hemisphere, for example, and -
more significantly - there are very few in the three-quarters
of the world that is ocean or the half of the world that is
mountains. Even more significantly, perhaps, most weather sta-
tions are found in towns. This skews temperature reporting
because towns are part of "heat islands" which are significantly
warmer than the surrounding countryside. Heat islands have-
been discovered even in villages with as few as three hundred
inhabitants and have produced, over a decade, temperature rises
of over O.3°C or more - equal to the global increase for the last
hundred years.
The recent availability of a decade of satellite data, of much greater
accuracy than data from earth-based stations, also suggests that there
may be a heat bias in existing records. Dr Roy Spencer of the NASA
space centre in Huntsville, Alabama, has been quoted as saying:
"Over the entire ten-year period [i.e. the 1980s] there was no net
warming or cooling".18 Even with ground-station figures, it is possible
to isolate periods - 1930 to 70 - when the trend was towards cooling.
Those who cast doubt on any warming maintain that the hundred-
years record is not long enough to establish a trend, especially
given the historical evidence of the Little lee Ages (1550-1850).19
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There are also many uncertainties about sea-level rises. The
0.5 m rise, for example, used originally in the WG1 model does
not appear great: the size of a small wave. Most of the data come
from the tide gauges in sheltered harbours and on jetties. The data
average readings, and there is often no compensation for any land
movements. There are areas - south-west Britain, for example -
where there is . geological sinking which raises sea levels, whilst
in Scandinavia the land is rising. Some low islands in the Pacific
and Indian oceans are certainly currently threatened and others
flooded, but by cyclonic surges rather than sea-level rises. Other
islands, such as the Shetlands, are rising. Satellite imagery has
also contradicted a small number of submarine reports of thinning
polar ice.
The observational picture has led to a criticism of global
computer modelling which actually relies less on weather obser-
vations than on dynamics derived from basic geophysical data,
such as the amount of radiation arriving from the sun and
the radiation propensities of the atmosphere, working back to
temperature, winds and precipitation. In the past, the grids used
for GCMs were the size of England, so that local variation was
difficult to incorporate. More powerful computers are halving the
resolution and also accommodating to "negative" feedbacks such
as cloud cover.
The major thrust of the IPCC work has been concerned with
the so-called Scenario A - what has come to be known as the
"business as usual" scenario. This scenario assumes "few or no
steps" taken to limit greenhouse gas emissions, with a doubling
of CO2 by around 2025 and some compliance with international
agreements. This scenario is examined in Chapter 3; we shall
now examine how mountains fit into all this debate about climate
change.
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Chapter 2
Mountain and Cryosphere Situations
Where do mountains fit into all this? According to the World
Climate Research Programme organized by the World Meteoro-
logical Organization (WMO) and the International Council of
Scientific Unions (ICSU), the physical climate system is made up
of four major components:
• the global atmosphere, which is the most rapidly varying
component and also the most energetically active, since it is
the heat engine that drives the whole climate system and, in
particular, the global water cycle;
• the world ocean, which interacts with the overlying atmos-
phere on periods of months to years within its superficial
layers, while the deeper ocean responds over periods of
decades to centuries;
• the cryosphere, which comprises the continental ice sheets and
ice caps, mountain glaciers and sea ice;
• the land surface of the continents, with its surface and
groundwater flow systems that control evaporation from land
and water storage in the ground.
Mountains represent a range of systems, even if the popular
conception is of ice and snow. At low latitudes in the tropics or the
Himalayas, there can be successive zones from luxuriant jungles
on the valley floors to arctic conditions on the peaks. Even in the
warmest interglacials, high peaks have remained snowcapped. At
the height of the ice ages, the ice sheets did not extend into the
tropics.
The topography of mountains complicates both temperature and
precipitation. Altitude may be associated with temperature decline
in isolated peaks, especially in mid-latitudes where there are high
wind speeds, but there is a different situation where (as is usual)
there are ranges with plateaux, valleys, basins and so on. Nor are
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linear relationships true of precipitation or snowfall which may
reach a maximum below the highest altitude.
The physiography of mountains also has dynamic effects. Moun-
tains may block or deflect the poleward or eastward movement of
the weather. As the weather approaches mountains, precipitation
may be stimulated as the air rises or collides with the relief.
Mountains orientated towards the equator are warmer. Within
mountains, deep-cut glacial and river valleys contain microclimates
influenced by altitude, slope, aspect, etc. The presence of water
in these valleys in lakes, rivers, wetlands and glaciers provides
humidity for evaporation and local precipitation, as well as being
the source of runoff for the plains below.
In mountains there are extremes of temperature and precipita-
tion. Some of the wettest areas in the world are where monsoonal
storms strike, and no longer is this phenomenon to be found only
in the tropics. The mountains are a most prominent part of the
cryosphere - especially in Antarctica, the most mountainous of
continents, where most (98 per cent) of the world's ice is located.
Overall, mountains may constitute (according to different criteria)
at least 30 per cent of the world's surface, whilst the cryosphere at
certain seasons may be double that.
A most significant point is that the mountains are the water
tower for the plains below them. The great rivers rise in the
mountains, drawing on the immense store of groundwater, much
of it frozen. The European mountains, for example, provide about
50 per cent of the water for river systems which include the Rhine,
Rhone, Po and Danube (through the Inn). Much precipitation
comes from the westerly flow of weather, as well as polar and
intertropical convergence zones. Quasi-monsoon conditions are
becoming common. In the Alps, this situation may be created
by the so-called Genoa effect. The westerlies arriving across the
Atlantic are deflected into the Gulf of Genoa. This deflection
stimulates a vortex effect which gathers speed and picks up water
over the Mediterranean, spinning off eventually back to the Alps
as warm, wet, stormy foehn conditions.
The mountains, therefore, are intrinsically dynamic climatic
situations changing in space and time, and the effects of any
general climate changes are also complex. There have been major
trends in recent years, obvious even to the most casual observer.
The Alpine glaciers are retreating and have, for example, lost
30 per cent of their overall bulk; some glaciers (Rhine) have
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diminished by 50 per cent. The duration and depth of snow cover is
much less now than a hundred years or even fifty years ago. Then,
even the Jura was described as a valley without spring.
More detail is provided by the analysis of glacier and permafrost
changes where there are data for the European Alps covering
much of the twentieth century.l The retreat of Swiss glacier
tongues may be correlated with an increase in air temperatures
of 0.5°C to 1°C. Admittedly, some small glaciers are advancing, but
generally this is because of steep slopes rather than the volume of
the glaciers themselves. None the less, there are anomalies where
there has been an increase in precipitation - where there is more
exposure to wet maritime influxes or impediment to radiation.
The analysis of permafrost and firm snow also shows a complex
pattern. Boreholes in the Swiss Alps indicate a possible cooling
since 1950, though the dynamics of convective heat transfer
and groundwater are not well understood. Some frozen sites in
the mid-altitudes appear to be much less affected than higher
latitudes, possibly because of different exposures to wind, snow
accumulation patterns, melting, etc.2
A major problem with interpreting mountain climates is the
lack of weather data as well as uncertainties and confusions in
what there is. Two major sources are used: historical indicators
and observational data. There are differences, however, in results
from different methods such as core sediment analysis, tree rings,
ice layers, glacial-geomorphological evidence, etc. Sometimes, as
in the so-called Little Ice Ages (1550-1850) there is written evi-
dence, though not often before the eighteenth century in the high
mountains. In the 1780s Sassure and others established the first
observation posts in the Mount Blanc area. Modern observational
data may also be scanty even in the most heavily studied areas,
since there are still not enough observatories and stations.
An important exception to the absence of data, at least in the
Alps, has been the ALPEX experiment, part of a fifteen-year
programme between WMO and ICSU.3 ALPEX, which was ini-
tiated in 1982, looked specifically at the so-called Genoa cyclones.
The high winds, heavy precipitation and storm surges associated
with the Genoa cyclones cause enormous damage. For the project
additional observation stations, aeroplanes, ships and satellites
were used to gather data. These data revealed how mountains
create not only unique climates but unexpected events such as
cyclones, and have served as a model for other regions. It should
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be remembered that with global warming there is more unstable air
in the atmosphere and hence a greater tendency to violent storms.
Most predictions for the future in the European mountain region
are derived from computer General Circulation Models (GCMs)
under doubling CO2 conditions. These analyses have been applied
to European Alpine regions by Ozenda and Borel4 as well as
in the IPCC WG2. Ozenda and Borel start with two computer
models, UKMO (United Kingdom Meteorological Office) and
GlSS (Goddard Institute for Space Studies), but these have too
weak a resolution, covering the whole alpine range (80 longitude 50
latitude), missing the variation in the valley regions. Ozenda and
Borel use pinpoint data to argue for nuances in the grosser models.
They distinguish, for example, the four quarters of the compass.
The south will be up to 20 per cent drier with doubling of CO2,
and olives will be grown in the Val D'Aosta as the Mediterranean
climate moves up the south-facing valleys. The north-west may be
wetter as well as warmer, while continental conditions (e.g. dry,
cold winters) influence the eastern boundaries. Altitude will result
in upward temperature movements of 150-200 metres per degree
centigrade.
Not only temperature and precipitation affect the Alps, but also
the quality of the atmosphere. The mountain forests in Europe
were long protected from human interference by their isolation,
but have not escaped the pollution produced by industrialization
and urbanization. Over half the forests of the Alps and the
Carpathians are said to be sick and dying prematurely. The most
recent figures released at the end of 1990 by the Swiss Forest
Institute increased the number of sick trees by approximately
10 per cent. Both acidity and warming have been implicated
as reasons for forest dieback. High levels of acidity focus on
the Alps. The ability of forest soils to absorb CO2 or stop
erosion is consequently diminished. The warmer, drier climate
is also creating a situation where there is more stress on species
which are unable to move and adapt to the climatic situation.
Ultimately, therefore, major desertification and deforestation may
be the result.
Acidity is accentuated if, as is happening in Central Europe,
there is a poleward shift of warm air and the mountains find
themselves in a zone of tranquil anticyclonic air. The recent
problem of the absence of snow in the Alps at the height of the
tourist season is largely because the polar front of cold, snow-laden
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air lies far to the north. Any southward incursions are blocked
by persistent high-pressure anticyclones which last for months
on end. These anticyclones are literally mountains of air whose
resistance is related to the elevated landmasses on which they sit
as a giant atmospheric cap. The contrasts with North America,
where southward unseasonable incursions of cold air occur, and
the European warmth may be partly explained by the geographic
orientation of the great ranges on the two continents. The Rockies
run north-south, the Alps/Carpathians east-west. There is a
major difference between North and South Europe. In general,
the North (Scandinavia) is becoming warmer and welter, whilst the
South (Alps, Mediterranean) is drier and colder in winter (Iberia,
Atlas).
The global climate shifts affecting mountains are influenced by
the ocean. Cold water from the Antarctic may be conveyed to the
northern oceans quite rapidly. The oceanic temperature system has
been historically - and is assumed to be in the future - stable. The
mean ocean surface temperature in the period 1860 to 1880 was
essentially the same as it is now, even if there has been warming
or cooling in the intervening period.5 Combining land and oceans,
the temperature increase has been only 0.6°C, and only O.2°C since
1930. Ocean temperatures are influenced by the mixing of water
at different depths, and there is a cooling effect of deeper waters.
Some futurological models6 predict a melting of sea ice, which is
already very thin in parts of the Arctic and pulsates annually in the
Antarctic. There is a fear that if this were to happen, the lower
part of the ocean would be insulated from the upper layers. This
would allow more rapid heating of the surface; possibly also the
destruction of the living organisms which absorb CO2•
There is also some agreement that increased ocean temperatures
may favour the generation of violent storms. It has been suggested
that a mean rise in August temperatures of 2.3°C to 4.8°C would
increase the intensity of cyclones by 60 per cent though not
necessarily their frequency.7 In some mountain ranges - the
Caucasus, for example - very heavy precipitation is the result
of these storms. Some currents or upswellings are influences and
indicators of climate change. The most famous is El Nino, so-called
because fishermen noticed every four years around December that
the waters became unusually warm. El Nino refers to the coming of
the Christ child with which December is associated. Climatologists
noticed that when El Nino appeared, there were very hot and dry
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summers in the northern hemisphere. The opposite condition was
at first called Anti-EI-Nino, but Spanish-speakers did not like the
anti-Christ analogy so the cold upswelling was called La Nina
- little girl. Some researchers claim that either the cold-water
conveyor or the upswelling may suddenly flip the world's climate
into heat or cold.
The cryosphere contribution to global climate patterns, then,
is considerable. Also important is the effect of glaciers on sea
levels. Recent satellite pictures have shown the break-up of the
West Antarctic Ice Sheet. With warming, huge blocks the size of
Belgium have begun to chip off. As they go, the lighter floating
ice is more likely to fissure, especially because a huge ice-stream
pressure behind the blocks builds up. These ice blocks may set off
cold currents but also raise sea levels very significantly. Rises of up
to 6 metres have been predicted.8
In temperate latitudes at least, alpine glacial melt also raises
sea levels - more than Antarctica in some theories, since small
ice blocks (as in a cocktail) melt more quickly than large ones.
Additionally, polar ice is locked up in colder conditions (see
Table 2.1). In some areas (Scandinavia, for example), as the ice
has been retreating, the land is rising, but the general effect of
sea-level rise is drowning and increased salinization of low-lying
areas and groundwaters, especially if there is a greater frequency
of storm surges. This is accentuated in many delta regions because
the land is sinking. Low-lying countries and islands are most at
risk. Great cities such as Amsterdam, London, New York, Sydney,
Hamburg, Bangkok and Shanghai may be vulnerable to flooding
due to melting ice thousands of kilometres away.
Table 2.1: Sea-level rise causes, 1985-2030 (cm)
Source Low Best guess High
Thennal expansion 4 9-14 18
Alpine glaciers 2 8-12 19
Greenland I 2-3 4
Antarctica -2 -2- -3 3
Total 5 17-26 44
Source: Commonwealth Secretariat (1989).
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Chapter 3
Climate Change and Mountain Regions
In Chapter 1 we set out some of the major perceptions, assess-
ments and explanations of the current situation. We look now
at the most probable effects in mountain regions of the most
likely scenarios. We basically use the IPCC "business as usual"
scenario, nuanced - as Ozenda and Borel have done - for the
Alpine region.! That is, we assume both a considerable amount
of warming and a situation of considerable change and dynamism,
in both time and space. Whatever is happening to global climate,
there seems to be an overwhelming consensus that there is or will
be warming; the debate now is about when and where, as well as
the effects.
The concept of "business as usual" is double-edged. First, it is
assumed that industrialization and growth will proceed broadly
within the parameters of the post-World War II period, even if
such a period of tranquillity is rare indeed in history. Secondly,
there is a tendency to play down the gloom-and-doom elements
of more catastrophic theories. Winners and losers are identified
in the different regions, but also it is felt that there is a balancing
out of all the actions and reactions, past and present. Certainly
in mid-latitude mountain regions there is evidence of more of a
steady state than at high latitudes.
Table 3.1 summarizes the regional forecasts in the "business as
usual" scenario prepared by IPCC Working Group 1. Even if
confidence in these estimates is low, they give some indication
of climate changes. The Southern Europe region includes the
Alps, Carpathians, Pyrenees, Balkans, Iberian and Apennine
mountains, and part of the Caucasus. More precise figures are
supplied by Ozenda and Borel (see Table 3.2).
When will all this happen? There is virtually a consensus that
CO2 will double within the next century, and the different speeds
of this process are the starting point for any models. The future
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Table 3.1: Regional changes: "business as usual" estimates by
Working Group 1
Changes from pre-industrial, I.e. c.1750
The estimates are based on high-resolution models, scaled to give a
global mean warming of 1.8°C consistent with the best estimate
(2SC) of climate response to greenhouse gases. With the low
estimate value of 1SC, these values should be reduced by 30%; with
a high estimate of 4SC, they should be increased by 50%.
Confidence in these estimates is low.
Central North America (35°_50° N 85°_105° W)
The warming varies from 2° to 4°C in winter to 2° to 3°C in summer.
Precipitation increases range from 0% to 15% in winter, whereas
there are decreases to 5% to 10% in summer. Soil moisture decreases
in summer by 15% to 20%.
Southern Asia (5°_30° N 70°-105° E)
The warming varies from 1° to 2°C throughout the year.
Precipitation changes little in winter and generally increases
throughout the region by 5% to 15% in summer. Summer soil
moisture increases by 5% to 10%.
Sahel (10°_20° N 20° W-40° E)
The warming ranges from 1° to 3°C. Area mean precIpitation
increases and area mean soil moisture decreases marginally in
summer. However, there are areas of both increase and decrease in
both parameters throughout the region, which differ from model to
model.
Southern Europe (30°_50° N 10° W-45° E)
The warming is about 2°C in winter and varies from 2° to 3° in
summer. There is some indication of increased precipitation in
winter, but summer precipitation decreases by 5% to 15%, and
summer soil moisture by 15% to 25%.
Australia (1ZO-45° S 110°-155° E)
The warming ranges from J° to 2° in summer and is about 2°C in
winter. Summer precipitation increases by around 10%, but the
models do not produce consistent estimates of the changes in soil
moisture. The arca averages hide large variations at the subconti-
nental level.
Source: JPCC, Policymakers summary of scientific assessment of climate
change. Report of Working Group I (JPCC, 1990).
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scenarios we describe are based on this doubling of CO2 and the
presumption that when it occurs there will be global warming of
at least 1DC - i.e. an escalating upward curve - even in the
most conservative estimates. The possible climate changes are
summarized in Table 3.3.
Table 3.2: Seasonal climatic changes in the Alps range according to
the GISS model
Temperatures (SOC) Precipitati( n (mm/day)
Western Alps Eastern Alps Western Alps Eastern Alps
Winter +4.5 +4.3 +0.45 +0.45
Spring +4.2 +4.1 +0.5 +0.65
Summer +3 +3.8 +0.3 +0.3
Autumn +4 +3.8 +0.3 +0.3
Total + 15.7 + 15.5 + 15.5 17
Mean +3.9 +3.9 +3.9 +4.2
Source: Ozenda and Borel (1989)
The World Meteorological Organization and United Nations
Environment Programme have established three basic scenarios:
a fast track - envisaging a doubling of CO2 concentration from
300 parts per million (ppm) to 600 ppm by the year 2030, a
medium track - by 2060; and a slow track - by 2090. The other
greenhouse gases have similar projections. Methane and nitrous
oxide are linked to agriculture and the assumption that the human
population will double in the next hundred years, CFC increases
are rather to be explained by consumer demand for specialized
products, such as refrigerators. The fast-track scenario is explained
by the following causal factors. First, it is assumed that developing
countries will expand their use of fossil fuels at a rapid rate.
Between 1973 and 1980, developing-country energy consumption
grew at a rate of 62 per cent per annum compared to 0.5 per cent
in the developed world. Poorer countries have less access to energy
sources which are less polluting, and it is assumed that there is a
lesser effort on energy-conservation measures.
An added factor is the greater increase in population numbers
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Large Stratospheric Cooling (virtually certain). Reduced ozone concentra-
tions in the upper stratosphere will lead to reduced absorption of solar
ultraviolet TlIdiation and, therefore, less heating. Increases in the stratospheric
concentnUion of carbon dioxide and other rddiatively active trace gases will
increase the radiation of heat from the stratosphere. The combination of
decreased heating and increased cooling will lead to a major lowering of
temperatures in the upper stratosphere.
Global Mean Surface Warming (very probable). For a doubling of
atmospheric carbon dioxide (or its radiative equivalent from all the
greenhouse gases) the long-term global mean surface warming is expected
to be in the TlInge of 1.5 to 4.5°C. The most significant uncertainty arises from
the effects of clouds. Of course, the actual rate of warming over the next
century will be governed by the growth rate of greenhouse gases, natural
fluctuations in the climate system, and the detailed response of the slowly
responding parts of the climate system, i.e. oceans and glacial ice.
Global Mean Precipitation Increase (Pt!ry probable). Increased heating of the
surface will lead to increased evl.. IOTlItion and, therefore, to greater global
mean pecipitation. Despite this increase in global averdge precipitation, some
individual regions might well experience decreases in TlIinfall.
Reduction of Sea Ice (very probable). As the climate warms, total sea ice is
expected to be reduced.
Polar Winter Surface Warming (Pt!ry probable). As the sea-ice boundary is
shifted poleward, the models pnxfict a dramatically enhanced surface
warming in winter polar regions. 1lIe greater fraction of open water and
thinner sea ice will probably lead to warming of the polar surface air by as
much as three times the global mean warming.
Summer Continental Dryness/Warming (likely in the long term). Several
studies have predicted a marked long-term drying of the soil moisture over
some mid-latitude interior continental regions during summer. This dryness is
mainly caused by an earlier termination of snowmelt and rainy periods, and
an earlier onset of the spring-to-summer reduction of soil wetness. Of course,
these simulations of long term equilibrium conditions may not offer a reliable
guide to trends over the next few decades of changing atmospheric
composition and changing climate.
High-Altitude Predpilation Increase (probable). As the climate warms, the
increased pokward penetration of warm, moist air should increase the
average annual precipitation in high latitudes.
Rise in Global Mean Sea Level (probable). A rise in mean sea level is generally
expected due to thermal expansion of seawater in the warmer future climate.
Far less certain is the contribution due to melting or calving of land ice.
Source: Leggett, J. (Ed.) Global Warming - The Greenpeace Report (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
34 MOUNTAIN WORLD IN DANGER
in developing countries. Infant mortality rates are falling (below
50 per thousand), life expectancy is rising (now over sixty years)
and consumer demand (especially for cars) is expanding along
with increased per capita GNP and expectations of Western life
styles. The increasing movement of populations to the cities and
industrial concentrations creates pollution black spots. A new
area of energy increase has emerged recently with perestroika
in Eastern European countries. There is a very strong demand
for Western consumer products, especially motor vehicles. At
present, the car pool in Europe is increasing by 5 per cent annually,
but this rate may double if Western car manufacturers are success-
ful in their marketing campaigns to provide every East European
family with a car. The medium and slower tracks assume some
kind of restrictions in either/or population growth and consumer
demand increase or increased effectiveness of energy-conservation
measures. Historical experience certainly indicates that there may
well be "natural" checks to population increases - wars, the AIDS
pandemic, etc. - as well as a growing success for family-planning
programmes.
Global warming itself will save energy to some extent, since
there will be lower heating bills. Improved energy-conservation
technology (house insulation, vehicle catalysers, solar-energy
cars) will all help, especially if any propaganda is stiffened with
legislation. The green ethic may well prompt people to look
for ecological solutions for their daily energy needs - walking,
bicycles, wearing sweaters, reducing consumption of fast foods,
using less wrapping. CFCs may well be outlawed completely, since
they do not occur naturally. There must, however, be much uncer-
tainty about the degree to which governments will move to control
emissions or climate change. The Ministerial Declaration issued
after the Second World Climate Conference in November 1990
(Appendix 11), was quite vague about commitments to specific
levels, despite NGO pressure. Some agreement may, however,
emerge on stabilization at 1990 levels by the year 2000 and a 20
per cent reduction by 2005 (see Chapter 6).
A most important point is that even if there were stabilization at
present levels, there would still be increases in key gases which
have long lives (C02: 200 years; CFCs: 100 years; see Figure 3.1).
Estimates of the effects of warming on mountain climates are,
of course, as speculative as those for other regions. It is presumed
that with warming there will be less permanent snow, increased
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glacial melt, and a higher tree line. But in some models there is an
increase in precipitation too - for example, in the wetter inner axis
of the Alps. There will also be major effects on the permafrost,
whether in the mountains or the tundra zones. In the mountains,
the melting of frozen materials in the upper layers increases the
risk of severe rock falls from the debris. Avalanches will generally
increase as the warmer weather creates spring snow conditions.
Figure 3.1: Greenhouse gases and scenario effects
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There arc some counter-intuitive trends. The key factor may
be less temperature than precipitation, and predictions for parts
of the European region are for wetter conditions and more soil
humidity. For example, some mountain ranges (e.g. the Caucasus)
are already experiencing more, rather than less, severe winters.
Very heavy snowfalls (up to 10 metres have been reported) in the
Caucasus arc associated with monsoonal conditions in the Black
Sea which falls as snow because of the high altitudes of the range.2
By contrast, the Alps are experiencing less winter snow because
of the stability of dry, if cold, anticyclonic conditions in winter.
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Whilst the melting of the high-latitude permafrost will enhance
the greenhouse effect through the release of methane gases, other
melts may decrease it by providing more evaporation and hence
more clouds. Most glaciers are melting and retreating, as they
have since the last ice age, but a number in the Alps are starting
to advance, and advances may be triggered by warming.
A major effect of warming is on the water system (see Table
3.4). Runoff, for example, is exponentially sensitive to temperature
rises when accompanied by aridity. A 1°C to 2°C rise in tempera-
ture accompanied by a 10 per cent fall in precipitation could
produce a 40-70 per cent reduction in runoff. Conversely, in
regions where there is increased precipitation (North European
mountains) there may be excess water or ice and consequent
flooding dangers, as well as extra pressures on water-supply
systems and hydro dams. Erosion, especiallY if there is massive
deforestration, will result in increased amounts of silt being washed
down into the river system, sometimes causing huge floods far
downstream as in the Himalaya-Indo-Gangetic system. In any
case, changes in snow accumulation and melt patterns will result in
the redistribution of major bodies of water, changes in the regimen
of streams and rivers and in the moisture status of soils.3
Sea-level rises are not usually directly related to mountains,
though lake and river levels are. Hydrological variation may
greatly affect energy and water supply, navigation, health and
conservation. In general, glacial melt may initially increase river
and lake levels. but in the long term drying out will be more
common. With a warming regime, there may be more hydrological
disasters. Ice- or moraine-dammed lakes may empty, as happened
near Salzburg in 1932 when a plug shifted. Wetlands may drain
when the ice floor melts. A general melting of the permafrost,
wherever it occurs, will lead to difficulties for transport and
housing, as well as facilitating slips and avalanches.
Several climatic effects on vegetation have been picked out in
global climate modelling scenarios, with many effects on moun-
tains. First, the relatively greater warming predicted in higher
latitudes will allow a northward advance of forests by about 150
kilometres per degree of temperature rise. A similar effect to this
latitude increase has been noticed in altitude too. In the European
Alps, a 1°C rise results in the tree/crop/vine line rising by about
150 metres. Thus, if temperatures rose by 3°C, the Alps would
expect a climate and vegetative regime similar to the Pyrenees
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Table 3.4: Climate change and water resources
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aimatic Annual runoff Runoff RunolT Sediment Sealevel
impact waleT (increue or frequency lelIIOIlality productio,n (ri.ina)
function decn:aac) (increue or (Icu even) (Jreater)
decn:aac)
Waler supply Increased yield Increased yield Lcsseven Increased Saline
reservoirs in humid arQI mo~ ~Iiablc distribution, lICdiment, so intrusion of
in humid an:as so ~uced loss of .torage aquifers
Reduced yield yield and and ~uced
in semi-arid Reduced yield ~Iiability yield Flooding of
arQI and generally rescrvoin
~Iiability due
to more
drought in
semi-arid areas
Hydropower Increased Increased Reduced Loss of
reservoirs generation in generation and generation and storaF and
humid arQI firm load in firm load ~ucedFn-
humid areas; cration from
Reduced ~uced firm lICdimcnt
generations in load in semi-
semi-arid areas arid an:as
Flood Increased Greater I100d Mo~ frequent Loss of Serious hazard
protcction protection frequency in noods in reservoir in low- lying
requi~ in humid an:as, humid areas; .torage; arcaa; sea
humid an:as incraasinl greater incrcallCd nooding
noodhazard wet-season deposition; frequency and
Protection in runoff in semi- increue:s of aew:rity
semi-arid Fewer wet arid an:as; Rood hazard increased
area.; need to yean in lCIlli- I100d hazard
cope with arid areas but
infrequent Rood severity
severe noods could be
greater
Environment Quality Quality Dry-season Water quality Groundwater
resources and improved in improved in water quality impai~ by contamination
water quality humid area. humid a~as affected in lCdimcntation by salt water
lCIlli-arid areas
Quality Quality Saline infiltra-
~uced in impai~ in tion into sew-
lCJI1i-arid aras semi·arid areas enlge system
Navigation Improved river Reduced risk Sedimentation Affects
and lake of drying up in ~uc:es vi"bility of
navigation in humid arcaa navigation low-lying pon
humid arcaa instllllations
Source: Commonwealth Secretariat (1989).
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today, whilst the Scandinavian mountains might resemble the
Alps, especially as the warming increases with latitude.
A second effect is a northward shift in the precipitation belts
associated with the Intertropical Convergence Zone and the
Polar Front. The effects in European mountain zones may be
further to increase precipitation in northern zones, particularly
Scandinavia, and hence further to enhance the potential for forest
and agriculture expansion. By contrast, in the South - e.g. the Alps
and Carpathians - there are forecasts of decreased precipitation,
especially on southern slopes. There will be increased dryness,
and the growth and expansion of existing forests and cultivation
will be restricted. Precipitation patterns may also be influenced
by monsoonal tendencies, with very heavy downpours on exposed
slopes leading to erosion and flooding.
A third major effect will be changes in patterns of soil-water avail-
ability. With temperature increases, the level of evapotranspiration
also rises. Any soil-water deficiencies are most likely to be felt
in the warmer, drier regions of the Mediterranean mountains,
Carpathians and south-facing slopes of the Alps.
Most discussions of climate change are concerned with the
atmosphere and warmth, but it is important to recognize the
changing climate of other ecosystems, particularly soils. Agri-
culture is dependent on this pedoclimate. The map of changing
soil climates does not necessarily mirror atmospheric changes.
Soil type, texture, structure, position, depth are also significant.
Soil humidity is a key factor, since optimum conditions require a
balance between the extremes of desiccation and waterlogging.
Although the increased dampness in some areas may be a positive
factor, levels of acidification may remove any advantage. Moun-
tain soils are not well adapted to pedoclimate changes. Fragile,
unstable and stony soils cannot easily withstand major changes in
temperature and precipitation regimes.
Both warmer and drier conditions reduce the amount of snow. A
one degree rise in average annual temperatures, combined with win-
ter drought, may reduce the duration of snow cover by 50 per cent
at 1,500 metres in the Alps, with enormous consequences for the
tourist industry. The present vegetation may be placed under stress
by these climate changes - not least because pests or disease may
survive more easily in the milder conditions. There is also a greater
risk of fire and increased mortality, especially in the overmature
stands which are common in the Central European mountains.
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If there is warming, one of the first changes will be a shift in the
situation of the ecological belts. Each belt is often defined by charac-
teristic flora but additionally has its own soils, fauna, land use
and microclimate. The whole can be regarded as an interrelated
system defined within an altitudinal belt, as shown in Figure 3.2.
These belts have an approximate relief of 700 metres. Thus belts
would roughly move up to succeed each other and the northern
Alps would take on the appearance of the southern (European)
Alps. In fact, most flora do not have such an adaptive range, so
that even if over the long term there was a succession in the short
term there is more likely to be degradation and disappearance of
species. The problem is particularly acute for trees, which cannot
migrate as quickly as herbaceous species and fauna.
Combining temperature with precipitation may mitigate some of
the apparent effects. Ozenda and Borel consider that some species
in the Pre-Alps area would rejoin their niche because by moving up
in temperature they would receive more precipitation. In the inner
alpine axis the same authors consider that the 10 per cent increase
GISS forecast would have little effect, but the decrease forecast
would be devastating, creating steppe conditions, a desiccation
enhanced by increased temperatures and evapotranspiration.
Atmosphere changes involve not only new patterns of tem-
perature and precipitation but also the direct effects of the
greenhouse gases themselves. CO2 increases may have a fertilizing
effect, but the jury is still out oil the evidence, at least as far
as forests are concerned.4 There is some indication that the
carbon fixation biochemistry of trees - the so-called C3 group
- which predominates in cool-temperature zones, both latitudi-
nally and altitudinally, may be favoured. The specific effects of
different scenarios on the forests will be discussed in the next
chapter.
Temperature rises and CO2 concentrations may favour forests,
especially in the cooler zones, but the same cannot be said for
other greenhouse gases and pollution in general. Studies of Alpine
forests have shown that over half are affected by acid pollution and
more are exposed to risks of pests and disease, as well as having a
lessened life expectancy, though the interrelationships have been
difficult to prove. The major causes of forest decline have been
described as in order of rank, ozone, acid deposition, other
gaseous pollutants (S02' NOx)' excess nitrogen deposition, and
growth-altering organic chemicals.s Lower-altitude ozone (not to
40 MOUNTAIN WORLD IN DANGER
Figure 3.2: Altitude zone schema (Alps)
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be confused with high-altitude natural ozone) can lower the rate of
photosynthesis and directly damage trees - conifer needle surfaces,
for example - weakening resistance against disease and speeding
up drying out, but also assisting in the formation of acid pollution.
Ozone has been cited as a prime cause of forest decline in the Alps
where levels of S02 have been stable or even declined in the recent
years, though low, continuous doses have been implicated.
The decline of the forests constitutes a vicious cycle. Pollution
and warming temperatures were part of the reasons why the
trees were dying. The forests were, therefore, less able to resist
diseases, pests and severe climate. For example, the huge storm
in the abnormally warm and turbulent conditions of February
1990 wreaked havoc in the Alpine forests. In the cantons of
Glarus, Grisons and the Unterwald, the windfalls were more
than 2.5 per cent of the woodstock - three times the annual
exploitation, though this was possibly an exceptionally violent
tempest. Winds of 269 km/h were recorded at Grand St Bernard.
The abnormally warm conditions and weakened trees favoured
pests, notably the bostryches, which were estimated to destroy
285,000 cubic metres (1985-6) of spruce, or 10 per cent of the
number of conifers exploited. The maps of windfall incidence and
bostryche infestation show considerable similarities.
The most recent figures on damage in the forests indicate a
worsening situation, especially in the Swiss Alps.6 There is a
rough-and-ready scale by which damage is measured according
to the amount of defoliation. Between 1985 and 1990 the number
of trees in Classes 1-4 (11-100 per cent defoliation) rose in Swiss
mountain regions from 42 to 68 per cent of all trees, whilst Classes
2-4 (26-100 per cent defoliation) nearly doubled (11-21 per cent).
The increases in affected trees was not a smooth curve; 1988 and
1989 recorded only 51 per cent and 49 per cent damage (Classes
1-4). On the plains, the number of affected trees (Classes 1-4) rose
from 27 to 48 per cent (1985-90). The higher Alps region had more
affected trees in Classes 1-4 (72 per cent) than lower mountain
regions, such as Jura (65 per cent, Southslopes (68 per cent) and
Pre-Alps (57 per cent). The high figures for the mountains and
the association with altitude are partly to be explained by the
increasing predominance of conifers with height. Conifers have
had a higher rate of damage than deciduous trees: 63 per cent
compared to 55 per cent (Classes 1-4).
The complexity of interrelationships must be emphasized. A
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recent Swiss study has placed more emphasis on climate change
than on pollution, whilst recognizing than any interpretation must
be based on extensive research (much not available) of soil,
vegetative and other physiological processes. In this study there
seemed to be some relationship between warm and dry conditions
in the summers before the deterioration was detected.7
Ozone depletion is another effect of pollution with particular
effects in mountain areas. Chlorofluorocarbons are a family of
substances widely used as refrigerants, solvents, foam-expanding
agents and aerosol propellants. When released into the atmos-
phere, they slowly diffuse to the upper stratosphere, where their
molecules are broken down by radiation, producing chlorine which
strips an atom from ozone, making it normal oxygen. Ozone
"holes" have been discovered over colder mountainous areas
like Antarctica, but some thinning has also been found over
the Alps. Ozone deficiency has a major effect because normally
the ozone layer excludes ultraviolet radiation, which can damage
living tissues. Skin cancers are more common in mountain areas
and there is also an effect on sensitive crops.
The detailed analysis of the effects on forests follows in the next
chapter, but it is important to note how different climate-change
scenarios affect the incidence and distribution of pollution. Acidi-
fication maps of Europe show a high incidence over Alpine areas.
This high incidence, attaining critical proportions, persists in future
scenarios even after emission reductions8 September 1990). Higher
temperatures may lead to more rapid chemical processes. Water-
vapour distribution is important, since it is necessary for both
acidification and deposition. Prevailing wind directions and forces
determine where depositions will occur. Mountain topography is
important too. There may be higher deposition rates on windward
slopes, in wet valleys or in those areas susceptible to acid mists.
Probably because of cloud and mist formation in certain altitude
bands (800-1200 metres in the Alps), there is also a concentration
of acid deposition and tree dieback.
Of considerable importance is the scale and speed of climate
change. The warming that is predicted even in the most con-
servative estimates to the year 2030 would make the earth hotter
than at any time in the last 120,000 years. Nor are these speeds
uniformly distributed over the earths surface. Such changes have
been accommodated much more slowly in the past, and existing
ecosystems cannot easily cope. The present rate of change is
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estimated to vary between ten and a hundred times that previously
encountered. For example, trees with light seeds may disperse only
2 kilometres per annum. It is not certain what will happen in the
ecozones between broadleaved boreal forests and tundras to the
north or conifers to the south, or in the altitudinal analogues.
In those areas where precipitation is increased, wetlands may
enlarge. Conservation experts fear that many species will not
be able to adjust to such abrupt changes and may become
threatened.
On the other hand, most studies have been carried out latitu-
dinally rather than altitudinally. Vertical dissemination is much
easier than horizontal, and the common mountain winds may help.
Trees with winged seeds (maples, ashes) can spread over several
hundred metres' altitude in a season. Modern silvicultural tech-
niques may also assist. Those species whose spread is vegetative
are in a different category, and in any case competition will be
accentuated.
Key economic sectors of mountain activities will also be affected
by the "business as usual" scenario. First, in mountain agriculture
the number of growing days can be expected to increase at
altitude, so improving the food situation, especially for those
mountain communities dependent on subsistence - an effect
possibly enhanced by CO2 stimulation. Although poor mountain
communities are mainly to be found in the Third World, some
poor communities in the European mountains would also benefit
- in Eastern Europe, for example. New pests may be introduced
with warming, especially where winter freezing does not reduce
their numbers. As precipitation is likely to come in more frequent
bursts, erosion and avalanche risks will be increased. Not all
regions, of course, are predicted to have precipitation increases.
For example, the Mediterranean mountains and adret slopes of the
Alps may well experience summer drought, and yields have been
predicted to fall by as much as 15 per cent.
The whole pattern of crops and fruits may change in reaction to
small but critical climate changes. For example, many fruit trees
depend on winter chilling to initiate or accelerate the flowering
process. The range of other crops may be restrained by the number
of frost-free days. Equally important are the number of days at
wilting point - when all the available water capacity in the soil
for plant growth is depleted. Wind and light conditions require
adaptation. All this may necessitate a complete relocation of
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horticultural and arboricultural practices. There will be a major
effect on conservation.
First, in the mountain zones of Europe there are a number of
altitude zones, each with its own specifically adapted and often
threatened fauna and flora (see Figure 3.2).
On the summits is the nival zone, basically a zone of permanent
snows. In the Alps, this zone extends at present from 2,500 to
4,000 metres altitude. Contrary to the popular view, this zone is
rich in wildlife; important species are lichens, glacial ranunclus,
the heresian primrose, the brown and orange mountain butterfly,
the snow finch, the royal eagle, the glacial flea - to name only
a few. Many nival species are already threatened. If the snow
and freezing limit were to shift upward by 700-1,000 metres
(Le. +3°C temperature rise) the nival zone would practically
disappear, being confined in summer to small regions on the
Mont Blanc massif. The median height of the Alps summits is
around 2,000 metres, barely enough to attract winter snow for
more than a month or two, let alone year-round cover. Certainly
some species can migrate (notably birds), but the pressure of
population concentrations will lead to increased species decline
and further loss.
Below the present nival level, between 1,800 and 2,800 metres,
is the Alpine zone proper. This zone, usually defined as having a
growing season of fewer than 90 days, is characterized by small
plants and grasses that can grow rapidly in the short season.
The stunted herbaceous willow, the yellow saxifrage and the
edelweiss are typical, but there is an abundance of fauna - the
alpine ptarmigan, the black salamander, the Apollo butterfly, the
viviparous lizard, the snow campagnol, the marmoUe, the Siberian
cricket, etc. Many of these species have already suffered from
human incursions into the alpine zone - not only high altitude
ski resorts but also pollution. Perhaps because this region has
frequent mists and cloud, there are high deposition rates of toxic
substances. Some plants concentrate toxins. The Chernobyl effects
were very obvious, and still persist in this zone. Some of the fauna
- the black salamander, for example - are as sensitive an indicator
of dangerous thresholds as canaries used to be down the mines.
Like the nival zone, the alpine area will become compressed
with climate change. A 700-1,000 metre rise in the limit would
eliminate the zone in many mountains, especially as the "combat"
and forest zones below push upward. Some species may be able
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to migrate, but adaptation is difficult because these zones are
distinguished not only vertically but also horizontally by the
dissection of the mountains into valleys. Given the different
precipitation patterns, the alpine zone will be at different levels
on the adret and ubac slopes. The wetter ubac slopes favour forests
to higher levels (Figure 3.3). As precipitation levels are likely to
increase on the northern slopes in the Alps, there is likely to be
more encroachment on the alpine zone.
Figure 3.3: Aspect and vegetation
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According to Ozenda and Borel, the higher ranges of tempera-
ture increase estimates (e.g. 3.8°C ) would virtually eliminate the
alpine and nival zones from the Central and Southern European
ranges. Some remnants may remain in the Pyrenees, and areas
in the Alps would be greatly reduced. The alpine zone might
disappear completely from the Western Alps (south of Pelveux),
the Dolomites, the Eastern Alps and east of the Hohe Tauern.
Two zones only would remain: the Mount Blanc massif and the
East Tyrol - at best 25 per cent of the existing nival and Alpine
zones. With this disappearance of the alpine and nival zones, at
least 150 vegetative species would be threatened or disappear. The
fauna would be less affected in terms of immediate mobility, and
already there are studies of ibex or migrating birds adapting.
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But this fauna is, of course, dependent on the vegetation, which
would either disappear or for which there would be increased
competition.
If the temperature rises dramatically and precipitation decreases,
a progression of Mediterranean ecosystems may be expected.
Such an ecosystem is characterized by a shrubby-type vegetation
(maquis). The temperature would have a high annual mean (+13°C),
absence of winter frosts, high aridity (especially in summer), and
the limit for olive cultivation may reach Aosta.
Below the alpine zone are the regions where the forests begin,
often divided into two subzones: the sub-alpine, at present 1,200
to 2,000 metres and the mountain or forest zone 600 to 1,200
metres. Conifers dominate in this zone; also to be found are deer,
famous birds such as the tetras, rhododendrons, the lynx, and
snakes. In many parts of the Alps, meadows are heavily utilized
for transhumant dairy agriculture as well as for ski lifts.
It is presumed that the upper-altitude levels of the forest will
increase by as much as 1,000 metres. If the nival and alpine zones
are losers in conservation terms, the forest zone is in one sense a
winner. There are, however, some cautionary notes to be sounded.
There is a lag in natural regenerative response to temperature
rises. If, as seems likely in much of the Alps, there is a decline
in precipitation as well as a rise in evapotranspiration, especially
in the growing season, there will be a drying out of forests and
a greater susceptibility to disease. Historical studies derived from
tree-ring analysis have shown that the present is a time of a lesser
tree-growth cycle. Forest dieback may be accentuated. Given the
expectation that it will be difficult to control pollution emissions,
the forests may decline unless there are vigorous programmes of
replanting with the most resistant species.
Below the forest zone are the valleys, usually marked by the
limits of the vine on adret slopes which in former times rose to
1,200 metres in sheltered parts of the Valais. These abandoned
vineyards may again be viable, but the limits and types of
cultivation will be determined by social, economic and political
factors rather than climatic. The political future for many countries
involves internationalization and rationalization of agriculture and
other industries, with a reduction of Government subsidies. This
would not favour any expansion of mountain activities, which are
in many respects marginal and peripheral.
There may, however, be counter-trends, at least in some regions.
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Countries such as Switzerland have been reluctant to enter into
international agreements and may favour national autarchy. Here
there is strong pressure from peasant groups to continue subsidies.
This policy could favour mountain farmers, who would have to
supply most of the national market with dairy products, cereals,
fruits, wines, etc. What is more, Europe's "green wave" may lead
more people to decide to go and live in the mountains and may also
mean an increased demand for "organic" mountain products.
Many mountain communities are above the "fog" line: in the
sun in winter when the plains cities have cold anticyclonic smog.
The smog factor is increasing as more cars come into the cities.
By contrast, more mountain towns restrict traffic on the model
of Zermatt. Telecommuting may lead to a decentralization of
work. Lighter serviCe industries are possible in the mountains,
and already centres such as Davos are attracting many businesses.
The "grey" revolution whereby the majority of the population
are ageing will also favour an increase in the use of mountains
for retirement and health care, especially in the sunny, warm
mid-altitudes. Traditional health stations such as Leysin may
experience a renaissance.
High-altitude stations, although they have less snow, may capi-
talize on the search for the sun amongst tourists and residents,
especially as tropical and marine tourism may decline with growing
pollution, health hazards and political instabilities. The advent of
cultural tourism, with musical events and artistic exhibitions and
the rediscovery of Alpine history, may favour a growth rather
than a decline in visitors. Green ideas will stimulate walking and
nature studies. Soft tourist activities like cross-country skiing may
also expand, with a heavy concentration on the permanent snows
of the glaciers.
Traditional "snow-related" activities are bound to decline. The
industry depends on an adequate snow cover for four or more
months. For Alpine skiing a minimum of a metre is desirable.
Small meterological changes may make all the difference. If
December is warm, there may not be a snow base for any
later precipitation to settle on. In February it is often cold but
dry. In addition to tourism, a number of specific socioeconomic
elements with many knock-on effects have been identified in the
reports of IPCC Working Group 2 (1990). This group concluded
that "projected changes in climate will dramatically reduce the
areal extent and volume of the terrestrial cryosphere". In general
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this Working Group plumped for a higher range of temperature
increases than Working Group 1.
First, the global climate models indicate a major decrease in
mid-latitudes of the extent and volume of snow cover. This results
in a reduction in the albedo effect and therefore enhanced warm-
ing. The loss of snow cover threatens plants (including valuable
crops) sheltering under the snow, and hibernating animals. There
would probably be much less water available for drinking and
irrigation as well as for hydropower and waste management. In
Europe, the Alps and the Caucasus have been singled out as
especially sensitive - as have the plains which depend on mountain
melt. The discharge in a river such as the Rhine has a major origin
(about 50 per cent) in the Alpine headwaters. Transport is also
affected where, for example, snow roads may become impassable
when there is only mud.
Ice sheets and glaciers are already melting in mid-latitude,
though the increased precipitation in parts of Eurasia (East of
the Urals) may lead to an equilibrium. In the last hundred years,
the Alpine glaciers have lost about a third of their extent. The
prediction in Austria is that if there is a 3°C rise in temperature
by 2050, there will be an additional 50 per cent reduction in
glacier size. The Soviet Arctic glaciers may disappear in 150-250
years. The increased flow from glaciers will help hydro-electricity
generation, or at least offset any decline in precipitation at first,
but shortage of meltwater will become a severe problem later.
A more dangerous consequence of melting may be the instability
created in the debris zone on the surface of mountains, leading
to catastrophic rock slides as well as avalanches burying roads,
houses and disrupting water supplies. In addition, very heavy
rains and snows associated with climate change lead to floods and
avalanches. The poleward movement of the tropical convergence
zone and monsoon conditions increases the likelihood of severe
storms, erosion and flooding, which has already been seen in the
Alps and Caucasus. Permafrost regions in the northern mountains,
especially in valley bottoms and intramontane basins, may be
especially vulnerable to melting, releasing methane and to a lesser
extent CO2 (further enhancing the greenhouse effect), eroding
the soil, creating ponding (melting of top layer) and landslides -
all affecting the integrity of transport and building systems. The
effect of global warming may be very dramatic in the permafrost
zone. According to Soviet studies, the southern boundary of the
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Russian permafrost may move 500-700 kilometres north with a 2°C
temperature rise.
Catastrophic events may be linked with climate change, espe-
cially when changes are sudden. In the Middle Ages the cold
conditions of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries led to poor
harvests, malnutrition, lowered immunity and less resistance to
devastating plague. Very heavy rainfalls and snowfalls in our
time may put extra pressure on engineering facilities, particularly
dams. When these dams have been weakened by earthquakes
or "concrete cancer" (the deterioration of building materials) a
catastrophic situation may exist. Earthquakes may be a particularly
dangerous triggering factor, leading to breaches in dam walls or
leaks from nuclear power plants. The European mountains are
part of the Alpine-Himalayas seismic belt, which is still active.
Even Geneva is classified as a medium-risk zone. In the fourteenth
century, the Alpine region saw one of the ten greatest known
earthquakes when all the houses and churches fell down. A recent
newspaper article presented the following scenario:
It is two minutes to seven on the evening of Saturday 12 November in
the year? An earthquake of 7.1 on the Richter scale strikes the Valley
of Herens for 11 seconds. The violence of the shock ruptures
the Grande Dixence, the largest dam in Switzerland, lelling loose
400 million cubic metres of water. At this period of the year the
accumulation lake is at its maximum level. The town of Sion, only
20 kms away as the crow flies, is wiped from the map in a gigantic
tidal wave.9
The health effects of pollution and climate change are also
significant and have been documented by the World Health
Organization. In a celebrated incident in 1990, WHO presented
to a UN meeting a confidential document concerned with the
long-range transport of pollution which was leaked to the press
by the NGO Greenpeace. lO The main effects concerned a lessened
life expectancy (ten years) if pollution levels were to continue and
increased morbidity, especially cancers, pulmonary and cardiovas-
cular ailments. There are data showing how increased temperature
greatly raises risks of strokes. Some of these effects are accentu-
ated at altitude. For example, ozone concentrations are higher
at altitude and may reach dangerous proportions in the summer,
inducing cancers. In winter toxic fogs may settle in valley bottoms,
worsening heart and respiratory conditions. Heavy metals may
deposit in the soil, entering the food chain (see Figure 3.4).
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The degree of effect is also related to the country or region's
socioeconomic status. As a general rule, poorer countries or
regions are less able to withstand disadvantageous climate change.
It is possible to construct a matrix (see Figure 3.5) plotting moun-
tains by their socioeconomic status and possible climate-change
scenario. This matrix, however, should be taken as a very rough
guide only. Many mountain regions as defined in the table cover
several types of socioeconomic systems. The Alps, for example,
have had - historically at least - three types: socialist (Slovenian
Alps) heavily subsidized market entities: (EEC - French, Italian,
German Alps) and somewhat less subsidized cantonallcommunal
systems (Swiss, Austrian Alps). This, and the patchwork of local
laws, creates much variation not only in living standards but also in
funds available for preventive or protective measures to cope with
climate change.
This variation may be expected to continue and increase in the
future as the socialist countries swing over to a market system and
more and more functions are decentralized. Mountain regions in
many parts of Europe are asserting ancient independent claims.
Ethnic loyalties are strong in mountain regions. Conversely to this
centripetal force, there are centrifugal movements uniting local
governments across national boundaries, as in the Alpe Adria
grouping in the Eastern Alps and Alpe Arge in the Western Alps.
Most of what has been said so far is derived from computer
modelling of probable global changes. These models are only as
good as the material that is fed into them: GIGO - garbage (or
guesses) in and garbage (or gospel) out. Much of the data fed
in are uncertain, or incomplete. Nor are the computer models
finely enough grained, or dynamic enough, to accommodate to the
fast-changing situation of mountains. Another source is analogy
- either with past warm or cold periods, or spatially with other
regions.l.1
In the present interglacial, about six thousand years ago, there
was the so-called Hypsithermal when temperatures were about
1.5°C higher than the period 1950-79. Also in the Middle Ages
between about 900 and 1050, there was a warm period - the
Medieval Optimum, probably about 1°C higher than the 1950-80
period.
The Medieval Optimum is the best known. Forests extended
much farther north and higher on the mountains than they do
now. Iceland and Greenland were able to be settled. Vineyards
52 MOUNTAIN WORLD IN DANGER
Figure 3.5: Climate change and socioeconomic factors in European mountains
HOTfER
RICHER (+i C)
Fenno-Swedish
Arctic •
Russian •
Arctic
COOLER
(with x2 C02) (0· C)
Norway • Alps 0
Scottish •
Highlands
Iberia 0
Pyreenees 0
Apennines 0
Carpathians 0
Balkans 0
Caucasus •
Urals •
Siberian •
Mountains
POORER '-- ---'
• = precipitation increase
o = precipitation decrease
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flourished in England. There was considerable prosperity and a
healthy population following a series of good harvests. Historians
have called this period the Dark Ages because the empires had
been eclipsed, but at the grass roots there was much independence,
not least in mountain communities. The bully boys of the great
powers were away in the Crusades. It is probably no accident
that in the twelfth century there was an independence movement
in the Alps, the revolt of William Tell, and the establishment
of a Helvetic Confederation. By the thirteenth century, the
climate had cooled off. There was a series of bad harvests, the
population became malnourished, and the Black Death swept over
Europe.
Table 3.5: CO:z and palaeoclimate
Palaeoclimatic: warm oDe Assumed COl Analoguc: yc:ar
phases c:ontent (ppm)
(nASA)
Medieval warm
phase (1,000 yrs ago) + 1.0 385-430 2000 (380)1
Holocene warm
phase (6,000 yrs ago) +1.5 420-490
Eem interglacial +2.0 460-555 2025 (420)
(120,000 yrs ago) +2.5 500-610
Ice-free Arctic Ocean
(12-2.5xI06 yrs ago) +4.0 63a-880 2050 (560)
Brackets refer to estimates made by Soviet scientists.
Sources: Flohn, Possible Climatic Consequences of a Man-made Global
Warming (Laxenburg: IIASA, 1980).
Climate historians such as Hermann Flohn (see Table 3.5), have
interpreted the Medieval Optimum as a shift to the north of the
main storm path of rain and cyclonic weather, leaving much of
Central Europe under the influence of persistent anticyclonic
weather. 12 In many areas there were droughts, but their effect
was significant only on food production in the Mediterranean
mountains. If the Medieval Optimum is analogous to the present,
the warm phase would continue at present levels for one or
two hundred years, even with little human intervention. If the
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greenhouse effect produced higher temperatures (+4°q, the only
analogy would be the last interglacial, when the sea level was so
high as to make Scandinavia an island and melt all the Arctic ice.
This warm, wet world eventually cooled off when the vast amounts
of precipitation fell as snow.
By delving deeper into the historical record, it is possible to find
analogies of greater warming. Table 3.5 summarizes some of the
analogues, both from the last interglacial and earlier. Fossil rec-
ords for the Pliocene show that the first hominids emerged in this
period. The Gribbins have argued that this stage of evolution was
triggered by a deteriorating climate.J3 In their thesis, the arrival
of the ice stimulated our ancestors to expand their intelligence
beyond that of other creatures. Very much warmer conditions,
when tropical jungles spread over London, were found much
earlier, though there is no certainty about CO2 levels then. There
are traces of ice even from the Miocene, a little over three million
years ago. There is no certainty about the cause of the change in
the climate. The Gribbins have said that it was possibly the jostling
of continents in northern latitudes which cut off the flow of warm
water into Arctic regions, so allowing the skin of that ocean to
freeze over and thus renect heat back to space. The evidence seems
to indicate a situation where ice was expanding, but temperatures
were higher than they are today in Europe, with more precipitation
and forests. The Ice Age proper did not begin until the Pleistocene,
1.8 million years ago, when there was also an unexplained reversal
in the earths magnetic field.
The contemporary situation is said to be rich in surprises. Moun-
tain environments are especially prone to sudden unexpected
changes in weather, or unforeseen events such as earthquakes or
avalanches. When IPCC Working Group 1 prepared its scientific
assessment, many of the mountain and cryosphere factors were
relegated to the surprise box. So, the possibility of huge chips of ice
breaking off the Antarctic continent, causing a 6 metre sea-level
rise, was largely discounted, though it was documented by satellite
pictures. Surprises may be human as much as physical. Wars and
revolutions are sudden events with enormous consequences. King
Hussein argued at the Second World Climate Conference that a
Gulf War, because of extensive oil-field fires, would generate a
hundred times more carbon emissions over that region than the
upper limits of present scenarios. Sadly, his prediction, which
seemed sensationalist at the time, came true in 1991 when the
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Gulf environment was all but destroyed by oil slicks, black rain
and carpet bombing. One major significance of surprises is that
spirals of feedbacks and reactions are set in motion. Unexpected
snowfalls or long snow seasons may trigger a vicious circle of poor
harvests, malnutrition and bad health, as well as continuing bad
weather.
The cryosphere is the most sensitive to climate change of all
ecosystems, as well as the most influential.14 Even the monsoonal
rains of India have been correlated inversely with the great extent
of the Eurasian snow cover. 1S Over 90 per cent of the earth's
freshwater store is in ice, mostly in Antarctica. Ice is a most
valuable natural resource, even in such remote places. There are
serious studies currently under way of towing Antarctic ice blocks
to irrigate the Middle Eastern deserts. 16
How quickly might the ice melt? There are predictions that there
will be no Alpine glaciers in Europe in a hundred years, given
the present c1imate.l7 Warming may cause ice surges, leading to
sudden calving of polar ice sheets. Sea levels would be raised
rapidly and disastrously, and the amount of ice in the ocean might
increase the albedo effect. As the ice melted, more moisture would
be released and there would be a sudden new ice age, even without
increases in cloud cover.
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Chapter 4
Climate Change and Mountain Forests
The changes in climate illustrated in previous chapters are expected
to affect a wide spectrum of forest processes, forest management
operations and, indirectly, socioeconomic development. Today,
only a small fraction of the total range of forest responses
to climate change is under investigation. We therefore have
limited knowledge about the possible negative and positive effects,
especially in mountainous areas.
Research today on effects of climate change on forests is concen-
trated within the areas of growth and forest boundaries. However,
even here we face serious problems, the fundamental one being
that there is presently no one in the field of ecological theory
who can successfully predict the outcome of climate change at any
specified time or place. We lack cohesive, tested theories to predict
both the behaviour of forest ecosystems in changing environmental
situations and the behaviour of species along boundaries of geo-
graphic zones. l
There are two possible effects on forests of a COz increase and
climatic warming. First, there is the direct effect of COz on plant
growth. Increases in atmospheric COz could expand the net photo-
synthesis, resulting in tremendous growth increases. Greenhouse
experiments have shown that enhanced COz definitely affects
woody seedling growth. Studies carried out in Finland show that
a one per cent increase in the atmospheric CO2 level precipitates
an increase of 1.3-3.6 per cent in the basal area of forests. z On the
other hand, no effects on the growth of established forest stands
due to increased COz levels were found in Sweden) It is likely
that climate change can disturb the photosynthetic potential of
mature trees and reduce the uptake of atmospheric COz' Growth
losses with enhanced atmospheric COz by mature trees have been
demonstrated, and it was found that the photosynthetic capacity
tended to decline at increased COz concentrations.4 The same
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Table 4.1: Forest processes influenced by climate change
Regeneration of forests
Insufficient restocking
Land availability and quality
Seedling production
Species selection
Site preparation
Planting
Seedling establishment and
survival
Genetics and resistance
Growth
CO2 enhancement
Temperature/precipitation
relations
Soil organic matter and nutrient
dynamics
Soil water
Wood
Wood characteristics (density,
width of tree ring, chemistry
composition)
Forest boundaries
Tree-line
Grassland/wetland borders
Agricultural displacement
Forest depletion
by fire
insects
diseases
decline and dieback
windstorm
icing/winterkill/frost
flooding/landslides
Forest harvesting and
transportation
transportability of harvesting
machines
landslides/flooding
fire hazard
road/water transportation
Wood storage
quality changes in storage
Forest management
change of silviculture
Socio-economic consequences
on forest sector and society
Source: Duinker, P. N., Antonovsky, M. Va. and Solomon, A. M.,
Impacts 0/ changes in climate and atmospheric chemistry on northern/orest
ecosystems and their boundaries: Research Directions. Working Paper WP-
89-14. (Laxenburg, Austria: IIASA, 1989).
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occurred with stomatal conductance. Decreased growth can cause
the death of trees.
A third possibility would be that different tree species acclim-
atize to higher CO2 at different rates. Some species can acclimatize
smoothly by changed physiological mechanisms; others will react
dramatically. There are indications that forests close to growth
boundaries may be the first to respond to changing CO2 and
climate. Such acclimatization indicates that significant changes in
boreal or deciduous forest biomass may not be detectable during
the first few decades of environmental changes. However, future
shifts in forest biomass may show a relative loss of seedlings and
saplings compared to mature trees. It has been suggested that a
fertilizing effect of increased CO2 concentrations is more likely to
take place in open forest stands with moderate climatic stress.s The
increased CO2 concentrations might affect the transpiration and
gas exchange, increasing the sensitivity of the forest community
structure.6
Temperature and soil moisture changes are also likely to have a
direct effect on physiological mechanisms. This is especially true
of areas where these two factors restrict growth today, such as
the boreal forests of North America, the Nordic countries and
the USSR, and mountainous areas. It is argued, however, that
there will be no physiological effects of increased temperature
and soil moisture, unless the degree of mineralization increases
proportionately. (This statement is based on conditions in Swe-
den.7) Nutrient limitation and suboptimal climate conditions could
limit the extent and rate of reaction by vegetation to all three
factors: CO2 increase, temperature rise and greater precipitation.
Opinions differ as to the changed rate of mineralization due to
climate change. Climate change may cause a decline in litter
quality which could slow down the mineralization rates. This
would also slow down forest productivity and create a general
decline.8 Alternatively, the rate of nutrient supply in mineral soils
could be accelerated by increased temperature. A temperature rise
from 14°C to 17°C could increase the rate of litter breakdown by
a third.9
Special analyses of the possible effects of climate change have
been made in Finland. lO The growth rate for pine and birch will
increase under Scandanavian conditions within the first rotation
period. Norway spruce growth response seems to be fairly neu-
tral. The long-run productivity and standing crop of trees could
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decrease due to enhanced decomposition of litter and humus.
On the basis of the Finnish study, it is concluded that the
climate change will accelerate the death rate of trees, since the
site capacity will be exceeded earlier than it is today. Trees will
also mature in a shorter period of time, and annual growth rhythm
will be altered. The greatest positive growth changes are projected
in the maritime northern part of Europe, whereas growth will level
off in the southern areas. l1
Climate warming is associated with extreme climatic variability
of temperature and precipitation. This can cause damage and
death to trees and the other components of the forest ecosystem
- directly or through the secondary action of pathogens or fire. 12
There is also the risk of increased forest decline due to adoption
problems of old genetic strains to climate warming. Not much is
known about ecosystematic mechanisms. There are some indica-
tions that climate change may encourage the growth of pioneer
trees and kill a large number of slow-growing late-successional
trees. The disturbance of the annual growth rhythm will make the
future structure of forest ecosystems uncertain. Insects, pathogens,
diseases and their vectorS have their own - often complicated -
life-cycles which depend on weather and climatic events in a
manner different from that of most trees. Due to climate change,
the activities of microbial pathogens and insects will be altered with
unknown effects, positive or negative,l3
The greatest effect of warming on forests is to be expected at
the high latitudes. Some observers predict a northerly expansion of
forests into previous unforested areas in this region; others argue
that this will probably not OCCUr. 14 Forests require centuries to
develop, especially in areas with thin soil and a scarce supply
of nutrients. The predicted climate change is rapid and will not
offer the necessary conditions for forests to develop on new land
or remain for long periods.
At southern latitudes, forest land is estimated to lose ground to
non-forest vegetation; hence the total production of forest bio-
mass for Europe could take one of the following directions: status
quo, decline or expansion. Preliminary results also indicate that
rates of migration would be much lower than in the past, due to a
limited supply of seeds. This could result in a rapid loss of species
from landscapes in the absence of massive reforestation programs.
One of the first problems one encounters when trying to assess
the impact of climate change on natural vegetation in Europe is the
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lack of comprehensive vegetation information. In addition, what is
known about the links between climate, ecosystematic mechanisms
and human management/influence is not well documented from a
scientific point of view. There is a major lack of understanding
of the influences of ecophysiological mechanisms. In order to
improve knowledge in these fields, IIASA's Biosphere Project lS
has developed a Global Vegetation Model which includes a global
database on vegetation and climate. The aim of the model is to
simulate the effects of climate change on interactions between
climate, soil and vegetation. The ecophysiological processes in
the model are under development and, for the moment, rather
simple. The model merely takes into account limits for the
following parameters: precipitation, temperature of the coldest
month, temperature sum (base 500C), temperature sum (base O°C),
temperature of the warmest month and moisture index based
on Priestley and Taylor's potential evapotranspiration ratio. 16
The model works on a grid size of 0.5 longitude, so for the
moment, it lacks crucial information on components such as
the important nutrient and carbon cycle, soil moisture, and the
detailed physiological effects of climate change,17
Five different General Circulation Model (GCM) predictions
have been made or linked to the Global Vegetation Model to
estimate the global climatic response to a doubling of CO2:
GFDL: Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory of NOAA,
Princeton (Wetherald and Manabe 1986, Manabe
and Wetherald 1987).
GFDL-Flux: Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory - ocean
heat flux version (Manabe and Wetherald 1987,
Jenne 1989).
GISS: Goddard Institute for Space Studies NASA, Col-
umbia (Hansen et al. 1983)
OSU: Oregon State University, Corvallis (Schlesinger and
Zhao 1989)
UKMO: United Kingdom Meteorological Office (Mitchell
1983, Wilson and Mitchell 1987)
Climatic output from these GCM projections has been used as
input for the IIASA Global Vegetation Change Model. Special
maps have been produced for aggregated biomes for Europe as
a whole and for areas within Europe with an elevation level
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above 700 metres and 900 metres respectively.i8 It is important
to remember that small-scale physical processes are not taken into
account in the GCM models. This is an important obstacle for
mountainous regions, where ecosystems are small-scale and local
climate variations are great.19
The GFDL-Flux scenario generates a quite different effect
pattern on the vegetation from the other scenarios. In this case
the ocean heat flux is statistically incorporated into the GCM
model. In the other models, the oceans are represented by
a shallow ocean. This means that predetermined sea-surface
temperatures are used to regulate the atmospheric circulation.
Many uncertainties arise from projections in the GCMs. If oceans
are included, the uncertainties will increase. There is a general
scientific consensus that it will take about ten years of research
to bring the ocean models within today's standard of the General
Circulation Models.
The other four scenarios outline how vegetation change may
develop as a result of the greenhouse effect in similar ways. The
overall trends may be summarized as follows:
• Forest tundra and boreal forests will probably be the veget-
ation systems in Europe most affected by climate change in
terms of area.
• At northern latitudes there will probably be a dominance of
temperate deciduous and cool mixed forests, instead of boreal
and cool conifer forests.
• In the eastern part of continental Europe, transfer from cool
mixed to temperate deciduous forests is foreseen.
• In mountainous areas of continental Europe most of the
tundra will be replaced by boreal forests, the former boreal
forest and mixed cool forests will be replaced by cool mixed
and temperate deciduous.
• At the southern latitudes of Europe, a strong increase in scrub
and warm grass/shrub areas is plausible.
• In the mountains at southern latitudes, former cool conifer
and boreal forests will be replaced by cool mixed and temp-
erate deciduous forests.
Many further studies of the effects of climate change on the
vegetation of Europe's mountains have been carried out. What
follows is a brief survey of the findings of some of these studies.
66 MOUNTAIN WORLD IN DANGER
Climate change would involve an upward transition of the vege-
tation belts. Each existing vegetation belt will take the place of
the one immediately preceding it. Vegetation and fauna above
the timber line would recede. The flora is estimated to be
impoverished. Many of the biotopes would disappear or become
fragmented, endangering rare species and making regeneration of
vegetation more difficult. This study concludes that it will take
several centuries for the forest systems in the alpine regions to
stabilize after climate change.2o
In the long term, higher regions will be more affected than lower
regions by increased CO2 concentrations and increased tempera-
tures. Indirect effects appear to be of much more importance than
direct effects for plant processes. The most important factor seems
to be the increasing length of the snow-free period. The probable
effect will be partial replacement of evergreen dwarf shrubs by
deciduous.21
In a study of the responses of alpine forest ecosystems to various
environmental changes using simulation models, the most striking
response to CO2 increase and climate change occurred at extreme
climatic sites - Le. sites near and above the upper timber line - and
on dry sites. As a result of increased temperature, temperature-
sensitive trees invaded the high montane sites.22
In another study using model simulations (but underlining
their strong limitations) the following warnings about effects of
increased CO2 in mountainous regions were stressed:
• a drastic biomass reduction may take place on xeric sites in all
altitudinal belts due to increased water stress;
• a significant increase in biomass production may occur on
intermediate and mesic sites in the montane, sub-alpine and
alpine belt;
• an invasion of deciduous species into existing montane and
sub-alpine belts is foreseen;
• a dieback of various coniferous species is foreseen in montane
and sub-alpine regions. These species will be replaced by
warm-temperate species;
• a migration of coniferous species to high-elevation sites in the
alpine belt is foreseen.23
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The tundra ecosystem in Fennoscandia could completely disappear
as a result of climate change. Increased temperature could improve
tree growth in (sub)-Arctic and (sub)-alpine zones. Deciduous
trees may invade the boreal zone, and coniferous species may
move into (sub)-alpine areas.24
Various plants from the (sub)-Arctic and (sub)-alpine zones
will be among the losers in the event of a climatic change,
because plants in these regions have adapted to a more constant
environment, have a long life expectancy, live in more constant
numbers and have relatively low migration ability.25
The potential vertical shift of vegetation belts in European
mountains could be in the range of 300-700 metres.26 Ongoing
severe growth declines and dieback of silver fir in the Vosges
mountains in France is due to the change in climate.27
Although the scientific background material is limited, the general
conclusion must be that the mountainous forests of Europe are
under severe threat from the predicted climatic changes. The
mountain forests are one of the big losers of global vegetation
in this changing situation.
The effect on individual species must also be considered. A
change in permafrost distributions, shifting nutrient dynamics,
expansion of heat-unit accumulation with allendant increases in
the length of the growing season, decreased snow persistence
periods and loss of winter temperature severity may all contribute
to endangering species.28 Many tree species may benefit from
a warming of up to approximately 1°C, but warming above
that temperature may result in declined growth and dieback.
Warm temperatures can be harmful to popubtions used to cooler
conditions. The net CO2 influx may be slow on warm and dry
days; the phenology may be disrupted; the chilling requirement
may not be met; the trees will be unable to handle periods of
drought and high temperatures. A temperature increase of 2-3°C
does not guarantee an earlier budburst during the spring because
there has been decreased chilling and failure to release winter
dormancy.19
In a study of the historical long-term migrations of beech (Fagus)
in Europe and North America, the conclusion was that climatic
change has been the primary factor controlling migrations and
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abundance of beech for these two continents. A study of historical
migrations of West European oaks led to a similar conclusion.3D
The life-cycles of different species must be in harmony with
the changed weather patterns. Sensitive stages of most species'
life-cycles - such as flower production, pollination, seed set, seed
germination and seedling establishment - are disturbed by climate
change.31 Losses caused by insects and disease will probably be
the first observed effects of climate change in forests. Temperature
is the most important climatic factor regulating most mountain
insects, and a higher temperature could result in an increased
number of insect generations per year. Just one more insect
generation could have dramatically increased effects. Insects are
better able to adapt to changed climate than trees, and in the
short run will have the advantage. Pathogens are even more
active than insects under warmer conditions, and increased activity
could result in declining forests.32 Storms and fires constitute
another threat to forests, and are likely to increase with climate
change. Their frequency, sequence and distribution will change
and become more difficult to predict. Forest fire hazards depend
on the amount of dead biological material in the forests, and its
water content. With higher temperatures and less precipitation,
the probabilities of forest fires will rise. An increased windfall rate
is also expected.33
The biological diversity of the world will be strongly affected,
too. Climate may alter population sizes, the distribution of species,
the composition of species' habitats and ecosystems, and their geo-
graphical extent. It may also accelerate the extinction of different
species. Ecosystems and their life communities which are limited
to restricted areas are more sensitive to climate change than those
which occupy large, undisturbed areas. This also means that in
these restricted areas the biodiversity is under an increased threat.
The following groups of ecosystems are thought to be especially
threatened :34
peripheral populations
genetically impoverished species
specialized species
animals
montane and alpine communities
Arctic communities.
There is special concern about mountainous areas. Mountain
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ecosystems occupy small areas, have smaller populations and will
be more vulnerable than other ecosystems to genetic and environ-
mental pressures.35 Most of the world's biodiversity is located in
small areas which will probably be the most affected by climatic
change. In most cases, these restricted areas are surrounded by
urban landscapes that many species cannot cross.36 Protected areas
and reserves in the mountainous areas are a case in point. They are
located close to the margin, making them even more sensitive to
climate change. Different policies for the selection and manage-
ment of these zones in the future have been proposed. A relocation
of the reserves, taking into account the expected effects of climate
change and the establishment of new reserves containing a broader
ecological variability, has been recommended. This is necessary to
minimize future potential losses of species and ecosystems.37
There is a strong link between the numbers of species in all
ecosystems and the total level of the systems' evapotranspiration.
The climate scenarios presented above show that there will be
significant changes in evapotranspiration rates, which may lead
to a decline of the ecosystems. This decline will disturb the
relation between climate and biodiversity. Most of the current
discussions about biodiversity centre on the number of species,
but there is considerably more involved than this. A species'
existence depends on other species. Physiognomic diversity and
genetic diversity are critically important, and both are expected to
be affected by climate change.38
The changing CO2 rate in the troposphere is thought to be the
most fundamental and important factor in the evolution of plant
and animal life. The natural evolution of plants and animals has
so far followed the composition of the atmosphere, so increased
CO2 concentrations raise concerns about effects on biological
evolution as a whole.39 Yet predicting the microevolutionary
consequences of climate change is a complex matter, with so
many gaps in understanding that "for even a single species the
problem is dauntingly complex".4o
The future location of vegetation belts is also dependent on
animals' response to climate change. At present we have very lim-
ited understanding of the complicated interactions between plants,
animals and environment. Climate change will not only alter
vegetation but will also disturb the animals inhabiting the present
vegetation zones, so that the energetics and reproduction possibil-
ities of these animal populations will be affected too. It is not
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certain that the animals will follow the shift of vegetation, owing
to other biotic factors.
Wildlife has biological, social and economic value. The IPCC
(1990) emphasizes that "wildlife have recreational and aesthetic value
as well as contributing to the preservation of aboriginal lifestyles".
In Europe, forestry wildlife contribute to the production of meat,
fur, recreation and tourism. Wildlife is the basis for much of the
tourism and recreational industry in Europe's mountains. Since the
mountain ecosystems in Europe will suffer seriously from climate
change, the wildlife in these regions will probably be strongly
affected too. There are few quantitative estimates of the effects
of climate change upon mountain wildlife. A study in the US Great
Basin mountains shows that in the event of a temperature increase
of 3°C this region will probably lose 44 per cent of the mammal
species, 23 per cent of butterfly species and roughly 20 per cent of
bird species. It is also anticipated that the animals' social structure
will be influenced; this may lead to genetic changes.41
The socioeconomic consequences of climate change on forests
and the forestry sector will also be considerable. The following
breakdown of climatic effects into regional effects for Europe will
serve as a framework for discussion of this aspect:
• in high-latitude areas there will probably be a significant
temperature increase in the winter months;
• in the Mediterranean region and in Southern Europe there
will probably be a temperature decrease during the winter;
• in Central and Southern Europe there will probably be an
increase in the summer temperature;
• in Central and Southern Europe, and in the Mediterranean
region there will probably be a decrease in the mean annual
precipitation. The opposite will probably occur for Northern
Europe;
• in Central Europe, Nordic and Balkan countries and Spain,
there will probably be a decrease in the summer precipitation;
• in widespread areas of Central and Southern Europe there will
probably be increased evapotranspiration during the summer
season.42
It has been estimated that with a temperature increase of 3°C,
forest production in Sweden will increase by 38 per cent north of
Limes Norlandicus, by 16 per cent south of Limes Norlandicus,
and by up to 43 per cent between the lines.43 For other regions
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of Europe, no quantitative estimates on changed production are
available.
The silvicultural implications of climate change for the Nordic
countries have been outlined as follows:
• regeneration will improve, but the production of herbs and
grass will increase, which requires intensified cleaning of the
regeneration sites;
• the demand on tending will increase, especially for deciduous
species;
• because climate change will stimulate increased growth, there
will be a need for shorter intervals between more intense
thinnings;
• because of increased growth, the rotation period will be
shortened;
• the mortality rate will probably increase, requiring intensified
sanitation fellings;
• silvicultural management will probably have to become more
site-specific and intensified;
• improved species/provenance control will be required.44
Similar studies for other parts of Europe do not exist. We have
therefore tried to estimate the effects on forest production and
silviculture for the different regions in Europe in a rough manner
in Table 4.2. lt is important to point out that these rough estimates
are based mainly on knowledge from managed industrial forests.
Most of the European mountain forests are not industrial forests
but protected forests, parks, etc. with very specific management
systems.
Some socioeconomic analysis has been conducted for regions
other than Europe. According to one study, the effects of climate
change on US forest products industry would be negative.4S The
same was found for the socioeconomic impacts both in the USA
and in Canada.46 A further study found that Canadian forest pro-
ducers will suffer more than the estimated gains for forest-product
consumers.47 Climate change generates significant cost increases
in regions with limited forest-production capacity today, such as
Western Europe.48
Some aggregated calculations on climate change and develop-
ment of forest resources in different parts of the world have
been made by the US Department of Commerce and are shown
in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.3: Changed forests production and silvicultural management due to
climate
Region Forest production Snvicultural implications
Nordic countries Increased production Intensified management of all
phases of silviculture
Nonhem USSR Increased production Intensified management of all
phases of silviculture
Middle-Belt USSR Increased production in the Intensifed management in the
western pan western pan
Southern USSR Decreased production Intensified protection forest
management; intensified
sanitation and fire protection
Denmark Incresed production Intensified management of all
Benelux phases of silviculture
France
United Kingdom
Ireland
Germany Increased production Intensified management of all
Poland phases of silviculture
Czechoslovakia
Lower-Land Austria
Switzerland
Mountainous areas: Decreased production Intensified protection forest
France management; intensified
Germany sanitation and fire protection
Austria
Switzerland
Italy
Hungary Decreased production Intensified protection forest
Bulgaria management; intensified
Romania sanitation and fire protection
Yugoslavia
Albania
Iberian Peninsular Decreased production Intensified protection forest
management; intensified
sanitation and fire protection
Italy (except Decreased production Intensified protection forest
mountains) management; intensified
sanitation and fire protection
Greece Decreased production Intensified protection forest
Turkey management; intensified
sanitation and fire protection
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vegetation
influences:
ReglOII Estimated Temp. Steady stateI change Steady statel change
Increase C forest land area forest biomass
US 2.5 +5% +10%
USSR 3.0 +10%_ +20%_
Australia 2.5 0% 0%
China 2.5 +1% 0%
Brazil 2.0 -2% -3%
EEC 3.0 +2% +10%_
1. Over 100 year's adjustment to changed temperature and precipitation.
Source: US Department of Commerce (1989).
On the other hand, model analysis of forests in the USA
found that at changes more severe than 2°C warming and 12
per cent reduction of precipitation there will be virtual dieback
of the forest. These conditions are similar to estimates for the
mountainous forests in Central and Southern Europe.49
It is clear from the previous discussion that climate change
is likely to cause timber-supply fluctuations in Europe as a
whole and in its mountainous regions. Very little is known,
however, about the socioeconomic impact on rural communities,
indus~::al concerns, markets and trade in forest products, or on
governments. The land base for the forest industry may be shifted
to other regions as a result of climate change. This could lead to
socioeconomic problems in the rural mountainous communities in
Europe.50
Yet another aspect which must be considered is water. Veget-
ation interacts both directly and indirectly with the hydrological
cycle, so a climate change which affects forest communities will
also influence hydrology. Three ways of interactions between
vegetation and hydrology have been identified:51
the amount of precipitation entering the soil
the rates of runoff and erosion
the water available for evapotranspiration.
Table 4.5 illustrates a number of water-related disturbances due to
climatic change.
Since the mountains in Europe are big water "collectors" and
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there are to be major changes in forests, we can anticipate
major water-related disturbances. These factors will probably
cause seasonal water shortages, with many adverse socioeconomic
effects requiring local changes in water-storage capacity.52 Major
research is needed on the way changed vegetation patterns will
influence water quality.
Anticipated forest decline and changed forest species will also
affect the recreational and touristic use of forest land. The pattern
of tourism will change in space and time. Winter sports will
probably lose some of the most suitable areas. GRCR points
out that between 1981 and 1989, there was a decline in the
snow cover in Europe of 5.8 per cent in winter, 9.4 per cent in
spring and 12.9 per cent in autumn in comparison with the period
1972-80.53
The skiing season in Ontario, Canada will be reduced, but
opportunities for summer recreations will increase. Winter sports
in eastern Canada, the European Alps and the snowy mountains
of Australia may no longer have a viable length of ski season within
20-30 years.54 Warmer winter conditions also give higher risk of
avalanches, already the cause of big problems in many winter sport
areas. The extent to which the skiing season will be reliable over
the Christmas-New Year holidays is a crucial factor for the survival
of winter tourism. 55
Owners of tourist infrastructure in general should be prepared
for reduced recreational potential due to forest changes caused by
climate change. Tourism is the major source of income for many
of the rural communities in the mountainous regions of Europe.
The industry should have sufficient understanding of atmospheric
sensitivity to plan strategically for the future. 56
In conclusion, it is clear that our knowledge of the effects of
climate change on forests is fragmentary. Most of it is based on
quite simplified models correlating vegetation type and forests
to gradients of temperature and precipitation, and the ratio of
potential evapotranspiration to precipitation. We know that the
ecophysiological processes are much more complicated, but for the
moment these are the best available tools. These types of models
are helpful in illustrating the global distribution of vegetation
under a steady state, but they do not take complicated dynamics
into account.
Today, the scientific consensus is that a temperature increase of
3°C will occur during the next century. A 1,400-year tree-record of
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summer temperatures carried out in Fennoscandia has indicated
that it will not be possible to detect regional greenhouse signals
in the forests until the year 2020.57 An important contribution
to illustrate the effects of climate change has recently been
published.58 This describes the effects on the lakes of the Central
Boreal Forests in Canada. Twenty years of climatic, hydrologic
and ecological data show that air and lake temperatures have
increased by 2°C and the ice-free season has increased by three
weeks. This development has resulted in higher evaporation,
lower precipitation and less water renewal, leading to higher
concentrations of most chemicals. Populations of phytoplankton
have multiplied. Wind velocities and transparency have increased.
Summer habitats for different organisms have declined.
Perhaps the most convincing data on climate-change effects on
forests are historical. During the Middle Ages (800-1200) the
mean temperature was 1°C higher than at presen t in the northern
part of Europe. At that time, it was possible to cultivate corn as
far as 65°N in Norway and Iceland. This temperature increase also
caused substantial shifts in altitudinal and latitudinal tree limits.
During the Little Ice Age (1550-1850) mean temperatures were
I-2°C lower than they are today. The land previously colonized by
new species was once again abandoned.59
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Chapter 5
What Can Be Done?
We have already studied existing emission patterns of greenhouse
gases in some detail. In order to outline possible options and
strategies to mitigate the effect of these gases on forests and their
related ecosystems, we must also look to the future. Future emis-
sions will depend on many individually complex and interrelated
factors such as population growth, the expansion of economies,
the amount and types of energy consumed and what policies and
new technologies are put into place. Many different scenarios have
been developed and discussed. l The one we have chosen was
developed by the US Agency for International Development.2
The actual baseline scenario assumes no response to climate
change and has a time horizon up to the year 2025. The CFC
protocol signed in Montreal in 1987 is, however, taken into
account. The purpose of the scenario, (which is presented in
Table 5.1) is to make it possible to identify the right options and
strategies to reduce greenhouse gases.
By studying current emission patterns and future developments,
the following points may be singled out as the most relevant to
future strategies:
• emissions will double by the year 2025 in comparison with
1985 if no response to climate change is made;
• emissions from developing countries will increase from a third to
half of the global share by 2025 as a result of population increase;
• emission from fossil fuels burning is and will be the largest
source of greenhouse gas emissions;
• emission of CFCs will continue to be a central source of
contribution to greenhouse gases;
• emissions from agriculture are expected to double by the year
2025, although total emissions from agriculture are less serious
than the factors mentioned above;
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• Eastern Europe and the USSR will probably be the largest
emitters of greenhouse gases owing to increased energy
consumption and inefficient energy systems;
• the second largest will probably be South and East Asia owing
to increased energy consumption and agricultural production.
These conclusions will be the basis for the following discussion of
strategies for mitigation.
A possible balance between energy supply and demand for a
sustainable world has been analysed, and it is argued that it is
possible to formulate energy strategies which are both technically
and economically viable for solving global problems such as CO2
emissions.3 The overall solution is an end-use strategy emphasizing
energy efficiency in both developed and developing countries. For
developing countries it means a transition from fuelwood to the use
of modern solid, liquid and gaseous fuels. For both developing and
industrialized countries it means increased electrification. Biomass
acts as an important swing energy source in the analysis.
Changing the fuels used is an important option for the reduction
of CO2 emissions, moving away from fuels with a high CO2
emission coefficient. Table 5.2 shows emission coefficients for
different energy carriers.
Table 5.2: CO2 emission coefficients (kg CO2/GJ8 ) for various
energy carriers
Energy carriers CO2 emission coefficients
Coal 94
Oil 73b
Gas 56
Uranium 0
Renewables 0
a Gigal Joule primary energy at lower heating value, combustion of fuels,
indirect emissions excluded.
b CO2 emissions from refineries are included.
Source: Blok, K., Bijlsma, J., Fockens, S. and Okken, P. A., COz emission
coefficients for fuels and energy carriers in the Netherlands (ESC-WR-88-12)
(petten, The Netherlands: Utrecht University, 1988).
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Table 5.1 Emissions from major greenhouse-gas-producing activities.
Baseline case with no responces to climate change.
Expressed in million metric tons on CO2 equivalents.
C02 "om energya CO2 from deforestation CFCsb
1985 2025 1985 2025 1985 2025
United States 5,100 6,200-7,700 1,350 1,675
OECD 2,900 4,000-5,100 1,275 2,340
Europe/Canada
OECD Pacific 1,100 1,500-2,200 510 935
Eastern
EuropelUSSR 5,100 8,400-10,300 710 1,735
Poland 436 935
Centrally
Planned Asia 1,900 3,700-7,300 220 250~60 90 650
China 1,844 6,303
Middle East 400 1,800-2,600 40 275
Africa 700 700-2,900 620 660-1,210 200 1,400
lalre
latin America 700 1,500-3,300 1,280 1,950-3,040 140 990
Brazil 150 473
Mexlco 249 730
Rest of Central
America
South & East
Asia 1,100 1,800-5,900 550 630-1,690 270 1,890
India 359 2,273
Indonesia 81 517
Pakistan
Philippines
Thailand
World 19,100 29,700-45,500 2,670 3,5OO~,600 4,580 11,890
Note: Several major emissions-producing activities are accounted for, but many of the smaller
source categories are not included. Estimates for 2025 are taken from 2030 Emissions scenario,
except for the CO2 estimates from energy, which also include the results from the EIS/AFOS
Reference case.
'The C02 emissions itemized in this table do not include emissions from cement production.
blnclude CFC-Il, CFC-12, CFC-113, HCFC-22, CCI., CHjCClj, and Halon 130 I.
Source: US Agency for International Development (1990).
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CH4 trom rice CH4 trom animals N,O trom fertilizer Total Tons per capita
1985 2025 1985 2025 1985 2025 1985 2025 1985 2025
17 21 206 267 128 156 6,801 8,319-9,819 28 29-34
15 15 311 397 136 268 4,637 7,020-8,120 11 14-17
38 27 97 168 11 16 1,756 2.646-3.346 12 16-20
34 38 2n 344 142 266 6,263 10.783-12,683 15 21-25
647 687 145 279 139 230 3,168 5,796-9,806 3 3~
561 571 134 254 129 211
13 17 21 59 11 27 485 2,176-2.978 4 6-11
55 116 107 2n 25 95 1,707 3,246-5,998 3 2-4
124 147 200 441 33 93 2,4n 5,121-a,011 6 7-11
86 78 57 92 8 14
2 4 23 63 13 46
34 63 59 176 12 28
1,331 2,056 212 384 99 427 3.562 7.187-12,347 2 3-5
653 1,084 111 189 53 144
153 302 10 23 12 155
25 34 34 61 13 75
2,297 3,124 1,576 2,617 723 1,580 30,946 52,411-71,311 6 6-9
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Energy Efficiency
The Stockholm Environment Institute recently published an opti-
mistic report on the possibility of reducing world energy consump-
tion significantly through increased energy efficiency. A feasible
goal could be a 50 per cent reduction in the growth of total
worldwide usage between 1986 and 2030. The report concludes
that this could be achieved without harming the global economy,
but it stresses that there are substantial obstacles in the way of
adopting the necessary measures. Such efficiency improvements
will not happen unless important new policies are drawn up and
enforced.4
Energy efficiency or conservation includes two major facets:
the improvement of the energy efficiency of our activities and
structural change promoting less energy-intensive activities. The
principal sectors where energy efficiency could be improved are:
household and services;
industry;
transport;
power generation.
Table 5.3 shows a carbon dioxide improvement potential index for
the Netherlands indicating that households and industry have the
best potential for energy efficiency/conservation in industrialized
countries.s
Table 5.3: Carbon dioxide improvement potential index
CDIP Index
Household 100
Industry 94
Transport 52
Power generation 52
Source: Diepstraater und Van Gool (1989).
However, the authors underline the fact that energy efficiency
is hard to tackle because of the large numbers of small users
involved. It is thought that it might be possible to improve the
energy efficiency of the household sector in the Netherlands by
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one per cent per year. The transport sector faces similar problems.
Another study has shown that with technical improvements to
vehicles, changed occupancy ratio of the means of transport,
changed volume development (passengers and ton kilometres)
and alternative fuels, it would be possible to reduce energy
consumption in transport by 25-45 per cent.6 Energy efficiency
in industry could also be improved by 2-3 per cent a year
through conservation. The power-generation sector has untapped
possibilities of co-generation, where electricity and useful heat are
produced together in a common thermal power plant.
Nevertheless, these analyses based on the Netherlands show
that, because of increased demand, even with maximal energy
conservation there will be only a slight reduction in total energy
consumption, and more drastic means than conservation will
be required in a growing economy to achieve stabilization of
carbon dioxide emissions. The following general conclusions may
be drawn:
• there is theoretical potential for improved energy efficiency;
• a number of obstacles lie in the way of its implementation:
lack of knowledge on efficient technologies
lack of care
demand for high return on investments
income from investment usually going to a third party.
Other studies reach similar conclusions. In the USA, complicated
market barriers are just one of the hindrances to achieving high
energy-use efficiency, yet research shows that improved energy
efficiency and conservation are of vital importance in attempting
to paIliate climatic change. The US Agency for International
Development (1990) argues that improved end-use energy effi-
ciency has the greatest potential for slowing the growth of CO2
and other greenhouse gases in the near future. A recent study
showed an average efficiency rate in the USA of 25 per cent -
proof, according to the author, of the high potential for energy
efficiencyIconservation.7
Alternative Energy
From Table 5.2, it may be seen that a shift from coal and oil to
renewable sources would greatly improve emission conditions. A
large number of renewable sources are also available such as
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solar energy, ocean thermal energy, wind energy, photovoltaics,
alcohol-based fuels and biomass energy.
Forests may be used not only as a carbon sink (to be discussed
below) but also as fuel and for the replacement of fuels with high
CO2 emission coefficients. To make major improvements to emis-
sion conditions, however, huge areas would be required. If half
the world energy consumption were supplied by forest biomass,
600 million hectares would have to be exploited sustainably. This
means extremely large-scale activities in order to influence the
overall emission pattern by the introduction of forest biomass
as fuel.s It has been calculated that 465 million hectares of
new forest plantations would be needed to offset the estimated
annual increase of 2.9 billion tons of free carbon. The wood
energy potential from these plantations would be high. One year's
production would be greater than the energy generated in the US
coal·fired power stations in two years.9 So the substitution of wood
for fossil fuel has advantages in terms of the carbon cycle, if the
overall stock of biomass is maintained. But today, wood is not
regarded as an important source of energy. It is regarded as a
"poor man's energy" and the market does not consider wood
as competitive with fossil fuel energy. Thus what counts is how
financially competitive this fuel would be in comparison with other
sources.
Hydroelectric power has great potential. 10 Global production
was 2112 TWh/year in 1988. The following hydroelectric potentials
have been calculated:
theoretical hydroelectric potential 44,000 TWh/year;
technically accessible potential 19,000 TWh/year;
economic accessible potential 9,700 TWh/year.
The countries with the greatest potentials are the USSR (3,900
TWh/year), Argentina (2,400 TWh/year) and China (1,900 TWh
/year). Increasing pressure from environmental groups, however,
makes it unlikely that funding organizations will support large
hydroprogrammes in the future. On the other hand, there seems
to be room for small hydroplants.ll
The literature is full of promising reports about other alternative
energy sources such as solar, wind, ocean, and so on. These prom-
ising features will not be repeated here. We shall merely describe
what has become of the development of alternative energy sources
in the USA since the oil crisis in the early 1970s.12
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• Solar heating and cooling systems: Installed in fewer than one
million of the nation's 80 million households and rapidly losing
momentum. Roughly 100 of 120 manufacturers recently went
out of business, resulting in a loss of 36,000 jobs.
• Ocean thermal energy conservation: No systems in commer-
cial operation.
• Tidal power: No systems in commercial operation.
• Electricity from industrial processes' waste heat: Between
1978 and 1988, 2800 co-generation facilities were installed;
capacity increased by 4 per cent.
• Wind energy: Accounts for less than one-third of 1 per cent of
installed US generating capacity.
• Electricity and steam heat from geothermal resources: In-
stalled generated capacity is comparable with totals for wind.
• Small-scale hydropower: About 1,500 units installed, enlarging
the national generating capacity by 1 per cent.
• Wood-fired power plants: Four plants installed; total capacity
is less than one-thirtieth of small-scale hydropower.
• Solar thermal generators: Eight systems installed, with a total
capacity smaller than the wood-fired units.
• Photovoltaics: Worldwide sales in 1986 were 23 megawatts.
This corresponds to about half the capacity of the smallest US
wood-fired power plant.
• Alcohol-based fuels: In 1988 about 1,000 alcohol-fueled vehi-
cles out of 130 million in the USA.
• Synthetic fuels: Energy-supply less than one-sixth the output
of small hydroelectric units (about 1 per cent of the total
generating capacity in the USA).
• Fusion power: No systems near commercial operation.
Gas has a lower CO2 emission coefficient than coal and oil fuels,
but the emission coefficient is still high, as we can see from Table
5.4. Natural gas produces significant quantities of the greenhouse
gases NOx and CO2, During production, transportation and burn-
ing, the gas also leaks methane. A number of natural gas-intensive
scenarios have been analysed, and the methane leaks found to be
significant. 14 These scenarios increased the greenhouse effect by 10
per cent in comparison with the utilization rate of gas today, but it
was also found that it might be possible to replace about 20 per cent
of coal by gas and still achieve improved emission conditions.
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Table 5.4: Estimate of recoverable resources of natural gas
(expressed in 16U m3)
Undis- Estimated
Cumulative Proved covered total
Region production reserves resources recoverable
North America 20.0 8.4 28-36 36-44
South America 3.4 4.9-5.2 7.7-10.8 12.&-16
Western Europe 2.2 5.4-5.6 4.2-6.0 9.&-12
USSR and E Europe 5.9 15.5 13--25 28-40
Africa 1.0 5.7-6.3 7.5-28 13--34
Middle East 2.5 17-24 30-37 47.61
Asia/Oceania 0.5 4.5-6.0 29-36 33--42
Antarctica 0 0 2.3--4.0 2.3--4.0
WORLD TOTAL 35.5 61-71 122-183 182-253
(in 1015gC) (19.2) (33--38) (6&-99) (99-137)
Source: Rotty and Masters (1985)13
The threat of climatic change, together with acid rain and other
air pollutants, have led to arguments for a broader acceptance of
nuclear power.1S In model analyses, coal-burning is completely
replaced by nuclear power within forty years. In order to achieve
this a new, large nuclear plant would have to be built every three
days from now until 2025. In addition, the CO2 would continue
to grow by about 25 per cent from now until the year 2,000 and
decline to today's level around the year 2025.16 So there are
many doubts about how great a contribution nuclear power would
make in mitigating climate change. There is considerable popular
- and therefore political - opposition to the nuclear option. This is
especially true when we take into account the amount of nuclear
plants required, increasing the risk of nuclear accidents. The costs
- about US$145 billion per year - would be tremendous.l7 It has
been argued that each dollar invested in energy efficiency in the
USA can displace about seven times more carbon than each dollar
invested in nuclear power.18
In the political and environmental debate (see Chapter 6)
there have been calls for a 30 per cent CO2 reduction over
1988 figures. 19 At the Second World Climate Conference it was
concluded that emissions of greenhouse gases must be reduced by
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60 per cent if the atmospheric concentration of these greenhouse
gases is to be halted. To achieve this objective, a dramatic change
in the consumption pattern of energy is required. It may be
concluded that:
• Energy efficiency has great potential, but given the many
obstacles in its path it will not have much effect on emission
patterns.
• The alternative source of wood for energy is potentially good,
but the required scale of operations and the poor economic
competitiveness with other sources make it difficult to foresee
any introduction of large-scale operations.
• Hydropower shows potential, but environmental restrictions
will limit the practical impact of this source.
• Other alternative sources like solar, ocean, wind, etc., show
high theoretical potential, but history has taught us that
practical implementation will probably be limited.
• Natural gases have strong potential, but are not a solution to
the problem owing to significant leaks of methane.
• Nuclear power is doubtful owing to the scale of operations
required, risks of accident and high costs.
Mter scrutinizing about thirty-five different scenarios for future
energy consumption and related CO2 emissions, as well as
producing his own, this is what Sinyak concludes about energy
patterns up to the year 20602°:
• there will be an increased demand for energy;
• energy efficiency will assume growing importance;
• nuclear development will be severely limited during the next
few decades;
• renewable sources will contribute little to the global energy
balance owing to unfavorable economics;
• fossil fuels will remain the leading global energy source.
He says: "in spite of many radical measures that could be taken [in
the energy sector]... it is unlikely that increasing CO2 concentra-
tions can be avoided."
The Second World Climate Conference (1990) concluded that
technically feasible and cost-effective means to reduce CO2 emis-
sions exist in all countries. The measures include improved effi-
ciency of energy use, and the use of alternative fuels and energy
sources. But the conference also concluded that these measures are
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"slowed down and sometimes prevented by a host of barriers".
Very long time lags are involved in reducing emissions through
changed energy patterns21 :
• political time lags: the time needed for political decisions on
countermeasures to be taken and enforced;
• technological time lags: the time needed for changes in energy
infrastructure to be made;
• atmospheric time lags: the long residence time of greenhouse
gases;
• ecological time lags: the time needed for ecosystems to
respond to changed emissions.
These time lags add up to a number of decades before the effects
of countermeasures in the form of changed energy systems could
be identified.
The German Bundestag concludes from a comprehensive study
that "there is growing evidence suggesting that the problems raised
by the greenhouse effect are so substantial that the structure of the
global energy system should be subjected to a fundamental review,
involving the readiness to induce major changes."22
A study of possible energy policies and the climate change for
China, India, Japan, the UK, the USA and the USSR concludes
that even in the most optimistic scenario, with each country
adopting policies for high energy efficiency and a fuel switch
to lower carbon emissions, the emissions of the six countries
in the year 2030 will be higher than they were in 1988.23 The
overall conclusion must be that the prevention of the greenhouse
effect through changed energy consumption will in reality be very
difficult to achieve without extreme and extraordinary actions.
Chlorofluorocarbons and Halons
CFCs and halons will remain a major problem in spite of the
Montreal Protocol - partly because developing countries were
allowed to delay restrictions against CFCs, but also because of
the Protocol's scope: emissions of CFC-ll, CFC-12, CFC-14
and CFC-15 will be reduced. However, the reduction of these
gases will be offset by the introduction of new gases which
are also greenhouse gases. An improved protocol applying to
all countries and implementing immediate action is required
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and should include the entire index of CFCs and halons which
contribute to the greenhouse effect.
Tropical Deforestation
The role of deforestation and reforestation in mitigating the effects
of climate change must be examined - here, tropical rather than
mountain forests are the principal focus. For at least twenty years
tropical deforestation has been recognized as a serious problem,
but little effective action has been taken to minimize or control
it. Deforestation results in a loss of food, energy, shelter and
other resources for local inhabitants. It also has a number of
environmental effects, the most serious of which is its contribution
to greenhouse gases.
The problem of tropical deforestation has worsened dramati-
cally over the past ten years: figures suggest that it has increased
by about 100 per cent.24 The development of deforestation is
illustrated in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Rate ofdeforestation (expressed in million ha per year)
1980 1989 1990 1990
(Lanly/FAO) (Meyers) (WRI) (FAO)
Closedffotal
Trop. CfFrITF CfFrITF CfFrITE
Forest
7.3/11.3 13.9/22.0 n.a.l16--20 n.a.l17.0
Deforestation
in million ha
per year
Year
According to the latest estimates, the largest losses of tropical
forests have taken place in Brazil, India, Indonesia, Burma,
Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines and Costa Rica. At present
there are about 0.8 billion hectares of tropical forests left. Newly
published estimates on the rate of deforestation support earlier
scenarios claiming a probable loss of 45-50 per cent of the existing
tropical forest by the year 2025 if special countermeasures are not
introduced.2s
Over the last ten years there has been considerable discussion
about deforestation's contribution to the greenhouse effect. The
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most important gases released by tropical deforestation are COz,
C04 and CO. Carbon monoxide is not a greenhouse gas but
indirectly affects the concentrations of other greenhouse gases
such as CH4.Z6
Future carbon emissions from tropical forests may be similar in
size to current emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The current
emissions of COz, CH4 and NzO, from both the global and the
tropical deforestation points of view, have been calculated. The
results show that tropical deforestation contributes about 25 per
cent of radiative emissions today. Based on new estimates of the
rate of tropical deforestation, it is thought that in the future,
emissions from this process may grow more rapidly than those
from the worldwide combustion of fossil fuels. z7
The process of tropical deforestation is tremendously compli-
cated.z8 The forests have fallen victim to the general lack of
socioeconomic progress in the developing countries. The driv-
ing force behind tropical deforestation is socioeconomic, and
socioeconomic factors are area-specific for each region of the
tropical forest. They also change over time: one can identify
an evolutionary process in the rate of deforestation. It may be
said that deforestation has been - and still is to some extent - a
necessary element of socioeconomic development.z9
To halt tropical deforestation is an overwhelming task. It
requires, as a starting point, a general improvement of the
socioeconomic conditions in the tropical forest regions. Experi-
enced development experts fear that the necessary development
will not be achieved until a very long time after the extinction of
tropical forests.
Reforestation/Afforestation
A wider, global perspective on reforestation is needed. Forests are
regarded as the only effective terrestrial source for the fixation of
COz and the sequestration of carbon. It has been estimated that
forest ecosystems account for a reservoir of over 1,200 billion
tons of carbon which is higher than in the atmosphere (700
billion tons).30 According to another study, 400--800 billion tons
are stored in the world's 4 billion hectares of forest. 3!
The IPCC Working Group I made calculations based on a
fixation rate of 5 tons carbon per hectare and year and found
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that a reforestation of 400 million hectares at a rate of 10 million
per year from now until 2030 would result in a sequestration of one
billion tons of carbon per year over a period of forty to a hundred
years. Other calculations give the following results:
• 200 million hectares of new forest will store around 1 billion
tons of carbon per year;32
• 120 million hectares of fast-growing tropical plantations would
sequester 800 million tons of carbon per year;33
• 465 million hectares of plantations are required to sequester
the annual increment of 2.9 billion tons of free carbon;34
• 800 million hectares are required to sequester 3 billion tons of
carbon.3s
Such high production figures may be misleading; and for long-term
purposes covering large areas, much lower production values
should perhaps be considered.36 It should also be emphasized
that the sequestering capacity in these plantation forests will be
sustainable only if the overall greater stock of forest biomass
is maintained. If the wood is cut and decomposed, the carbon
fixation is only short-term.
There are reasons other than carbon sequestration for the need
for increased reforestation; and these are summarized in Table 5.6.
In the table, the required reforestation is expressed in equivalent
areas of closed plantations. These plantantions, for purposes other
than seuqestration, will store about 700-800 million tons of carbon
per year, but over shorter periods in comparison with the earlier
calculations.
Is- reforestation of this scale realistic? The areas required corres-
pond to about 75 per cent of the non-forested land of the United
States.37 During the early 1980s, the yearly rate of reforestation
was roughly 10 million hectares; at the end of the 1980s it was
estimated at 15 million hectares.38 The total reforestation in
tropical areas in 1985 was 1.7 million hectares.39 At this rate,
given the requirement of plantations, it would, according to one
calculation, take at least thirty years to establish them.40 In
addition, the literature illustrates numerous examples of failed
reforestation projects.41 In the light of these experiences it seems
unrealistic to be optimistic about large-scale plantations. Rural
people cannot be expected to contribute to programmes for
long-term benefits, and carbon fixation in itself could never be
an objective for reforestation.42
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Table 5.6: Estimates on needs for reforestation (million hectares of
equivalent closed plantations)
Areas needed to cover deficits in wood production
Fuelwood deficits in 2000
Industrial wood deficits in 2000
Degraded areas needing protective tree cover
Degraded upland watersheds I
Desertified (semi-)arid lands2
Wasted fallow lands
1. Assumed 50% tree cover.
2. Assumed 15% tree cover.
Source: Wiersum (1989)
55-100
20-40
44-80
±50
23-40
Total 142-310
The costs of the plantations would also be tremendous. Land pro-
curement and plantation of 465 million hectares would probably
cost no less than US $500 billion: about 13 per cent of the US Gross
National Product. The disposal of wood from the plantations
would also be expensive. To maintain its carbon sequestering
capacity, additional costs for harvesting, transportation and pres-
erving would be at least US$3.1 trillion for a thirty-year period.
If the wood from the plantation were to be used for industrial
products, it would severely disturb world markets and have
negative effects. In this case, the long-term sequestering capacity
would also be lost.43
Another way of increasing the sequestering capacity of the forest
would be to increase production of biomass by intensified manage-
ment. To sequester all the excess atmospheric carbon, a dramatic
increase of biomass production is required. The stemwood produc-
tion would have to increase by 2.5 cubic metres per hectare per
year in all the world's 3 billion hectares of closed forests.44 Such
an increase may be compared with the average growth in some
regions:
USA: 3.15 m3/ha/year
USSR: 1.35 m3/ha/year
Western Europe: 4.10 m3/ha/year.
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Based on this comparison, it seems unrealistic to expect any
dramatic change of the forests' sequestering capacity by improved
forest management.4S
Another option would be to change the use of existing forest
resources to sequestration only; this would mean reducing indus-
trial wood harvests. It has been calculated that a worldwide no-
harvest policy would probably increase the sequestering capacity
of forests to meet only one-tenth of excess atmospheric CO2.46
In earlier sections, the possible effects on existing forests of
increased CO2 concentrations, temperature and precipitation were
discussed. We saw that the potential effects were still uncertain,
but one possibility is natural forest expansion. Natural forest
expansion of closed forests of about 3.5 billion hectares would
be required to sequester the excess carbon, representing more
than twice the world's existing closed forests (3 billion hectares).47
It seems unrealistic, therefore, to expect any dramatic changes in
the forest carbon sequestering capacity by natural expansion.
From the preceding discussion of deforestation and reforesta-
tion/afforestation, it may be concluded that:
o the rate of deforestation will not be halted until real socio-
economic development has been achieved in the tropical
regions;
o this will probably be achieved only after the tropical forests
have disappeared;
• theoretically, the forests could sequester the excess carbon
perfectly with increased production, mainly through new
plantations;
• in reality, though, this potential seems greatly reduced because
of:
the scale of plantations required
the long time needed to establish them
failures in former large-scale plantations
overwhelming costs.
Realistically, therefore, the forests cannot easily make a major
contribution to solving the greenhouse problem. The US Agency
for International Development seems to share this opinion, warn-
ing against the feasibility of either a dramatic reduction in defor-
estation or a major increase in reforestation. Its conclusion is that
social, economic, political and ethical constraints are too great for
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any dramatic cut in deforestation or any increase in large-scale
plantations to be expected.48
None of this, however, should detract from efforts to reforest
mountain areas. Mountain forests play a significant role in erosion
prevention and watershed management, quite apart from any
effects they may have on climate (and microclimates). Mountain
and boreal forests make up a significant portion of the world area.
In industrialized countries where there is forest dieback, there is a
need not only for replacement planting but also for improved man-
agement techniques. Last but not least, planting programmes can
be an important means of mobilizing and educating the community
to prepare for the effects of climate change.
Agriculture
Reforestation is at best only a partial means of combating the
effects of climate change; other sectoral actions must be included
in any forestry projects. Agriculture contributes significantly to
increasing greenhouse concentrations.49 Specific actions within
agriculture to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are difficult to
introduce and control. The US Agency for International Devel-
opment suggests the following measures:
• agricultural production involving biomass burning should
change over to alternative practices such as sustainable agri-
culture and the use of crop residues;
• more efficient management of livestock waste could reduce
methane emissions by 25-75 per cent per unit produced;
• use of improved fertilizer formulations and application tech-
nologies would reduce nitrous oxide emissions;
• marginal land for annual cropping should be shifted to peren-
nial production or pastoral land uses;
• to improve management of water regimes, cultivars should be
developed. This is especially important in rice production.
Others are doubtful, however, that anything can be done to mini-
mize the continuing accumulation of methane and nitrous oxide
from agriculture, given that the underlying factors are demographic
and very difficult to tackle.5o
So far we have discussed the possibilities of influencing the major
sources of greenhouse gas emissions: energy, CFCs, deforestation
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and agriculture. We have seen that the underlying factor of the
future emission pattern would be population growth, generating
special problems, especially, in developing countries. The USSR!
Eastern Europe region was identified as being a major future
contributor of emissions.
Population
From the scenario on future emissions of greenhouse gases it
can be seen that demography is a crucial factor. An exploding
population is to blame for most releases of these gases. If we
are to have any hope of controlling the emissions, it has been
argued, "the world population cannot be allowed to continue along
its present trajectory - it must be stabilized and soon."51 The
upward population trend plays a decisive role in the greenhouse
problem.52 World population is expected to reach 9 billion by the
year 2050, with developing countries making up three-quarters of
humankind. The foreseeable consequences will be that:
• increased population in developing countries will shift the princi-
pal activity away from agriculture to fuel-intensive industry
and transportation;
• population growth and rising income will result in an increased
number of cattle and greater expanse of rice fields, leading to
increased emissions of methane;
• the population growth will lead to an explosive growth of cities
and towns and a consequent move from biomass fuels towards
fossil fuels. 53
Elsewhere the population problem is described as "population
pressures", or "human-induced emissions".54 IPCC's conclusion
document (1990) states that "a rapidly increasing world population
will mean greater demands for resources in general and energy
in particular." IPCC's Special Committee on the Participation of
Developing Countries (1990) fixed its attention on insufficient infor-
mation and communication, limited human resources, institutional
difficulties and limited financial resources. The ISSC/UNESCO
Framework for Research on the Human Dimensions of Glo-
bal Environmental Change (1990) states that human beings
now significantly affect many of the systems of the biosphere
and the geosphere, although nothing is said in the document
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about the influence of the globe's population size on sustainable
environment.
It is obvious, though, that if we are to contain the greenhouse
problem and many other environmental problems, population
dynamics must be in harmony with the ecological support system.
At present, this does not seem to be the case, and the problem
is not sufficiently discussed because of sociopolitical and ethical
sensitivities.
On the other hand, it should be recognized that it is not simply
population numbers which determine emissions and pollution. The
average American is said to consume forty times more energy than
the average Ethiopian. It has been suggested that as important
as family planning is a greater voluntary simplicity in lifestyles,
especially in rich countries, along with the elimination of waste
and unnecessary luxuries. Such policies have proved unpopular in
the past, but they may be forced on populations by events.
Developing Countries and the USSR/Eastern European
region
We have seen that the developing countries and the USSR/Eastern
European region may in future be the largest emitters of green-
house gases, because of high population growth in many poorer
undeveloped regions. The following points highlight the scale of
problems facing these countries:55
• Debt Crisis: The total debt for developing countries was more
than US$l trillion in 1987 (WRI, 1990). The Soviet external
debt was $50 billion in 1989.56
• Balance-of-payment crisis: During the 1970s, the net capital
flow was from the OECD to the developing areas. Since 1981,
net capital flows have reversed. In 1988 this flow was US$50
billion. The USSR/Eastern European region faces a similar
dilemma.
• Capital for investment crisis: Debtor countries must export
in order to earn hard currency to pay interest on debts. In
the case of the USSR, capital is needed for the importation
of basic food supplies, so no capital is available for new
investments.
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• Limited export possibilities: most of the countries concerned
have only raw materials for export.
• Decreasing export prices: The world commodity indexes
based on constant prices, with 1979-81 = 100, had decreased to
71 in 1988.57 This development is expected to escalate owing
to trade negotiations.58
• Energy supply: The USSR and China process nearly 70 per
cent of the world's recoverable reserves of bituminous coal
and 50 per cent of lignite and sub-bituminous coal.59 The
USSR also has nearly 40 per cent of the world's recoverable
reserves of natural gas. It is difficult to see how these countries
- under the economic conditions outlined above - will change
to alternative energy resources.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
It must be stressed that to date, no complete cost-benefit analysis
on climate change exists. This is probably because of the dilemma
of global "commons" involving .long-term decisions and effects as
well as tremendous uncertainty. Another reason is that assessment
tools and methods for addressing equity issues are badly under-
developed.60 When and where climate change will happen raises
serious and fundamental problems. The best-developed body of
relevant theory to deal with the trade-offs of climatic change
is that:
concerning the discounting of future costs and benefits to obtain
single "preventative" estimates. There is little question that such
discounting practices have a role to play where the question at
hand is the comparison of alternative time flows of money or its
equivalent. There is equally little question that the long lag times
and potential irreversibilities associated with the greenhouse gas
issue pose serious technical problems for the comprehensive use of
discounting methods to weigh the future against present costs and
benefits.61
The basic question is what are we going to bargain with future
generations about. There is an urgent need to articulate the
value-laden choices that underlie this bargain.62
Traditional economists hold that climate has little economic
impact upon advanced industrial societies.63 The effects of climate
change in developed countries will be less than 1 per cent on
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GNP over the next half century, they say. They agree that
poorer countries with a large agricultural sector may be more
vulnerable. In some "ballpark" cost estimates of a 2.5°C global
warming, the economic impact is estimated at 3 per cent of
the gross global product,64 but for developing countries it could
amount to an unaffordable 4 per cent of GNP because of a more
vulnerable agriculture sector. In the calculations above, the values
for biological diversity, amenity and environmental quality are not
accounted for. Noone has analysed these values, argue traditional
economists such as Nordhaus: therefore, we do not know whether
the costs are low or high.6s
An estimate of the damage costs of fossil fuel has been made
from a climatic point of view; this came to US$3.6-36 $/ton
CO2.66 This has been revised to US$10--36 $/ton CO2 .67 IPCC
(1990) has called for a 60 per cent reduction in the annual
greenhouse emissions. If emission figures from 1985 (see Table
5.1) are used, that would mean a reduction of roughly 18.5 million
tons of CO2-equivalent greenhouse gases. Using the range of costs
worked out by Nordhaus (1989), we obtain a yearly damage cost
of US$61-666 million. This cost estimate does NOT include any
environmental or amenity aspects. Nordhaus estimates that the
IPCC call for a 60 per cent reduction in emissions would cost
over US$300 billion annually, and argues that the first 10--20 per
cent cut could be achieved fairly inexpensively but that further
reductions would be extremely costly. (This is illustrated in Figure
5.1.) He argues that the possible reduction of emissions should
be done efficiently and gradually, although judging from existing
economic analysis, the best investment today is in learning more
about climate change rather than in trying to prevent it. The
calculations above are based on traditional economic approaches
following the discounting principle.67
A number of partial cost-benefit analyses have been con-
ducted. One takes the components of the climate change problem,
comparing the economic cost of cutting carbon emissions by
substituting coal-fired electricity with nuclear electricity, natural
gas, and a variety of energy-efficiency measures and finding, in
most cases, negative costS.68 This means taking into account both
cutting carbon emissions and, at the same time, saving consumers'
money.
The cost of cutting emissions in the UK and Poland has been
calculated.69 The analysis shows that emissions could be cut by
What Can Be Done? 103
Figure 5.1: Estimated annual worldwide cost of cUlling greenhouse
gases:
($ bn)
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% cut in emissions
At 1990 levels of world economic activity. Assumes cuts through
efficient policies phased in gradually.
Source:Nordhaus (1990)
20 per cent in the UK with substantial growth in the economy and
rising living standards. For Poland it was found that the energy
growth (66 per cent) at current practice for the period 1987-2005
could be cut to 22 per cent at a cost of US$30 billion. The cost
of cutting CO2 emissions to the required level have been worked
out as US$15-20 per capita year in the USA, US$2-3 in Brazil
and Jamaica, and much less for Asia, India and China.7o The
cost of taking no action against climate change, resulting in lower
production in US agriculture because of less moisture, has been
put at tens of billions of dollars.71
The US Agency for International Development argues that
using present energy and technology prices as a basis for assessing
104 MOUNTAIN WORLD IN DANGER
long-term technological and policy alternatives - as is done in most
traditional cost-benefit analyses - is misleading. It indicates that
neither the present environmental costs of emissions nor the future
costs of climate change are reflected in present prices of goods and
services.
A first step towards economic evaluation of the tremendous
long-term uncertainty involved in climate change has been pro-
duced by Yohe.72 The basic problem lies in evaluating possible
responses and identifying the appropriate timing for different
decisions with only the present state of knowledge to work on.
According to another school of economics, there is no such thing
as cost of irreplaceable resources or of irreducible pollution.73
This school also argues that no relevant price can be set on
avoiding losses by emissions. The correct price can be set only by
future generations' bidding. Unfortunately, future generations are
unable to do that at present. Most of the historical depletion has
taken place because "the price was right", according to traditional
economics. Therefore, this school suggests that the only way out
of the trap is quantitative restrictions.
In its policy declaration, Ecology and the Global Economy,
the InterAction Council concluded that "current instruments
are inadequately used to support the process of reconciling the
competing environment and socioeconomic objectives. They pro-
vide policymakers, planners, and investors with insufficient, often
wrong, signals, incentives and definitions of economic growth."74
At the moment, it is obvious that the existing cost-benefit
analyses are of no help in formulating efficient countermeasures
to climate change. That leads us to a policy approach following
the principal of quantitative restrictions. Some research reports
have taken up this concept and allocated a global budget for
emissions,75 divided equally between industrialized and devel-
oping countries. The national budget is based on per capita
emissions. The basic concept is a time limit (number of years)
for individual countries before they deplete their emission rights.
Subak and Clark suggest approaches following CO2 release pat-
terns.76
Conclusions
The problems involved in formulating a global strategy for climate
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change are difficult. Feldman has defined the following:n
• identification of the atmosphere as a shared sustainable
resource;
• agreements on causes, rates, effects and responsibilities;
• minimizing economic efforts while maximizing economic
growth;
• encompassing the complexity in a multilateral policy.
We have discussed the major causes of greenhouse gas emission
and the possibilities of mitigating the effects, and come to some
rather bleak conclusions:
• The theoretical possibility of improving energy efficiency is
great, but it will be difficult to achieve.
• Substantial use of alternative energy sources will come up
against numerous socioeconomic and environmental obsta-
cles.
• Natural gases cannot be regarded as a major substitute for
fossil fuels.
• Nuclear power raises too many questions for it to be suitable
either.
• The Montreal Protocol on CFCs needs strengthening, and it
remains uncertain how this will be done.
• It is unrealistic to expect a rapid reduction in ongoing tropical
deforestation.
• The possibility of decreasing agricultural emissions seems
limited because of demographic factors.
• Large-scale forest plantations seem an unrealistic means of
mitigating the greenhouse gases.
• No one seems able to deal with the problem of population.
Georgescu-Roegen argues that the difficulty with population
is human nature and a deep-rooted mistrust "of the rich that
the poor will not cease growing in numbers and of the poor
that the rich will not stop getting richer."78
• The pessimistic scenarios for socioeconomic development in
the Third World and USSR/ Eastern Europe.
The expectations of world governments are probably too high.
Sand says that the size of the problems caused by climate change
means that they cannot be solved by world governments alone.79
His view is supported by the Nordic UN Project, which concludes
that there is "no common understanding, within or outside the
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UN system, as to what the operational implications of sustainable
energy development should be". The project also underlines the
lack of consensus between developing and developed countries on
the extent to which environmental issues should be administered
by the UN system.so
Schelling is pessimistic about the possibility of tackling and
slowing down global warming. He points out that actions from
individual countries have only minor effect; therefore, individ-
ual countries will not act until international agreements on the
reduction of greenhouse gases are enforced.81 White foresees great
difficulties in reaching an international agreement on mitigating
climate change. He estimates that it will take a long time -
even longer than the Law of the Sea Treaty, which took fifteen
years.82
Managing greenhouse gases certainly depends more on pol-
itical, cultural and socioeconomic conditions than on physical
constraints.83
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Chapter 6
International Responses
Despite the pessImIsm of some observers, there is at present
a vigorous international response to climate change, involving
research, discussion, planning and implementation even leading
to - or being led by - a comprehensive legal convention. Two
main agencies are involved: the United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO). UNEP and WMO established the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 after a resolution of
the UN General Assembly. The IPCC was charged with assessing
the scientific evidence on what was happening (Working Group 1)
and the impact (Working Group 2) and responses (Working Group
3) to any changes. It was instructed to report to the Second World
Climate Conference in Geneva in October 1990, from which a
very general declaration was duly produced (Appendix II). The
scientists were clearly worried, but the political documents did
not advocate or facilitate commensurately dramatic action and
the politically unimportant mountains were virtually missed out.
In an attempt to reach consensus, the lowest common denominator
prevailed. The Gulf crisis did not help. The shortage of oil, or the
fear of shortage, constrained the chances of carbon restrictions in
the leading industrial countries, where lifestyles are based on high
energy consumption.
Most of the detailed recommendations concerning mountains
were contained in the Report of Working Group 2, which is sum-
marized in Appendix I. Although the focus of the group was on the
cryosphere (defined as "seasonal snow cover, near-surface layers
of permafrost and some masses of ice"), there was much reference
and relevance to mountains. The Working Group 2 report was
based on assumptions at the higher end of the climate-change
estimates, despite the more guarded position of the WG1 report.
Most of the scientific evidence was gathered before WG1 changed
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tack, and the calculations could not easily be redone.
The conclusion from WG2 was that the cryosphere would be
"substantially" reduced by warming and that there would therefore
be very significant impacts and socioeconomic effects. WG2's major
recommendations for action related to the importance of getting
better data and improving the models as well as assessing the
needs, especially for protected areas, and providing educational
materials (see Appendix I.) The scientific conclusions to the
World Climate Conference stressed the need for more research,
especially on the role of ice.
The research response is also prominent in the other inter-
national agencies working on climate change in the mountains.
UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere programme, which had estab-
lished a special project on mountains in 1973, had a long-standing
interest in climatic interactions with the wider environment. The
UN University Highland-Lowland Interaction Project worked
within a context where mountains were considered in their inter-
actions, especially with related river systems. FAO has worked on
mountain watersheds.
Large sums of money are currently being committed to pro-
grammes which are duplicating each other or reinventing the
wheel. Very few programmes are action orientated. Some action
elements were included in International NGO's programmes, such
as the IUCN, where protected areas were seen as a means of miti-
gating some of the effects of climate change. (See Appendix IV.)
The research emphasis is necessary but not sufficient. Action is
needed before all the research is in, not least because an over-
whelming proportion of the evidence points in the same direction
and because it is clearly necessary to attack the root problem of
the generation of greenhouse gases as soon as possible. But how
can this action be implemented, especially at international levels?
Working Group 3 of the IPCC produced a set of response scenarios
(summarized in Appendix V), a shopping list of measures needed
to stabilize and bring down emissions and concentrations. In the
event, the World Climate Conference, in its final Ministerial
Declaration (Appendix II), opted to produce - much to the
annoyance of the NGOs - few of the targets suggested in WG3,
offering instead some rather pious hopes. Greenpeace saw an
unholy alliance between "climate criminals" - the USA, USSR,
UK and Middle Eastern Oil States.
Many scientists were also disappointed. There was a very large
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measure of agreement amongst those working in WG1 concerning
the probability of the greenhouse effect. The WG3 report was
called "full of politics" by Bolin (Greenpeace 1990). But in fact
political influences were obvious from the start in all the working
groups. These influences were reflected in the chairmanship and,
to some extent, the stance of the different working groups in the
IPCC. The United Kingdom chaired Working Group 1 which
gathered together the scientific evidence; the Soviet Union the
group on the effects(2) and the USA that on responses(3). The groups
had communication problems, as the New Scientist put it (23 June
1990), working mainly in parallel, though there should have been
a linear sequence from WG 1 to the others. The situation was
further complicated when in mid 1990 WG1, for reasons that
remain obscure, effectively shifted the goal posts, toning down
the temperature estimates and estimates of sea-level rises.
If the responses at the end of the World Climate Conference
really fudge the issues, what international approaches are neces-
sary, particularly in the mountains? Three interrelated approaches
may be identified: legal regulation; education; market forces. The
last may be discounted to some extent. Some have argued that
much of environmental economics represents market failure in that
there is a basic contradiction between short-term profit-seeking
and the long-term stability necessary for optimum environmental
management. None of this excludes the operation of financial
incentives and disincentives or price signals, nor of a fundamental
role for consumer demand. Ultimately, it is the consumer who pays
for environmental degradation.
Fiscal measures have been suggested - such as the "polluter
pays" principle or emission trading - where companies (or coun-
tries) may pollute in one place above norms, provided that other
sites are below. Neither has proved practical. The history of the
"polluter pays" principle is not overly optimistic. It was once
thought to be the panacea for all environmental degradation,
but failure has now been generally admitted, mainly because
the buck could be passed. Charges, fines, etc., can be converted
into licences or passed on down the consumer chain. Taxes may
be avoided or evaded. Carbon price rises do not necessarily
work either. Automobile fuels are rather inelastic factors, and
fuel accounts only for 10 per cent of the costs of running a
vehicle. Anyway, as we have noted, carbon has a long life in the
atmosphere.
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Other schemes suggested have been to establish an insurance
fund, increasing existing insurances by 1-2 per cent, or using
the peace dividend released by demilitarization. Apart from the
complications of such schemes and the bureaucracy so created,
there is not much evidence that consumer and public behaviour
would be altered to the extent necessary to achieve a reduction in
pollution.
A major international effort at regulation has been to establish
intergovernmental conventions for pollution control. In 1979
a Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(CLRTAP) was concluded by the nations of the industralized
countries through the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (which also includes North America). In 1987 a protocol
was signed requiring a 30 per cent reduction of S02 emissions and
in 1989 a second for the phased reduction of NOx and negotiations
are taking place on YOCs. Some have rated CLRTAP a success,
though the process has involved much slow diplomatic wrangling
and there has been a good deal of backsliding. Certainly the number
of trees dying in the mountain regions of Europe has continued to
increase.
The most rapid international action has been directed towards
the prevention of ozone depletion because of the deadly nature
of ultraviolet radiation. A large number of countries met in
Montreal in 1987 to reduce the use of CFCs and halons - the
former by 20 per cent in 1994 (50 per cent by 1999); the latter
to be eliminated three years after ratification of the agreement. At
the London Conference in 1989 more stringent restrictions were
proposed. The efficiency of ozone prevention, however, has been
queried, as there are exceptions for countries which have lagged
behind industrially. Moreover, there is at present a large stock of
CFCs in existing refrigerators which will find their way into the
atmosphere.
The restriction of CO2 emissions has been a slower process.
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarize the targets that have been adopted
up to October 1990 in a number of leading countries, as well as
desirable goals; more promises were made at the World Climate
Conference in November, though at best these looked forward to
stabilization by the year 2000. Although scientists have estimated
that an immediate 50-80 per cent carbon cut is required, much
less is politically acceptable - the best is probably a 20 per cent
reduction by the year 2005, which has formed the basis for a
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Table 6.1: Global carbon emissions 1988 and goals for 2000 and
2010
1988 2000 2010
Area Carbon Per Carbon Per Carbon Per
(miotons) capita (miotons) capita (miotons) capita
(tons) (tons) (tons)
North 1,379 5.07 897 3.03 662 2.13
America
Soviet 1,428 3.55 964 2.23 872 1.91
Union and
Eastern
Europe
Oceania 336 2.27 284 1.79 270 1.65
Latin 910 2.09 803 1.46 764 1.18
America
Western 774 2.03 699 1.79 664 1.67
Europe
Middle 187 1.14 187 0.83 217 0.74
East
Africa 534 0.86 646 0.73 749 0.64
Centrally 774 0.66 932 0.69 1,082 0.73
Planned
Asia
Far East 833 0.55 998 0.52 1,158 0.52
Asia
World 7,319 1.42 6,435 1.03 6,438 0.93
Source: Leggett, J. (ed.), Global Warming - The Greenpeace report
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
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Table 6.2: National carbon dioxide targets
West Germany
Netherlands
Denmark
Italy
France, Belgium,
Luxembourg
UK
USA
Austria
Switzerland, Norway,
Sweden
New Zealand
Canada
Japan
Second World Climate
Conference-European
Community, Australia,
Austria, Canada, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland
Source: WWF
25% cut by 2005
Stabilize by 1994 and 3-5% cut by 2000.
Then substantial cuts thereafter
20% by 2000 and up to 50% by 2030
Stabilization by 2000 and possible 20% cut
by 2005
Support a Community proposal to stabilize
emissions at 1990 levels by 2000
Stabilize at current levels by 2005. Wide
range of measures in Patten Report (1990)
Bills pending in Congress for 20% cut
(Oregon already has legislation for 20%
cut by 2(05)
20% by 2005
Freeze at current levels. Sweden plans
CO2 tax (1991)
20% by 2005
Stabilize CO2 emissions at current levels
by 2000
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number of countries' goals. More palatable may be a one per cent
per annum reduction suggested by Canada at the Geneva Climate
Conference. As the tables show, even dramatic cuts will barely
reduce CO2 levels.
Figure 6.1: Impact on atmospheric CO2 concentrations of cuts
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Source: Leggett, J. (ed.), Global Warming - The Greenpeace Report
(Oxford: Oxford University Prss, 1990).
Current international action is directed towards a global con-
vention (Appendix VI) that might attempt carbon reduction, as
well as a protocol reversing deforestation. Such a convention
is infinitely more difficult than the Montreal Protocol or the
CLRTAP, since carbon control strikes at the heart of contemp-
orary industrialization. In recent conferences such as the 1990
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Ministerial Meeting on Sustainable Development convened by
Mrs Brundtland in Bergen, leading industrial nations such as
the USA and UK were careful to avoid precise targets and sent
low-level delegations. The weak conclusion to the World Climate
Conference merely continues this trend. The forestry proposals
certainly have precise targets - for example 12 million hectares
per annum to soak up the carbon - but some fear that this planting
will be in inappropriate large-scale tropical forests, and not in the
mountains.
To reduce carbon emissions does not require only legislation
and incentives, especially in the industralized countries where
most (70-90 per cent) of the emissions originate. Also required
is a carrot-and-stick approach encouraging alternative fuels. There
are clear figures showing the value of alternative energy sources
(see Table 6.3).
Table 6.3: Costs of avoiding carbon emissions associated with
alternatives to fossil fuels, 1989
Fossil fuel
alternative
Improving energy
efficiency
Wind power
Geothermal energy
Wood power
Steam injected
gas turbine
Solar thermal
(with gas)
Nuclear power
Photovoltaics
Combined-cycle coal
Generating
cost
(cents/kwh)
2.0-4.0
6.4
5.8
6.3
4.8-6.3
7.9
12.5
28.4
5.4
Carbon
reduction
(percent)
100
100
99
100
61
84
86
100
10
Estimated
poUution cost
(cents/kwh)
0.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
0.5
0.2
5.0
0.0
1.0
Carbon
avoidance
cost ($Iton)
,0.16
95
125
125
97-178
180
535
819
954
Source: Leggett, J. (ed.) Global Warming - The Greenpeace Report
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
The switch to alternative fuels has thus far been piecemeal,
internationally. Nuclear accidents have made governments wary
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of this. There is sometimes a backlash effect. Sweden has said
that having given up nuclear power, it cannot reduce fossil fuels.
Although some emphasis is being given to solar hydrogen, natural
gas, wind, geothermal and biomass, there is not much international
action. Reforestation is still a minor activity without adequate
international co-ordination. Only Europe and Japan are currently
increasing their forested areas, despite the pressures of interna-
tional NGOs devoted to this purpose, such as Global Releaf. In
any case, reforestation must be accompanied by other measures
which also reduce CO2, Table 6.4 summarizes the possibilities.
Mountains, where water, wind and insolation are to be found in
abundance, could play a major role in this process, especially the
production of solar hydrogen. In addition, there are vast reserves
of non-polluting natural gas under the Alps.
Figure 6.2: Projected man-made CO2 emissions (billion or 1,000 million
tonnes carbon per year)
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If legislation has not worked well, more may have been -
and will be - achieved by improved education, training, aware-
ness and communication. The key to carbon reduction is, after
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Table 6.4: Potential CO2 reductions from various response
strategies given as gigatonnes of carbon per year - c:rclYr
1986 2005 2020
Historical emissions 6.8
Projected emissions (base case) 8.5-9.5 10.0-12.3
Potential reductions from specific
measures
Efficiency 0.8-1.4 1.7-3.0
Shifts in fossil-fuel mix 0.2--0.2 0.2--0.3
Afforestation 1.5-1.5 1.7-2.0
Energy technologies
Solar technologies 0.4-0.7 1.4-2.9
Wind 0.06-0.1 0.1--0.2
Geothermal 0.02--0.02 0.2--0.2
Biomass 0.4-0.4 1.0-1.0
Measures with severe environmental
and/or sociopolitical limits
Hydroelectric 0.0--0.1 0.0--0.5
Nuclear 0.0--0.3 0.0--0.6
Total of potential reductions 3.4-4.7 6.3-10.7
Feasible reductions, corrected for 3.0-4.5 5.2-8.8
possible double-counting
Scale of potential reductions
2005 2020
Feasible reductions as percentage of
projected emissions
Difference between projected emissions
levels (after feasible reductions) and the
1986 emissions expressed as a percentage
-30%--> - 50% --40%--> -90%
(---40% ) (---{i()%)
-50%--> -40% +5%--> -80%
(--25%) (---40%)
Source: Jager, J. (ed.), Responding to Climate Change (Stockholm:
Stockholm Environment Institute, 1990).
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all, changed behaviour. Certainly there have been efforts at
comprehensive environmental education relating to mountains
by UNESCO (1990) and UNEP (1990) involving the long-term
reconstruction of school curricula as well as shorter-term goals of
training key groups (decision-makers, professionals).
WWF, Mountain Wilderness and the Alpine Clubs have been
active in raising awareness about mountain problems using a wide
range of media. An interesting example of a recent campaign has
been the Bellerive Foundations Alp Action project. This project,
initiated by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan in 19901, attempted to
mobilize different sectors - science, conservation, government and
industry - to publicize the plight of the mountains and successful
grass-roots solutions (see Table 6.5). This book itself is a product
of Bellerive's effort to promote more widely information about
climate change and mountains. A business sponsor was identified
for each project, to fund it and assist in advertising the messages
within it. One of the great innovations of Alp Action is its
pioneering efforts to convince and involve the business world.
Such a task, which seemed impossible a few years ago, is now
moving ahead. Alp Action has been able to utilize networks such
as the World Economic Forum to alert the business community.
A symposium at Davos in 1990 showed that there was a quite
distinct green tinge to what was assumed to be a conservative
world. Through Alp Action there are new joint projects between
business and radical ecological NGOs.
But the NGOs do not have enough political clout to go it alone.
What alternatives are there? At present the United Nations family
do not even have enough teeth to chew over the necessary
arrangements, let alone produce a legal digest. UNEP has only
a small budget and is tied up in the red tape which plagues all
UN bureaucracies. Plans do exist for radical changes. The (1989)
Hague Meeting of seventeen leading industrialized countries pro-
posed a new and strengthened institutional authority with powers
to carry out a global warming agreement. Such a body would
not only prepare for climate changes but, as in arms control,
ensure that there were adequate verification measures. Such an
authority must involve the blossoming NGO movement and the
business world.
Any international authority requires a firm legal framework.
How far have the negotiations for a Climate Convention gone
in achieving this goal? In Appendix VI we reproduce the present
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Table 6.5: Alp Action projects
1. TIlE RETURN OF mE BEARDED VULTURE: A living symbol for
Switzerland's 700th Anniversary - Europe
2. RESTORING TIIAUR'S FIFTEENTII CENTURY PISCICULTURE: A
guarantee for the future of endangered Alpine fish - Innshruck, Austria
3. BERGWALD: Help conserve the protective functions of mountain forests
- Switzerland
4. lflGH-QUALITY WATER SUPPLY FOR CHALETS IN THE PAYS
D'ENHAUT ALPAGES - Switzerland
5. TIlE "SISTINE CHAPEL OF ITALIAN CERAMICS": Highlighting a
seventeenth-<:entury cultural heritage - Italy
6. ADOPT A BEAR: Don't be intimidated by the largest animal in the Alps
-Austria
7. LOVELY LAC LAMOURA: Caring for a threatened ecosystems - France
8. TRANSALPINE EXPLORERS: A new adventure game on Alpine nature
and culture - Europe
9. ALPINE GOAT·SHED AND CHEESE-DAIRY: Promote the production
of "Greina Goat Cheese" - Switzerland
10. HEDGES MATTER: Raising children's awareness through field action -
Liechtenstein
11. REVITALIZING mE INN RIVER'S ALLUVIAL FORESTS: a new
enrichment for the Engadine landscape - Switzerland
12. BET ON THE LYNX: Help our largest cat recolonize the "triple border
area" - Yugoslavia, Italy, Austria
13. WATCHING NATURE: A public observatory in a restored founeenth-
century watchtower - France
14. SOLAR PLANT FOR ELECTRIC CAR: Culture reborn in the Vanil Noir
- Switzerland
15. mE FLIGHT OF mE MYTIIICAL GRIFFON VULTURE: A summer
dream comes true - Italy
16. PRESERVING AN ANCIENT HANDICRAFr: Culture reborn in the
Vanil Noir - Switzerland
17. RESTORING A WETLAND PARADISE FOR FAUNA AND FLORA
- France
18. CHILDREN'S SKI DISCOVERY OF ALPINE LIFE - Germany
19. FLOATING ISLAND: To shelter nesting seabirds in "Les Grangettes" -
Switzerland
20. ALPINE DATABANK: A videodisk for the Chateau des Rubins - France
21. SOLAR ENERGY: A new power for schoolchildren - Switzerland
22. PRESERVATION OF THE INNSBRUCK PASQUE·FLOWER: Ensuring
the survival of a highly threatened botanical marvel - Austria
23. A PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK ON SOFT TOURISM HOTEL MAN-
AGEMENT - Switzerland
24. CHILDREN PROTECT BIRDS IN THE YUGOSLAVlAN ALPS -
Yugoslavia, Albania
25. SOLAR POWER PLANT: An initiation centre for renewable energy
- France
26. WHAT FUTURE FOR ALPINE CULTURE AND LANDSCAPES?: A
cinema trilogy will answer your questions - France
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framework for discussion. In many ways, the analogy of the Mon-
treal Convention and Vienna Protocols for Ozone are useful, since
specific targets were involved. But any international agreements
are only as good as the willingness of national governments to co-
operate, as the experience of controlling the horizontal and vertical
proliferation of nuclear weapons has shown. The experience of the
International Court of Justice in The Hague has exposed the limi-
tations of any international legal punitive measures. Monitoring
and verification remain difficult - despite detente. The history of
the Law of the Sea demonstrates how difficult it is for nations to
relinquish their sovereignty. The cryosphere is not even defined in
international law nor, apparently, to be covered in the proposed
Climate Convention.
The response most needed and most lacking in the mountains is
protection. Although it is not possible to erect a dome over the
mountains and exclude air pollution or prevent climate change,
there are still many benefits from protection. The system of
protection established by the United Nations and administered
by the World Conservation Union (mCN) envisages different
types of reserve, ranging from strict nature sanctuaries where
humans are not permitted through limited protection in national
parks to the biosphere reserve model where there are distinct
areas for multiple uses and buffer zones. In the European region
(apart from Iceland) no country has more than 15 per cent of their
area listed as protected. The mCN list (1985), however, covers
only protected areas over 1,000 hectares. In countries such as
Switzerland, there are many small village plots. In addition, there
are lists of protected wetlands or cultural sites which are separately
recorded.
Nevertheless, there is considerable scope for the extension
of protection. Reinhart Messner (personal communication) and
others have proposed that all permanent ice areas be made a
wilderness. Most of the worlds ice is in Antarctica, and the
present Franco-Australian initiative to establish a nature park
there - and especially to restrict mineral exploitation - is an
important step forward. Similar models have been suggested for
the Arctic, the Himalayas, and elsewhere. The world's ice might
well be administered by an international authority, possibly using
some kind of trusteeship arrangement. Like the oceans, this would
require an international Law of the Ice, which does not exist
at the moment, and the elaboration of the ideas suggested by
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the Brundtland Commission and the First World Conservation
Strategy (1980 and Dasmann and Poore)2 to regard areas such as
Antarctica as global commons. Even if such arrangements would
not necessarily stop melting, at least wildlife and local cultures
would be better protected.
Table 6.6: Protected areas in selected European countries and
regions
Country
Austria
France
Switzerland
Italy
Sweden
Norway
Iceland
Czechoslovakia
ArmeniasSR
GeorgiassR
Source: IUCN
Protected area
% Land area
13.2
7.5
0.4
0.9
2.3
1.5
59.8
7.9
6.8
2.0
ha/pop.
148.0
77.6
2.6
4.8
125.6
126.9
27,466.6
67.2
69.3
28.0
There is certainly a need to think about innovative ways in
which the cryosphere itself could be preserved. Here reforestation
is important to prevent erosion, to provide a carbon sink, and
because snow lingers longer, especially under conifer forest. The
preservation of wetlands is also significant, for in many mountain
areas the winters in anticyclonic conditions are cold enough but too
dry. The case for extending wetlands or adapting existing dams to
increase the frozen area in a controlled way is much more con-
troversial. Snow cannons have adverse effects on flora and fauna.
Cloud-feeding may also increase precipitation, though increases in
turbidity require unacceptable smoke or pollution levels.
Most of these panaceas involve a technology where costs prob-
ably outweigh benefits. More significant are those responses which
adapt to the changing climate, not only generic warming but
also the sudden changes typical of present climate change or
permafrost melting. Thus building and construction standards
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may be improved to withstand exceptionally heavy precipitation.
Alternative tourist activities may be scheduled for winter resorts
without snow - mountain biking, ice yachting, cultural events. In
general, the rising tree line is extending the area for reforestation,
but where dryness or acidity is a limiting factor, more efforts
might be made to improve grassland management. Experiments
from New Zealand, for example, have produced grasses which
practically grow in lemon juice. Grass has very important functions
in preventing erosion and retaining water. The tourist dimension
should not be neglected either. Psychologists have pointed to the
close bonding that people have to grassland landscapes, which may
explain the current fetish for golf in mountain as in other regions.
Throughout there needs to be an emphas:s on precautionary
and preventive measures. An expanded campaign of education,
training, awareness and communication can greatly assist this pro-
cess. The increasingly common disaster situations require plans,
equipment and an alert population. Funds, medicines, foods, etc.,
should be available but in situ in the mountains, where they are
required. Most ecologists dislike military analogies, but some of
the consequences of climate change are potentially as dangerous
as nuclear war. The political and popular response must be to be
forewarned and forearmed.
Conclusion
There is little point in reiterating the conclusions and recommen-
dations of the IPCC, the Second World Climate Conference, the
rash of new institutes climbing on the climate bandwagon, or even
of the emerging mountain NGO pressure groups. Mountains are
on the agenda for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) and climate change will receive much
attention. A network of mountain centres exists around the
world; key NGOs, like the International Mountain Society and
the Bellerive Foundation, are beginning to provide the necessary
co-ordination and stimulus for this network; working closely with
intergovernmental organizations.
All this is welcome and necessary, but not sufficient. Whatever
is planned for the mountains to prepare for climate change can
do little to turn the tide. Efforts to spray artificial snow on ski
slopes can hardly delay the demise of winter tourism and will
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hardly change the albedo effect. The greenhouse gases and the
pollutants will not go away for hundreds of years. Put crudely, the
mountains are at the mercy of the changing elements, as they have
always been.
What may be more readily - if not easily - changed are the
social, economic and political structures that affect the mountains,
at least in Europe. Robert Cox has claimed that the present is a
watershed in modern history. For the first time in Europe since the
Treaty of Westphalia (1648) the nation-state is threatened, both by
regional integration and by divisive ethnic forces. Restructuring is
in progress. An opportunity now exists for repairing the mountains
- the roof of Europe - whilst the renovation of the European house
is going on.3
A blueprint may be needed for mountain regions, promoting
both conservation and sustainable development. In Europe, where
there are ancient traditions and civilizations, there cannot easily
be a white wilderness. None the less, most mountain landscapes
and cultures could be protected. Such areas would have strictly
controlled multiple uses (farming, tourism, conservation etc.)
avoiding massive urbanization and industrialization. They might
be car-free and would certainly be demilitarized. Despite detente,
there remains a need for inviolable buffer zones, especially in times
of danger and anarchy.
How protection can be extended over the mountains remains
debatable. There is probably neither popular or political will to
embark on a comprehensive programme for what are considered
to be marginal lands. In a market-orientated economy - now in the
East as well as the West - there is reluctance amongst consumers
and businesspeople alike to abandon growth and high-energy path-
ways. Draconian measures, even if necessary, are unlikely from
governments fearful of unpopularity and instability. Education and
awareness, although hardly successful in the past, are a last hope.
Globally, we feel that a broad convention dealing with atmos-
phere, socioeconomic development, population, energy, technol-
ogy and environment is required. The work carried out so far (see
Appendix 6) is a first step. In our opinion, a gradual process of
consensus, with all stakeholders taking part, is necessary. This can
be achieved by a broad-scale convention. According to Nitze it
is necessary to build this convention from a bottom-up process
instead of the traditional top-down undertaking.4 He recommends
that the convention have a number of targets - for instance:
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• the industrial countries should stabilize their emissions of
greenhouse gases within x years of signing the convention;
• every signatory should agree on an energy efficiency of y
percent within x years;
• every signatory would ensure no net loss of forests after x
years, etc.5
Based on our earlier discussion of the possibilities of mitigating
the greenhouse gases, we believe that Speth has, in an excellent
manner, formulated the topics which must be covered in the
proposed global convention. In his view, these are the required
steps or topics:
• a demographic transition towards stable populations, both in
nations where growth is explosive and on a global basis
before the world's population doubles again;
• a technological transition away from today's resource-inten-
sive, pollution-prone technologies to a new generation of
environmentally benign ones;
• an economic transition to a world economy based on reliance
on nature's "income", not on depletion of its "capital";
• a social transition to a more equitable sharing of environmen-
tal and economic benefits;
• a transition in information and consciousness to a far more
profound understanding of global sustainability;
• an institutional transition to new arrangements among govern-
ment and peoples that can achieve environmental security.6
The wheel should not be reinvented in this process. Apart from
a climate-change convention, there are proposals for conventions
on biological diversity and an international instrument on forests
(Maini 1991). There are also existing international conventions
which have relevance - including the conventions on Wetlands of
International Importance the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage (Paris, 1972), the International Trade in Endan-
gered Species (CITES) (Washington, 1973); not to mention the
pollution instruments, e.g. ozone (Vienna, 1985; Montreal, 1987),
transboundary air pollution (Geneva, 1979) and as regional docu-
ments designed to protect natural resources (Washington, 1940;
Algiers, 1968; Brasilia, 1978; Bern, 1979; Kuala Lumpur, 1985).
The forest instrument in particular has great potential. Accord-
ing to a Report of the Secretary-General for the Preparatory
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Committee of the UNCED (NConf 151/PC/27, 5 February 1991,
p. 31) this instrument should:
• fully integrate all aspects of environmental protection and
economic development as they relate to all forests, whether
boreal, temperate or tropical;
• ensure a vital increase in international co-operation for poli-
cies and programmes aimed at forest conservation and sustain-
able use;
• complement other international initiatives with implications
for aspects of forestry, notably the climate change and
biodiversity conventions;
• ensure the incorporation of the concept of sustainable man-
agement of forests and its relation with food, fuel, shelter and
timber;
• provide a framework for increased national efforts and bring
together both the ecological and economic approaches to the
use of forest resources;
• provide a mechanism to monitor its implementation, to assess
progress and to co-ordinate international action.
So far, mountains have not been particularly prominent in the
forestry discussions, and the case for their protection should be
made here and in the other conventions we have mentioned.
A case may be made for a separate international convention
for the mountains. There is little in international law on the
cryosphere apart from the Antarctic treaty system, and ice is
poorly defined, if defined at all. The objectives need not be
only, or mainly, a set of mandatory prescriptions but rather
"softer" legal instruments embracing guidelines, codes of ethics,
etc. There has already been a series of international meetings
which have set out what is known and what should be done,
including Littlehammer (UNESCO, 1973), Mohonk and Honolulu
(1986, 1988). UN University and International Mountain Society,
Tshakadzor USSR (1989), (Geneva - Bellerive - 1989), Davos
(Bellerive, 1990, 1991). The 1989 Geneva Meeting produced the
"Bellerive Initiative" which, although concerned with the Alps,
set out ten action steps which might be applied in any mountain
region (see Appendix VII).7
Since every mountain range is different, a complementary
approach may be to generate conventions for the twenty or more
main ranges of the world. One model is the Alpine Convention,
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which has attempted, not altogether successfully, to harmonize
several existing legal systems. Since many mountain ranges are
international - indeed, are boundaries between countries and
cultures - this task will involve delicate negotiations. An alter-
native is to elaborate microscale frames for valleys; this also
has the advantage of incorporating highland-lowland interactions
associated with the river systems and watersheds. These frames are
not necessarily mutually exclusive; international conventions may
serve as templates into which regional or local plans and frames
may be slotted.
There is an urgent need for action, both because of the problems
and because there are at present opportunities which may not
reoccur. The UNCED 1992 Conference (usually called ECO 1992)
in Rio de Janeiro is a unique event. Not since the Stockholm
Conference of 1972 has there been such a major gathering of those
who can influence the future of environment and development.
The NGOs, renamed the independent sector, are being given
a place at the table, even if they are not carving the joint.
The independent sectors include the CONGO group (NGOs in
consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council),
all other environment and development NGOs, business and
industry, trade unions, professional associations, scientific and
academic institutions, women's organizations, youth groups, reli-
gious and spiritual groups, indigenous peoples' organizations and
other citizen groups.
Before Rio the mountain constituency must get its act together -
not just to be on the agenda, but to push a pragmatic plan of action
designed to develop as well as protect. There are suggestions for
the latter (see Appendix III), even if they are disputed, but much
less that is innovative for the former in keeping with essentials of
sustainable development which will be the cornerstone of ECO
1992. Sustainable development has been defined as "development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (World
Commission, 1987). Implied in this concept is that growth is
not quantitatively limited (the idea that dominated in Stockholm
in 1972) but, through technology and human actions, can be
qualitatively reorientated. In this process there must be an alli-
ance of the best positive ideas, rather than conservative charities
and bureaucracies. This means bringing in those environmentally
conscious and responsible elements of the business community to
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help reformulate regulations, provide capital (in all its senses), and
above all assist in communication, education, training, awareness
and advertising environmentally benign products and services.s
What can the private sector do specifically? There have been
some concrete suggestions.2 Kramer, Chairman of ClBA Geigy
(lEB, 1989), has argued that, first of all, the private sector must
acknowledge that there is a problem and not fall into the trap
of advocating no action just because there is speculation and
uncertainty. Secondly, there must be a recognition that industry
is part of the problem rather than shifting the blame to others with
whom co-operation should be sought. Thirdly, the private sector
should pool its technical, scientific and financial resources. This
process has already begun through the International Chamber of
Commerce, the International Environment Bureau or the group
assembled for the World Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment by Schmidtheiny, called the "green titans".
Corbett (Monsanto - IEB, 1989) has continued this line of
thought by emphasizing that companies should do more than com-
ply with the legislation; rather, they should take initiative before
legislation. He cited examples of the voluntary phasing out of
CFCs (Dupont), reducing hazardous emissions (Monsanto), waste
elimination (Dow, Union Carbide, 3M) as well as widespread
efforts for improved efficiency and energy conservation. Corbett
also suggested that biotechnology might produce tree species more
resistant to pollution and better able to cope with climate warming,
though critics have seen this as dangerous "appeasement" of the
pollution threat.
The private sector has also produced codes of ethics, such as
the Valdez Declaration prepared after the Alaskan disaster. Alp
Action (Newsletter No.1, 1990) has featured this as a model
for the mountains. Alp Action, a programme encouraging the
corporate funding of environmental protection, has itself consist-
ently emphasized the need for the recognition of a responsible
attitude by industry and has awarded prizes to the environmentally
conscious.
Finally, the private sector has shown itself willing to work with
other NGGs or the independent sector, as it is now called. At the
Bergen Conference convened by Mrs Brundtl:md, a mechanism
was established for continuing contacts. Allhough critics have
claimed that industry is merely window-dressing to catch the
green consumer, the process of dialogue and negotiation must
International Responses 131
be engaged. The question is: how? The problem is that the
constituencies in the NGO network have not got their act together.
Although the 1990 Bergen Conference identified and brought
together at least five of the NGO sectors (industry, trade unions,
youth, environment groups, scientists), none focused clearly on the
mountains. Since Bergen, as part of the Rio process, the scientists
have attempted a "mountain agenda", organized by the Inter-
national Mountain Society, the United Nations University and
the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
in Kathmandu. This initiative relies on individuals filling out an
elaborate questionnaire which will be presented to governments at
Rio, as a status report and manifesto.
The scientists' initiative is necessary but hardly sufficient. The
International Mountain Society numbers scarcely a thousand
members, very few resident in the highlands of the world where
500 million people live. The questions asked by the scientist are
neither new nor always readily understandable at the grass roots.
Not all scientists are disinterested in a free-market world where
there is increased competition for grants and power.
There has been a tendency to skirt politically sensitive moun-
tains (e.g. Antarctica) and to neglect the cryosphere, the preserve
of the glaciologists. Antarctica, where 98 per cent of the world's ice
is located, must be closely integrated with climate-change reforms
because the continent affects the global climate in so many ways.
In the past, the cosy club of Antaractic Treaty powers has excluded
governments and NGOs alike. Even the Secretary-General of the
United Nations is not invited to the consultative meetings. Antarc-
tica, like the sea ice, is not national territory in international law,
even if some nations claim it - something like a global common.
The current ideas to create a protected world park in Antarctica
may be a useful model for the rest of the cryosphere, if not the
mountains. Certainly, a role should be explored for the UN, even
if of late it has become the cat's paw of national interests. Very
useful are the recent attempts by GIPRI, Bellerive and others to
mediate between conflicting positions and to open up the debate
to a wide public.9
For the mountains, an interesting alternative proposal has been
put forward by the Bellerive Alp Action programme. Alp Action
has consciously attempted to forge a fair and frank partnership
between all the actors interested in mountains and to unite them
in microprojects in which there is a strong participation, even
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initiation, from below. Alp Action has identified the key NGOs
working in the field and has sought the widest possible dissemi-
nation of good, innovative ideas. It is working closely with the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
but also with those who cannot easily fit into the bureaucratic and
diplomatic niceties that surround all UN activities.
A series of next steps should be urgently considered, including:
• the fuller incorporation of mountains and the cryosphere in
the World Climate Convention process. The cryosphere may
want separate treatment in a Law of the Ice process;
• the immediate expansion of protected areas in specially
designated mountain and mountain forest areas. A map for
the Alps was prepared as long ago as 1974 for the Trent
Conference (Club 1974);
• an intensive campaign of education, training and awareness;
• a coalition and network of interested NGOs and official
bodies to facilitate the exchange of information and improve
co-ordination. There are still major obstacles to communica-
tion between the cultures and language groups in Europe;
• increased participation at local level in reforestation schemes
such as the Bellerive Alp Action Green Roof project or
Global Releaf;
• more emphasis on the preservation of biodiversity through
more comprehensive red data books and rescue operations;
• the preparation of templates for sustainable development in
different mountain regions to feature soft tourism "distance"
employment lO, an agricultural renaissance and community
development;
• contingency plans and funds for surprises and disaster relief.
All this means that most ancient and difficult of tasks - changing
human nature rather than just nature. There is a need to be
much more aware of the cultural mosaic which has survived,
especially in the mountains. Those who demand the changes
come generally from the plains and have too little appreciation
of mountain traditions. There will be a limited effect if there
is no communications and co-operation with and sympathetic
comprehension of the grass roots that struggle to survive in the
harsh mountain environment.
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APPENDICES

Appendix I
Impacts of Climate Change on Seasonal
Snow Cover, Ice and Permafrost and
Socioeconomic Consequences -
the IPCC Conclusions
Major findings
• The global areal extent and volume of the terrestrial cryo-
sphere (seasonal snow cover, near-surface layers of perma-
frost and some masses of ice) will be substantially reduced.
These reductions, when reflected regionally, could have
significant impacts on related ecosystems and social and
economic activities.
• Thawing and reduction in the areal extent of the terrestrial
cryosphere can enhance global warming (positive feedback
on climate warming) through changes in the global and local
radiation and heat balances, and the release of greenhouse
gases. This positive feedback could increase the rate of
., global warming and, in some regions, result in changes that
are sudden rather than gradual. The possibility of relatively
rapid changes increases the potential significance of the
,. 'fl assoc!ated impacts.
• -fhe areal coverage of seasonal snow and its duration are
projected to decrease in most regions, particularly at mid-
latitudes, with some regions at high latitudes in the Arctic
and Antarctic possibly experiencing increases in seasonal
snow cover.
• Decreases in seasonal snow cover can have both posi-
tive and negative socioeconomic consequences owing to
impacts on regional water resources, winter transportation
and winter recreation.
• Globally, the ice contained in glaciers and ice sheets is
projected to decrease. Regional responses, however, are
complicated by the effect of increased snowfall in some
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areas which could lead to accumulation of ice. Glacial
recession will have significant implications for local and
regional water resources and thus impact on water avail-
ability and on hydroelectric power potential. Enhanced melt
rates of glaciers may initially increase the flow of meltwaters;
however, flows will decrease and eventually be lost as glacial
ice mass decreases. Glacial recession and loss of ice from
ice sheets will also contribute to sea-level rise.
• Degradation of permafrost is expected, with an increase in
the thickness of the seasonal freeze-thaw (active) layer and
a recession of permafrost to higher latitudes and higher
altitudes. The thickness of the active layer is expected to
increase by I metre over the next 45-50 years. Although
major shifts are expected in climatic zones, recession of
permafrost will significantly lag behind, receding only 25-50
km during the next 40-50 years. These changes could
lead to increases in terrain instability, erosion and land-
slides in those areas which are currently underlaid by
permafrost.
• The socioeconomic consequences of these changes in
permafrost could be significant. Ecosystems underlaid by
permafrost could be substantially altered owing to terrain
disturbances and changes in the availability of water. The
integrity of existing and planned structures and associated
facilities and infrastructure could be reduced by changes in
the underlying permafrost. Retrofitting or redesigning would
be required at a minimum; however, in some situations the
associated terrain disruptions and/or costs (environmental,
social and economic) may be too large, necessitating aban-
donment. Development opportunities could also be affected
in areas where the risks associated with developing in an
area susceptible to permafrost degradation are assessed as
too high.
• The terrestrial cryosphere, because of its relative responsive-
ness to climate and climatic changes, provides an effective
means of monitoring and detecting climatic change.
• Lack of sufficient data and gaps in the understanding of
associated processes limit more quantitative assessments
at this time.
Principal issues
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The terrestrial component of the cryosphere consists of seasonal
snow cover, mountain glaciers, ice sheets and frozen ground,
including permafrost and seasonally frozen ground. These ele-
ments of the terrestrial cryosphere currently cover approximately
41 million square kilometres, with seasonal snow cover covering
as much as 62 per cent of the Eurasian continent and virtually all
of North America north of 35° latitude.
Projected changes in climate will dramatically reduce the areal
extent and volume of these elements of the terrestrial cryosphere.
This has implications not only with respect to changes in the
availability of fresh water and changes in sea-level and terrain
characteristics, but also for societies and related economic
systems which have come to depend on - or are limited by -
the existence of a terrestrial cryosphere.
Feedback mechanisms are an important factor in understand-
ing the impacts of climatic change on the terrestrial cryosphere.
Reduced areal coverage of these elements and degradation of
permafrost as a result of climatic warming can enhance warming
through changes in surface characteristics and release of green-
house gases. The impacts of socioeconomic consequences of
changes in the terrestrial cryosphere will depend to a large
extent on the rate at which the changes occur. Where the rate
of change is quick or sudden, environment and associated social
and economic systems will have little time to adapt. Under these
circumstances, the impacts and socioeconomic consequences
could be considerable.
Seasonal snow cover
General Circulation Models indicate that in most parts of the
northern and southern hemispheres the area of snow cover is
expected to decrease as a result of increased temperature and,
in most regions, a corresponding decrease in total mass of the
snow. Areas where snow cover is projected to increase include
latitudes south of 600S and higher elevations of inland Greenland
and Antarctica (though the latter is, and will remain, largely a cold
desert).
A reduction in the areal snow coverage and in the length of
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the snow-cover season will result in a positive climatic feedback,
increasing global warming as a result of the greater amount of
solar radiation that a snow-free surface can absorb relative to
one that is snow-covered. Loss of snow cover has both negative
and positive socioeconomic consequences. Decreases in snow
cover will result in increased risks of damages and losses for
those systems which rely on snow as protection (i.e. insulation)
from cold winter climates. Included are agricultural crops such
as winter wheat, trees and shrubs, hibernating animals, and
construction and maintenance of municipal infrastructures.
Reductions in both the temporal and spatial extent of seasonal
snow cover will have significant ramifications for water resources,
as the amount of water available for consumptive (e.g. potable and
irrigation water) and non-consumptive (e.g. hydroelectric power
and waste-management) uses decreases. Particularly sensitive
are those areas such as the Alps and Carpathians, the Altai
mountains of Central Asia, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya region
of the USSR, the Rocky Mountains and the North American Great
Plains, alI of which are dependent on snowmelt for the majority of
their spring and summer water resources.
Changes in snow cover will also affect tourism and recreation-
based industries and societies, particularly winter recreation
sports such as skiing. Projected climate change could eliminate
a $50 million per annum ski industry in Ontario, Canada.
From a positive-impacts perspective, reductions of seasonal
snow cover will reduce expenditure on snow removal, increase
access opportunities and ease transportation problems. A reduc-
tion in snow cover, however, will also have adverse impacts for
transportation in those areas which rely on snow roads in winter.
Inability to use snow roads will mean that other, more costly
methods of transportation will have to be used.
Ice sheets and glaciers
The relationships between climate and ice sheets and glaciers
are complex and, because of relatively limited monitoring and
research, not fulIy understood at this time. Increased tempera-
tures generalIy result in increased ablation, and hence in a
decrease in ice mass. Conversely, increased snowfalI usualIy
increases ice mass. Since projected changes in climate for some
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ice-covered regions include increases in both temperature and
snowfall, an understanding of the impact of climate changes
on glaciers and ice sheets must involve a consideration of the
combined impact.
The bulk of the earth's ice mass is stored in the Antarctic ice
sheet, divided between an eastern portion resting on continental
crust and a large western portion which is underlaid by both
continental crust and ocean. Much of the remaining ice mass
is contained in the Greenland ice sheet, with smaller quantities
stored in glaciers throughout the world. Although observed data
are limited, it is estimated that both the Antarctic and Greenland
ice sheets are at present roughly in equilibrium, with annual
gains close to annual losses. There is some evidence to suggest
that the Greenland ice sheet has been thickening since the late
1970s; this has been attributed to the new snow accumulations
on the ice sheet.
Greenhouse-gas-induced climatic change will tend gradually to
warm these sheets and bring them out of balance with the new
climate regime. Change in icc-sheet volume, however, is likely to
be slow, with significant loss unlikely to occur until after 2100.
Calculations for Greenland suggest that a 3 per cent loss of ice
volume in the next 250 years is possible, based on the projected
changes in climate. In the case of the Antarctic ice sheet, the
situation is more complex. The mass of the eastern ice sheet
is expected to remain virtually the same or increase slowly as a
result of expected increases in precipitation and temperatures.
In contrast, the western ice sheet, like other marine ice sheets,
is inherently unstable. Climatic warming could cause groundline
retreat and rapid dispersal of ice into the surrounding ocean
by way of relatively fast-flowing ice streams. These changes in
behaviour could lead to collapse of a portion of the western Ant-
arctic ice sheet; this, depending on the amount of ice involved,
could have a dramatic impact on sea level and the surrounding
environment.
The response of glaciers to climatic change will depend on
their type and geographic location. In general, however, they
have been shrinking for the last hundred years and are expected
to continue to do so in response to projected changes in climate.
In Austria a 3°C warming by 2050 is projected to cause a reduc-
tion by about one-half in the extent of Alpine glaciers. Melting
of glaciers in the Soviet Arctic archipelagos may result in their
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disappearance in 150-250 years. In contrast, an assessment of
mountain glaciers in the temperate zone of Eurasia indicates
that up to 2020 these glaciers will, in general, remain essen-
tially unchanged, with increased precipitation compensating for
increased melt.
Ice-sheet and glacier melting will result in higher sea levels.
Observations over the last century indicate that levels have been
rising between 1 an 3 millimetres a year, primarily as a result
of mass loss from Alpine glaciers. Current projections suggest
an accelerated rise with greenhouse gas warming to a most
probable rise of 65 centimetres by the end of the next century.
Glacial melting can act as a negative feedback to regional and
global warming, with heat extracted from the air to melt glacial
ice and snow, thereby reducing the degree of warming.
The melting of glaciers will also alter regional hydrologic
cycles. In New Zealand it has been estimated that a 3°C increase
in temperature would, in the short term, increase glacier-fed
river flow in some western rivers, increasing hydroelectric power
generation by 10 per cent. Another effect of glacier retreat
is possible increased debris flows. Large amounts of debris
masses on steep slopes will become exposed as a result of
glacial retreat and, therefore, would be unstable and vulnerable
to the effects of erosion. Landslides would result, leading to
burial of structures, traffic routes and vegetation. Obstructions of
river flows and increased sediment loads resulting in changes in
water quantity (e.g. local floods and reduced flows downstream)
and water quality would probably also occur as a result of
debris flows.
Permafrost
Permafrost is the part of the terrestrial cryosphere consisting of
ground (soil and rock) that remains at or below freezing through-
out the year. It usually contains ice which can take a variety of
forms, from ice held in soil pores to massive bodies of more or
less pure ice many metres thick. The presence of this ice in the
ground makes it behave uniquely as an earth material and makes
its properties vulnerable to climatic warming. At present about
20-25 per cent of the earth's land surface contains permafrost,
primarily in the polar regions but also in the alpine areas at
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lower latitudes. It occupies approximately 10.7 million square
kilometres in the USSR, 5 million square kilometres in Canada, 2
million square kilometres in China and 1.5 million square kilometres
in Alaska. Present and past climate is the major determinant of
permafrost occurrence and characteristics; however, a variety of
. other factors are also important - for example, the properties of
the soil, and overlying terrain vegetation and snow cover.
Permafrost is usually present where the mean annual air
temperature is less than -1°C. At temperatures near this value
it is discontinuous in extent (discontinuous permafrost zone).
Both its extent and its thickness increase at progressively higher
latitudes where temperatures are lower. It has been found to
extend to depths of approximately 1,000 metres or more in
parts of Canada, approximately 1,500 metres in the USSR and
100-250 metres in China.
Permafrost can also exist in seabeds. There is extensive
ice-bound material in the continental shelf beneath the Arctic
Ocean; however, this permafrost is commonly relict (i.e. it formed
under past conditions and would not form under current ones).
Permafrost is to a large extent inherently unstable, since it
exists so close to its melting point. Most responsive to changes
in climate would be those portions nearest the surface. Climate
warming would thicken the active layer, leading to a decrease
in soil stability. This permafrost degradation would lead to thaw
settlement of the surface (thermokarst), ponding of surface water,
slope failures (landslides) and increased soil creep. This terrain
instability would result in major concerns for the integrity and
stability of roads, pipelines, airfields, dams, reservoirs and other
facilities in areas which contain permafrost. Terrain instability
of the surface layer can also occur as a result of permafrost
degradation in alpine areas, such as the Alps. This instability
could result in dangerous debris falls from thawed rocks and
mudflows.
Slope failures, thermokarst and loss of near-surface moisture,
as the increased depth of the active layer moved limited water
supplies further from the surface, would have detrimental effects
on vegetation and could lead to significant decreases in plant
populations. In the longer term, permafrost degradation would
allow the growth of deeper-rooted, broadleaved species and the
establishment of denser forest of coniferous species. Wildlife
could also be affected through changes in terrain, surface
144 MOUNTAIN WORLD IN DANGER
hydrology and food availability. Loss of species and habitats
could be expected, especially where wetlands dry out or areas
are flooded as a result of melt.
Assessment of the effects of climate change on permafrost
in any particular location must consider factors other than
temperature - for example changes in summer rainfall and
snow cover. In general, however, the projected warming during
the next several decades would significantly deepen the active
layer and initiate a northward retreat of permafrost. It is expected
that a 2°C global warming would shift the southern boundary of
the climatic zone currently associated with permafrost over most
of Siberia north and northeast by at least 500--700 kilometres.
The southern extent of permafrost will lag behind this, moving
only 25-50 kilometres in the next 40--50 years (up to 10 per
cent reduction in an area underlaid by continuous permafrost).
The depth of the active layer is expected to increase by I metre
during the next 45-50 years. Projected changes in permafrost in
Canada are of a similar magnitude.
The melting of permafrost would result in the release of
methane and, to a lesser extent, CO2 from previously frozen
biological material and from gas hydrates. The extent to which
this will enhance the greenhouse effect is uncertain, but could
be about laC by the middle of the next century.
The socioeconomic impacts of permafrost degradation will be
mixed. Maintenance costs of existing northern facilities such as
buildings, roads and pipelines will tend to rise, with abandon-
ment and relocation needed in some cases. Change in current
construction practices will be necessary, as may be changes
in sanitary waste disposal. Benefits from climate warming and
permafrost melt are likely for agriculture, forestry, hunting and
trapping.
Recommendations for action
Projected greenhouse-gas-induced changes in climate will lead to
ablation of global ice masses. There is uncertainty, however,
regarding how this global response will be reflected at the regional!
local level and how the individual ice masses and seasonal ice
and snow will respond. The most important effects of climatic
change at high latitudes and elevated regions will be on and
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th~ough changes in the terrestrial cryosphere. Furthermore, the
terrestrial cryosphere is particularly suited for early detection of
the effects of climate change. These two points necessitate a
better understanding of the nature and dynamics of these ice
masses and the factors that control them. This will require:
• establishment or enhancement of integrated, systematic
observation programmes commensurate with research on
the use of more efficient ground-based systems and remote-
sensing technologies designed to provide baseline informa-
tion and trends;
• concurrent monitoring of those facilities, structures and natu-
ral resources that are at risk owing to projected changes in
the terrestrial cryosphere;
• establishment of new guidelines and procedures for design
and construction practices that consider the impacts of
climatic changes on permafrost;
• research, including international co-operative efforts, on
the relationships between components of the terrestrial
cryosphere and climate in conjunction with other determining
factors, including feedback mechanisms;
• refinement of existing climate-terrestrial cryosphere models;
• national and regional impact assessments that will provide
data and information on the impacts of climate change on
areas in which components of the terrestrial cryosphere
occur, and the socioeconomic consequences;
• assessment of the needs for protected areas (natural
reserves) for affected species and habitats; and
• development and distribution of relevant educational material
and information on climatic changes, their impacts on the
terrestrial cryosphere and socioeconomic consequences, as
well as a wider distribution of research results.
Appendix II
Ministerial Declaration of the Second
World Climate Conference
(7 November 1990)
Preamble
1. We, the Ministers and other representatives from 137 coun-
tries and from the European Communities, meeting in Geneva
from 6 to 7 November 1990 at the Second World Climate
Conference, declare as follows:
2. We note that while climate has varied in the past and
there is still a large degree of scientific uncertainty, the
rate of climate change predicted by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to occur over the next
century is unprecedented. This is due mainly to the con-
tinuing accumulation of greenhouse gases, resulting from
a host of human activities since the Industrial Revolution,
hitherto particularly in developed countries. The poten-
tial impact of such climate change could pose an envi-
ronmental threat of an up to now unknown magnitude;
and could jeopardize the social and economic develop-
ment of some areas. It could even threaten survival in
some small island States and in low-lying coastal, arid and
semi-arid areas.
3. We appreciate the work of the World Climate Programme
(WCP) during the past decade which has improved under-
standing of the causes, processes and effects of climate and
climate change. We also cOl/gratulate the IPCC, established
by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on
its First Assessment Report on Climate Change. It has
identified causes and possible effects and strategies to limit
and adapt to climate change and, in the light of the United
Appendix II 147
Nations General Assembly resolutions, has identified poss-
ible elements for inclusion in a framework convention on
climate change.
4. Recognizing climate change as a common concern of man-
kind, we commit ourselves and intend to take active and
constructive steps in a global response, without prejudice to
sovereignty of States.
I Global Strategy
5. Recognizing that climate change is a global problem of
unique character and taking into account the remaining
uncertainties in the field of science, economics and response
options, we consider that a global response, while ensuring
sustainable development· of all countries, must be decided
and implemented without further delay based on the best
available knowledge such as that resulting from the IPCC
assessment. Recognizing further that the principle of equity
and the common but differentiated responsibility of coun-
tries should be the basis of any global response to climate
change, developed countries must take the lead. They must
all commit themselves to actions to reduce their major
contribution to the global net emissions and enter into and
strengthen co-operation with developing countries to enable
them to adequately address climate change without hindering
their national development goals and objectives. Developing
countries must, within the limits feasible, taking into account
the problems regarding the burden of external debt and their
economic circumstances, commit themselves to appropriate
action in this regard. To this end, there is a need to meet
the requirements of developing countries, that adequate and
additional financial resources be mobilized and the best
available environmentally sound technologies be transferred
expeditiously on a fair and most favourable basis.
• Statement of sustainable development as agreed at the 15th session of UNEP
Governing Council (Annex II UNEP/GC 15/L.37)
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II Policy Considerations for Action
6. We reaffirm that, in order to reduce uncertainties, to increase
our ability to predict climate and climate change on a
global and regional basis, including early identification of
as yet unknown climate-related issues, and to design sound
response strategies, there is a need to strengthen national,
regional and international research activities in climate,
climate change and sea-level rise. We recognize that commit-
ments by governments are essential to sustain and strengthen
the necessary research and monitoring programmes and the
exchange of relevant data and information, with due respect
to national sovereignity. We stress that special efforts must
be directed to the areas of uncertainty as identified by the
IPCC. We maintain that there is a need to intensify research
on the social and economic implications of climate change
and response strategies. We commit ourselves to promoting
the full participation of developing countries in these efforts.
We recognize the importance of supporting the needs of the
World Climate Programme, including contributions to the
WMO Special Fund for Climate and Atmospheric Envi-
ronmental Studies. The magnitude of the problem being
addressed is such that no nation can tackle it alone, and
we stress the need to strengthen international co-operation.
In particular, we invite the 11 th Congress of the World
Meteorological Organization, in the formulation of plans for
the future development of the World Climate Programme,
to ensure that the necessary arrangements are established
in consultation with UNEP, UNESCO (and its IOC), FAO,
ICSU and other relevant international organizations for
effective co-ordination of climate- and climate-change-related
research and monitoring programmes. We urge that special
attention be given to the economic and social dimensions of
climate and climate-change research.
7. In order to achieve sustainable development in all countries
and to meet the needs of present and future generations,
precautionary measures to meet the climate challenge must
anticipate, prevent, attack or minimize the causes of, and
mitigate the adverse consequences of, environmental degra-
dation that might result from climate change. Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
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postponing cost-effective measures to prevent such envi-
ronmental degradation. The measures adopted should take
into account different socioeconomic contexts.
8. The potentially serious consequences of climate change,
including the risk for survival in low-lying and other small
island States and in some low-lying coastal, and arid and
semi-arid areas of the world, give sufficient reasons to begin
by adopting response strategies even in the face of significant
uncertainties. Such response strategies include phasing out
the production and use of CFCs, efficiency improvements
and conservation in energy supply and use, appropriate
measures in the transport sector, sustainable forest manage-
ment, afforestation schemes, developing contingency plans
for dealing with climate-related emergencies, proper land-
use planning, adequate coastal-zone management, review
of intensive agricultural practices and the use of safe and
cleaner energy sources with lower or no emissions of carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and other greenhouse gases
and ozone precursors, paying special attention to new and
renewable sources.
Further actions should be pursued in a phased and flexible
manner on the basis of medium- and long-term goals and
strategies and at the national, regional or global level,
taking advantage of scientific advances and technological
developments to meet both environmental and economic
objectives.
9. We note that per capita consumption patterns in certain parts
of the world, along with a projected increase in world
population, are contributing factors in the projected increase
in greenhouse gases.
10. We agree that the ultimate global objective should be to
stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with climate.
11. We stress, as a first step, the need to stabilize, while
ensuring sustainable development of the world economy,
emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Mon-
treal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
Contributions should be equitably differentiated according to
countries responsibilities and their level of development. In
this context, we acknowledge efforts already undertaken by
a number of countries to meet this goal.
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12. Taking into account that the developed world is responsible
for about three-quarters of all emissions of greenhouse gases,
we welcome the decisions and commitments undertaken by
the European Community with its Member States, Australia,
Austria, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and other developed coun-
tries to take actions aimed at stabilizing their emissions of
CO2, or CO2 and other greenhouse gases not controlled
by the Montreal Protocol, by the year 2,000 in general at
1990 level, yet recognizing the differences in approach and
in starting point in the fonnulation of the above targets. We
also acknowledge the initiatives of some other developed
countries which will have positive effects on limiting emis-
sions of greenhouse gases. We urge all developed countries
to establish targets and/or feasible national programmes or
strategies which will have significant effects on limiting emis-
sions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol.
We acknowledge, however, that those developed countries
with as yet relatively low energy consumption (measured
on a per capita or other appropriate basis) which can be
reasonably expected to grow, and some countries with econo-
mies in transition, may establish targets, programmes and/or
strategies that accommodate socioeconomic growth, while
improving the energy efficiency of their economic activities.
13. We urge developed countries, before the 1992 UN Con-
ference on Environment and Development, to analyse the
feasibility of and options for, and, as appropriate in light
of these analyses, to develop programmes, strategies and/or
targets for a staged approach for achieving reductions of all
greenhouse gas emissions not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol, including carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous
oxide, over the next two decades and beyond.
14. We recommend that in the elaboration of response strat-
egies, over time, all greenhouse gases, sources and sinks
be considered in the most comprehensive manner poss-
ible, and also that limitation and adaptation measures be
addressed.
15. We recognize that developing countries have as their main
priority alleviating poverty and achieving social and eco-
nomic development and that their net emissions must grow
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from their - as yet - relatively low energy consumption to
accommodate their development needs. Narrowing the gap
between the developed and the developing world would
provide a basis for a full partnership of all nations and
would assist the developing countries in dealing with the
climate change issue. To enable developing countries to meet
incremental costs required to take the necessary measures
to address climate-change and sea-level rise, consistent with
their development needs, we recommend that adequate and
additional financial resources should be mobilized and best
available environmentally sound technologies transferred
expeditiously on a fair and most favourable basis. Developing
countries also should, within the limits feasible, take action in
this regard.
16. The specific difficulties of those countries, particularly devel-
oping countries, whose economies are highly dependent on
fossil fuel production and exportation, as a consequence of
action taken on limiting greenhouse gas emissions, should be
taken into account.
17. We recommend that consideration should be given to the
need for funding facilities, including the proposed World
Bank/UNEP/UNDP Global Environmental Facility, a clear-
ing-house mechanism and a new possible international
fund composed of adequate additional and timely financial
resources and institutional arrangements for developing
countries; taking into account existing multilateral and
bilateral mechanisms and approaches. Such funding should
be related to the implementation of the framework convention
on climate change and any other related instruments that
might be agreed upon. In the meantime, developed countries
are urged to co-operate with developing countries to support
immediate action in addressing climate change including
sea-level rise without imposing any new conditionality on
developing countries.
18. We recommend further that resources be assessed. Such
assessments, to be conducted as soon as possible, should
include country studies and mechanisms to meet the financing
needs identified, taking note of the approaches developed
under the Montreal Protocol.
19. Financial resources channelled to developing countries should,
inter alia, be directed to:
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(i) Promoting efficient use of energy, development of
lower and non-greenhouse-gas-emilling energy tech-
nologies and paying special attention to safe and
clean new and renewable sources of energy;
(ii) Arranging expeditious transfer of the best available
environmentally sound technology on a fair and
most favourable basis to developing countries and
promoting rapid development of such technology in
these countries;
(iii) Co-operating with developing countries to enable
their full participation in international meetings on
climate change;
(iv) Enhancing atmospheric, oceanic and terrestrial ob-
servational networks, particularly in developing coun-
tries, to facilitate conducting research, monitoring
and assessment of climate change and the impact on
those countries;
(v) Rational forest management practices and agricul-
tural techniques which reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions;
(vi) Enhancing the capacity of developing countries to
develop programmes to address climate change,
including research and development activities and
public awareness and education.
Funding should also be directed to the creation of regional centres
to organize information networks on climate change in developing
countries.
20. Appropriate economic instruments may offer the potential
for achieving environmental improvements in a cost-effective
manner. The adoption of any form of economic or regulatory
measures would require careful and substantive analyses. We
recommend that relevant policies make use of economic
instruments appropriate to each country's socioeconomic
conditions in conjunction with a balanced mix of regulatory
approaches.
21. We note that energy production and use account for nearly
half of the enhanced radiative forcing resulting from human
activities and is projected to increase substantially in the
absence of appropriate response actions. We recognize the
promotion of energy efficiency as the most cost-effective
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immediate measure, in many countries, for reducing energy-
related emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide
and other greenhouse gases and ozone precursors, while other
safe options such as no- or lower-greenhouse-gas-emitting
energy sources should also be pursued. These principles
apply to all energy sectors. Transport energy use attracts
special attention of many of us in the light of its role in many
developed countries and of its expected importance in many
developing countries.
22. We recognize that there is no single quick-fix technological
option for limiting greenhouse gas emissions. However,
we are convinced that technological innovation as well as
individual and social behaviour and institutional adaptations
is a key element of any long-term strategy that deals with
climate change in a way that meets the goal of sustain-
able development. Therefore, we urge all countries, the
developed countries in particular, to intensify their efforts
and international co-operation in technological research,
development and dissemination of appropriate and environ-
mentally sound technologies, including the reassessment and
improvement of existing technologies and the introduction of
new technologies.
23. We urge that environmentally sound and safe technologies
be utilized by all sectors in all countries to the fullest
extent possible and further urge all countries, developed
and developing, to identify and take effective measures to
remove barriers to the dissemination of such technologies. To
this end, the best available environmentally sound and safe
technologies should be transferred to developing countries
expeditiously on a fair and most favourable basis.
24. We note that the conservation of the worlds forests in their
role as reservoirs of carbon along with other measures,
are of considerable importance for global climatic stabil-
ity, keeping in mind the important role of forests in the
conservation of biological diversity and the protection of
soil stability and of the hydrological system. We recognize
the need to reduce the rate of deforestation in consonance
with the objective of sustained yield development and to
enhance the potential of the worlds forests through improved
management of existing forests and through vigorous pro-
grammes of reforestation and afforestation, and to support
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financially the developing countries in this regard through
enhanced and well-co-ordinated international cooperation
including strengthening Tropical Forest Action Plan (TFAP)
and International Tropical Timber Organization (lITO). We
recommend that the protection and management of boreal,
temperate, subtropical and tropical forest ecosystems must
be well-co-ordinated and preferably compatible with other
possible types of action related to reduction of emission of
greenhouse gases, rational utilization of biological resources,
provision of financial resources, and the need for more
favourable market conditions for timber and timber prod-
ucts. The developing countries should be able to realize
increased revenue from these forests and forest products.
25. We also recognize that forests and forest products play a
key social and economic role in many nations and commu-
nities. We recognize that States have, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their juris-
diction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
26. We recommend that appropriate precautionary and con-
trol measures be developed and implemented at regional,
subregional and country levels as appropriate to counter
the increasing degradation of land, water, genetic and other
productive resource bases by drought, desertification and
land degradation.
Observatories on climate and climate change and observa-
tories on ecosystems should be encouraged to work together
on the consequences of drought. Studies must be undertaken
on drought and desertification.
We stress that stepped-up financial and scientific contribu-
tions should be provided to facilitate these efforts.
27. We recommend that similar measures be adopted to address
the particular problems and needs, including funding, of
low-lying coastal and small vulnerable island countries, some
of whose very existence is placed at risk by the consequences
of climate change.
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28. We call for negotiations on a framework convention on
climate change to begin without delay after a decision is
taken by the 45th Session of the General Assembly of the
United Nations recommending ways, means and modalities
for further pursuing these negotiations. Taking note of all
the preparatory work, particularly the recommendations
adopted on 26 September 1990 by the ad hoc working
group of government representatives and regional economic
integration organizations to prepare for negotiations on
a framework convention on climate change, we urge all
countries and regional economic integration organizations
to join in these negotiations and recognize that it is highly
desirable that an effective framework convention on climate
change, containing appropriate commitments and any related
instruments as might be agreed upon on the basis of consen-
sus, be signed in Rio de Janeiro during the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development. We welcome
the offer of the Government of the United States of America
to host the first negotiating meeting.
29. We recommend that such negotiations take account of the
possible elements compiled by the IPCC, and that the
framework convention on climate change be framed in
such a way as to gain the support of the largest possible
number of countries while allowing timely action to be
taken. We reaffirm our wish that this convention contain
real commitments by the international community. We stress,
given the complex and multifaceted nature of the problem of
climate change, the need for new and innovative solutions,
including the need to meet the special needs of developing
countries.
30. We also welcome the invitations of Thailand and Italy to host
workshops, respectively on the feasibility of forestry options,
and on all technologies for energy production and use and
their transfer to developing countries.
31. We believe that a well-informed public is essential for
addressing and coping with as complex an issue as cli-
mate change, and the resultant sea-level rise, and urge
countries, in particular, to promote the active participation
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at the national and, when appropriate, regional levels of
all sectors of the population in addressing climate-change
issues and developing appropriate responses. We also urge
relevant United Nations organizations and programmes to
disseminate relevant information with a view to encouraging
as wide a participation as posssible.
Appendix III
Mountains and the Cryospere - Proposals
for the World Conservation Strategy·
Issues
Mountains cover approximately 40 per cent of the earth's surface
and 10 per cent of the world's population live in these regions,
including some of the poorest tribal and indigenous peoples. Many
more people living on the plains depend on the mountains for
water, energy, forests, recreation and spiritual needs. Many of the
world's endangered species, including valuable medicinal plants
and cultivars, are located in specialized mountain microhabitats.
The cryosphere, the snow and ice regions of the world, may
extend at the height of the northern winter to 60 per cent of the
earth's surface. The cryosphere plays a vital role in regulating
climate change through the albedo effect, whereby heat is reflected
back to space.
Mountains and the cryosphere are currently under great threat.
In Europe more than 50 per cent of the forests are dying prema-
turely because of pollution and dryness. The melting of Alpine
glaciers is contributing to sea-level rises, whilst the melting of
the permafrost has led to disastrous rockfalls and damage to
roads and buildings. Human activities in this fragile ecosystem,
particularly tourism, are causing damage, especially in wetlands.
Erosion, the result of deforestation and poor grassland manage-
ment, is becoming more frequent, often producing disastrous
flooding downstream. Poverty is intense in regions such as the
Himalayas, Andes, Atlas and Ethopian highlands. Traditional
cultures and ways of life are threatened. There are many health
problems in mountain regions, respiratory ailments and diarrhoeas
• Draft statement presented to the General Assembly of the World Conservation
Union (IUCN): Perth, December 1990
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in the tropics and cancers, a consequence of ozone depletion, in
the north.
Recommendations
1. That an international campaign for mountain reforestation
be established. Climate changes will probably result in the
potential for forest planting at higher altitudes and latitudes.
Mountain forests may thus make a major contribution in the
carbon sink. Appropriate indigenous species planting should
be encouraged.
2. Governments and NGOs should be urged to increase the
areas of mountains and cryosphere under protection. Perma-
nent ice (including Antarctica) might be declared a wilder-
ness park with minimal human intervention. Below the nival
zones a major part of the land area might be protected. Pro-
tection should extend to the cultural as well as natural herit-
age. Provision should be made for the safeguarding of tra-
ditional agriculture, lifestyles and identities. Consideration
should be given to declaring mountains car-free zones. Ava-
lanche and erosion control should be included in protection.
3. An international campaign should be established to promote
better grassland management in mountain areas. Appropri-
ate species, especially those that are acid-resistant, should be
encouraged.
4. Alternative energy sources should be proposed for moun-
tain areas including solar hydrogen, minihydrels, biomass
and wind.
5. Alternative employment schemes are necessary for depressed
mountain areas. These should emphasise self-reliance and
take full advantage of appropriate technology, including
communications (telecottaging).
6. Research on biodiversity in mountain areas should be con-
tinued with red databooks for all major ranges.
7. An internationally co-ordinated education, trammg and
awareness programme should be established, drawing to-
gether existing efforts.
8. Templates for future conservation and development should
be prepared for all mountain ranges involving the fullest
participation of local communities.
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9. A network should be created of existing mountain centres
interested in mountain conservation. This network should
have access to a common databank of relevant information,
resources, consultant skills, etc.
10. An international fund should be established for the protec-
tion of the mountains with an international mandate and a
small secretariat. This fund should draw not only on the UN
but on NGOs and the business world.
Appendix IV
IPCC 3: Report of the Response Strategies
Working Group'"
The Scenarios
A. The 2030 High Emissions Scenario
• Few or no steps are taken to reduce emissions.
• Montreal Protocol comes into effect but without strengthen-
ing and with less than 100 per cent compliance by countries.
• Fossil fuels continue to dominate energy supply.
• Costs of solar electricity remain at current levels.
B. The 2060 Low Emissions Scenario
• Energy efficiency improves more rapidly due to such factors
as technology transfer.
• The share of primary energy provided by natural gas increases
significantly.
• Full compliance with the Montreal Protocol is realized.
• Tropical deforestation is halted and a global reforestation
effort begins.
C. The Control Policies Scenario
• Rapid penetration of renewable energy sources in the last half
of the next century (solar electricity costs fall to half of current
levels).
• Increased utilization of nuclear power.
• Montreal Protocol is strengthened to include a full phase-
out of CFCs and freezes on methyl-chloroform and carbon
tetrachloride.
• Extracted from Climate Change - A Reader's Guide to the IPCC Reports
(London: Greenpeace, 1990).
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• Agricultural policies yield reductions in emissions.
D. The Accelerated Policies Scenarios
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are similar to the Control Policies Scenario but feature much more
rapid development and penetration of renewable energy sources
(partly encouraged by global adoption of carbon fees of up to
$50/tonne of coal by the year 2025) plus greater use of nuclear
power.
Only in the Alternative Accelerated Policies scenarios is the goal
of the 1988 Toronto Conference "The Changing Atmosphere", for
a 20 per cent reduction in CO2 emissions by 2005, achieved.
Measures to Reduce Greenhouse Gases
In the shopping list of options produced by RSWG which could
reduce greenhouse gas emissions are:
• energy efficiency and conservation improvements;
fuel substitution by energy sources which have lower or no
greenhouse gas emissions, e.g. move from coal to gas, or to
non-carbon fuels such as solar or nuclear;
• reduction of emissions by removal, recirculation or fixation;
• management and behavioural changes (e.g. increased work
in homes through information technology) and structural
changes (e.g. shift towards public transport);
• phasing out CFC emissions and careful assessments of the
greenhouse gas potential of proposed substitutes;
• sustainable forest management and afforestation;
• review of agricultural practices to improve productivity and
reduce wastes.
Carbon Reductions in the Energy Sectors
1. Transportation Sector
Options include fuel substitution via fuels derived from bio-
mass, e.g. ethanol; electric or hydrogen-fuelled vehicles from
non-carbon-based electricity sources; and fuel-efficiency improve-
ments. All three options were regarded as more expensive than
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current options, because petroleum fuels are relatively cheap.
2. Buildings Sector
"Energy requirements in new homes could be roughly half of the
current average for new homes . . . and the technical potential for
retrofits could average 25 per cent." "Reductions of energy use
in existing commercial buildings by at least 50 per cent may be
technical feasible, and new commercial buildings could be up to
75 per cent more efficient."
3. Industry Sector
"The technical potential for efficiency improvements in the indus-
try sector ranges from 13 per cent in some subsectors to over
40 per cent in others." "Considerable opportunities for energy
savings also exist in the industrial sector by the recycling of
energy-intensive waste."
4. Electricity Sector
"The technical potential for greater efficiency in generation is
in the range of 15-20 per cent." "Overall, efficiency of the
electricity system can be improved through the use of least cost
utility planning."
Note: Research for Greenpeace has demonstrated larger technical
potential improvements in efficiency than those indicated here.
Feasibility and Costs of Reducing Energy Emissions
Feasibility
Around twenty case studies were provided by individual countries,
the European Community and the International Energy Agency.
Though developed using widely different dates, assumptions and
policy measures (where the effects of these were included), the EIS
subgroup made some general conclusions, including:
• reducing the annual growth in CO2 emissions in developing
countries from over 3 per cent to 2 per cent;
• slowing the growth in East European countries and the USSR
to stabilize emissions over the next two decades;
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• stabilizing or reducing West European emissions by early in
the next decade;
• slowing the growth in CO2 emissions in North American and
Pacific OECD countries.
Costs
Some preliminary cost figures were provided which suggested:
(a) "significant emissions reductions are available at low or nega-
tive costs when tested at social discount rates." "By 2020 this
might amount to around 20 per cent of global emissions."
(b) "A significant further tranche of emission abatement is poten-
tially available at relatively moderate resource costs."
(c) "as the scale of abatement rises, marginal abatement costs will
escalate."
Note: Many of the case studies presented included extremely
high "business as usual" emissions, way above those produced in
RSWGs "High Emissions" scenario. The UK case study, for exam-
ple, has been criticized by a range of academics and organizations
for this. A wide range of alternative scenarios have been produced
worldwide showing that significant carbon reductions are available
at low or zero cost. For example, a study by the Batelle Memorial
Institute on behalf of the US Environmental Protection Agency
covered eight OECD and East European countries. It concluded
that most countries "appear to be capable of holding emissions
constant at no real cost to their economies", and achieving 20 per
cent reductions at costs ranging from negative to 0.75 per cent of
GNP in 2020.
Policy Measures
The measures fall generally into three groups:
• Information measures.
• Economic measures, e.g carbon taxes, pollution permits.
• Regulatory measures, e.g. efficiency standards and least-cost
planning.
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REPORT OF THE SUBGROUP ON AGRICULTURE,
FORESTRY, AND OTHER HUMAN ACTIVITIES
Future Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Future greenhouse gas emissions in these sectors are difficult to
predict because of many uncertainties, but the IPCC estimates that
CO2 emissions from deforestation could range between 1.1 and
3.9 billion tonnes of carbon in 2020 (an increase of 40 to 90 per
cent), and that methane emissions from flooded rice will increase
by around 30 to 80 per cent in 2025.
Policies for Reducing Emissions
Near-Term Options
The opportunities for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and
enhancing carbon sinks in the near term include:
1. Foreslly
• Improve fuel efficiency, e.g. woodstoves.
• Introduce sustainable harvesting and natural forest.
• Large-scale afforestation and forest-protection plans.
• Ensure the health of existing forests by reducing pollution,
e.g. acid deposition.
• User available agricultural land for forestry.
2. Agriculture
• Reduce biomass burning.
• Reduce methane emissions through management of livestock
wastes and expansion of supplemental feeding practices for
livestock.
• Reduce nitrous oxide emissions through improved fertilizers,
and through better use of animal manure.
3 Waste Management
• Use landfill gas-collection systems and flaring.
• Use biogas systems to treat wastewater in development coun-
tries.
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Longer-Term Options
4. Forestry
• Implement improved global forestry management.
• Increase wood production and forest productivity.
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5. Agriculture
• Management of water regimes, development of new crop
systems, and more efficient use of fertilizers could lead to a
10 to 30 per cent reduction in methane emissions from flooded
rice cultivation.
• Reduce methane emissions from livestock by up to 25-75 per
cent through improved stock systems.
• Reduce trace gas emissions from biomass burning, land con-
version and crops through adoption of sustainable agriculture,
optimizing fertilizer use and improved pasture management
and grazing systems.
International Options
6. Forestly
• Strengthen and extend the Tropical Forestry Action Plan, the
role of the International Timber Trade Organization (lTTO)
and the role of development banks, the International Mon-
etary Fund, United Nations agencies and other multilateral
or bilateral international organizations in helping developing
countries to achieve conservation and the sustainable develop-
ment of forests and agriculture.
• At a special workshop on tropical forest in Sao Paulo,
Brazil, in January 1990 it was "recommended that a World
Forest Conservation Protocol, covering temperate, boreal and
tropical forests, be developed in the context of a climate con-
vention process that also addresses energy supply and use."
Planting Trees to Soak up Carbon Emissions
The amount of afforestation required to balance total anthropo-
genic carbon dioxide emissions would be about 1 billion hectares
(ha), or an area the size of Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals. Currently, only one million hectares per year are being
afforested. Afforestation on such a scale is impracticable; hence
forestry measures can play a minor but none the less important
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contributory role in reducing the build-up of greenhouse gases. It
is estimated that in 20-50 years, very roughly, up to 200 million
hectares might be planted, which would require an average rate of
4-10 million ha per year. Such an area could store up to about 20
per cent of present carbon dioxide emissions for a limited time.
Afforestation Scenarios: three scenarios of replanting were evalu-
ated by IPCC, including planting 6 million ha/year over ten years, 89
million ha/year over twenty years, or 10 million haiyear over thirty
years to offset 5 per cent, 13 per cent or 26 per cent of the 5.5GtC
currently released from burning fossil fuels annually. The estimated
costs total $222.4, $3.0 or $4.0 billion per year, respectively.
Note: The major tree-planting schemes implied by the above would
require huge agroforestry projects. There is major doubt as to the
productivity of such schemes over time, and uncertainty as to the
quantities of carbon which would actually be locked up in the trees.
Turning the trees into paper or burning the wood releases carbon
back into the atmosphere.
REPORT OF THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT SUB
GROUP
Responses to sea-level rise
The responses required to protect human life and property from
sea-level rise and associated impacts fall into three categories:
Retreat, Accommodation and Protection.
Retreat - involves no effort to protect the land from the sea.
Accommodation - implies that people continue to use the land at
risk but do not attempt to prevent it from being flooded.
Protection - involves hard structures such as sea walls and dykes,
as well as soft solutions such as dunes and vegetation, to protect
the land from the sea so that existing land uses can continue.
Environmental Implications of Policy Options
Two-thirds of the world's fish catch, and many marine species,
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depend on coastal wetlands for their survival. Without human
interference (i.e. the "retreat" option), ecosystems could migrate
landward as sea level rises and remain largely intact, although
the total area of wetlands would decline. Under the "protection"
option, a much larger proportion of these ecosystems would be
lost, especially if hard structures block their landward migration.
Economic Implications of Policy Options
No response strategy can completely eliminJlle the economic
impacts of climate change. In the "retreat" options, coastal
landowners and communities would suffer from loss of prop-
erty, resettlement costs, and the costs of rebuilding infrastruc-
ture. Under "accommodation", there would be changing property
values, increasing damage from storms, and costs for modifying
infrastructures. Under the "protection" option, nations and com-
munities would face the costs for the necessary structures.
"It is urgent for coastal nations to begin the process ofadapting to
sea-level rise - not because there is an impending catastrophe, but
because there are opportunities to avoid adverse impacts by action
now, opportunities that may be lost if the process is delayed."
Recommendations
National
• By the year 2,000, coastal nations should implement compre-
hensive coastal-zone management plans, and identify coastal
areas at risk.
• Nations should ensure that coastal development does not
increase vulnerability to sea-level rise.
• Emergency preparedness and coastal-zone response mecha-
nisms need to be reviewed and strengthened.
International Co-operation
• A continuing international focus on the impacts of sea-level
rise needs to be maintained.
• Technical assistance for developing nations should be pro-
vided and co-operation stimulated.
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• International organizations should support national efforts to
limit population growth in coastal areas.
Research, Data and Information
• Research on the impacts of global climate change on sea-level
rise should be strengthened.
• A global ocean observing network should be developed and
implemented.
• Data and information on sea-level change and adaptive options
should be made widely available.
Appendix V
Extract from Second World Climate
Conference - Conference Statement*
Part I: Main Conclusions and Recommendations
A. Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change
1. Emissions resulting from human activities are substantially
increasing atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases.
These increases will enhance the natural greenhouse effect, result-
ing on average in an additional warming of the earth's surface.
The Conference agreed that this and other scientific conclusions
set out by the IPCC renect the international CGnsensus of scien-
tific understanding of climate change. Without actions to reduce
emissions, global warming is predicted to reach 2 to 5° C over the
next century, a rate of change unprecedented in the past 10,000
years. The warming is expected to be accompanied by a sea-level
rise of 65 cm + 35 cm by the end of the next century. There remain
uncertainties in predictions, particularly in regard to the timing,
magnitude and regional patterns of climate change.
2. Climate change and sea-level rise would seriously threaten
low-lying islands and coastal zones. Water resources, agriculture
and agricultural trade, especially in arid and semi-arid regions,
forests, and fisheries are especially vulnerable to climate change.
Climate change may compound existing serious problems of the
global mismatch between resources, population and consumption.
In many cases the impacts will be felt most severely in regions
already under stress, mainly in developing countries.
3. Global warming induced by increased greenhouse gas concen-
trations is delayed by the oceans; hence, much of the change is
still to come. Inertia in the climate system due to the influence
• Extracted from SWCC 1990, Document No. 13 (mimeo)
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of the oceans, the biosphere and the long residence times of
some greenhouse gases means that climate changes that occur may
persist for centuries.
4. Natural sources and sinks of greenhouse gases are sensitive to
a change in climate. Although many of the response or feedback
processes are poorly understood, it appears likely that as climate
warms, these feedbacks will lead to an overall increase rather than
a decrease in greenhouse gas concentrations.
5. The historical growth in emissions has been a direct con-
sequence of the increase of human population, rising incomes,
the related exploitation of fossil fuels by industrialized societies
and the expansion of agriculture. Under "business as usual"
assumptions it is projected that emissions will continue to grow
in the future as a consequence of a projected doubling of energy
consumption in the first half of the twenty-first century and an
expected doubling of population by the latter half. As a result,
the effect of human-induced greenhouse gas concentrations on the
earths radiation balance would correspond to a doubling of carbon
dioxide by 2025 unless remedial action is taken.
6. Over the last decade, emissions of carbon dioxide (C02)
contributed 55 per cent of the increased radiative forcing pro-
duced by greenhouse gases from human activities. The CFCs
contributed about 24 per cent of the past decades changes and
methane 15 per cent, with the balance due to other greenhouse
gases. With controls on CFCs under the Montreal Protocol, the
relative importance of CO2 emissions will increase, provided the
substitutes for CFCs have minimal greenhouse warming potential.
Some 75 per cent of total CO2 emissions have come from the
industrialized countries.
7. The above emissions can be expected to change the planets
atmosphere and climate, and a clear scientific consensus has been
reached on the range of changes to be expected. Although this
range is large, it is prudent to exercise, as a precautionary measure,
actions to manage the risk of undesirable climate change. In order
to stabilize atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations by the
middle of the twenty-first century at about 50 per cent above
pre-industrial concentrations, a continous worldwide reduction of
net carbon dioxide emissions by 1 to 2 per cent per year, starting
now, would be required. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
change (IPCC) also considered three other emissions scenarios,
which would not lead to stabilization of CO2 concentrations in
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the twenty-first century. A 15-20 per cent reduction in methane
emissions would stabilize atmospheric concentrations of that gas.
8. This Conference concludes that technically feasible and cost-
effective opportunities exist to reduce CO2 emissions in all coun-
tries. Such opportunities for emissions reductions are sufficient
to allow many industrialized countries to stabilize CO2 emissions
from the energy sector and to reduce these emissions by at least
20 percent by 2005. The measures include increasing the efficiency
of energy use and employing alternative fuels and energy sources.
As additional measures to achieve further cost-effective reductions
are identified and implemented, even greater decreases in emis-
sions would be achieved in the subsequent decades. In addition,
reversing the current net losses in forests would increase storage
of carbon. The economic and social costs and benefits of such
measures should be urgently examined by all nations. An inter-
nationally co-ordinated assessment should be undertaken through
the IPCC.
9. Countries are urged to take immediate actions to control
the risks of climate change with initial emphasis on actions
that would be economically and socially beneficial for other
reasons as well. Nations should launch negotiations on a con-
vention on climate change and related legal instruments with-
out delay and with the aim of signing such a convention in
1992.
B. Use of Climate Information in Assisting Sustainable
Social and Economic Development
Climate data, analyses, and eventually climate predictions can
contribute substantially to enhancing the efficiency and secu-
rity of economic and developmental activities in environmentally
sustainable ways. These benefits are particularly important in
food and wood production, water management, transportation,
energy planning and production (including assessment of poten-
tial resources of biomass, hydropower, solar and wind energy),
urban planning and design, human health and safety, combating
of drought and land degradation, and tourism. This requires
both data on the climate system, and its effective application.
Data acquisition, collection, management and analysis must be
more vigorously supported in all countries, and special assistance
must be provided to developing countries through international
172 MOUNTAIN WORLD IN DANGER
co-operation. Transfer of techniques for applying climate infor-
mation should be accelerated through more widespread use of
software (e.g. CLICOM) for readily available personal computers
and other means. Further development of methods for predicting
short-term variations in climate and the environmental and social
impacts should be vigorously pursued. These advances would
provide enormous economic and other welfare benefits in coping
with droughts, prolonged rain, and periods of severe hot and
cold weather. Such predictions will require major steps forward
in ocean-atmosphere-biosphere observing systems. Much greater
efforts are also needed to increase involvement in these fields by
developing countries, especially through increased education and
training.
C. Priorities for Enhanced Research and Observational
Systems
1. A consensus exists among scientists as summarized in the
Report of Working Group 1 of the IPCC that climate change
will occur due to increasing greenhouse gases. However, there
is substantial scientific uncertainty in the details of projections
of future climate change. Projections of future regional climate
and climate impacts are much less certain than those on a global
scale. These uncertainties can be narrowed only through research
addressing the following priority areas:
clouds and the hydrological cycle
greenhouse gases and the global carbon and biogeochemical
cycles
oceans: physical, chemical and biological aspects; and
exchanges with the atmosphere
palaeoclimatic studies
polar ice sheets and sea ice
terrestrial ecosystems.
2. These subjects are being addressed by national programmes,
the World Climate Research Programme and the International
Geosphere-Biosphere Programme and other related international
programmes. Increased national support and substantially in-
creased funding of these programmes is required if progress
on the necessary time scale is to be made in reducing the
uncertainties.
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3. Present observational systems for monitoring the climate sys-
tem are inadequate for operational and research purposes. They
are deteriorating in both industrialized and developing regions. Of
special concern is the inadequacy of observation systems in large
parts of the southern hemisphere.
4. High priority must be placed on the provision and interna-
tional exchange of high-quality, long-term data for climate-related
studies. Data should be available at no more than the cost of
reproduction and distribution. A full and open exchange of
global and other datasets needed for climate-related studies is
required.
5. There is an urgent need to create a Global Climate Observing
System (GCOS) built upon the World Weather Watch Global
Observing System and the Integrated Global Ocean Service Sys-
tem and including both space-based and surface-based observing
components. GCOS should also include the data communications
and other infrastructure necessary to support operational climate
forecasting.
6. GCOS should be designed to meet the needs for:
(a) climate system monitoring, climate change detection and
response monitoring, especially in terrestrial ecosystems
(b) data for application to nalional economic development, and
(c) research towards improved understanding, modelling and
prediction of the climate system.
7. The main components of such a GCOS would be:
(1) an improved World Weather Watch Programme;
(2) the establishment of a global ocean observing system (GOOS)
of physical, chemical and biological measurements;
(3) the maintenance and enhancement of monitoring programmes
of other key components of the climate system, such as lhe
distribution of important atmospheric constituents (including
the Global Atmosphere Watch), changes in terrestrial ecosys-
tems, clouds and the hydrological cycle, the earth's radiation
budget, ice sheels, and precipitation over the oceans.
8. The further development and implementation of the GCOS
concept should be pursued, with urgency, by scientists, govern-
ments and international organizations. All countries must ensure
a full and open exchange of the datasets needed for climate
system research, process and impact studies, and modelling.
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9. The impacts of climate variability on human socioeconomic
systems have provided major constraints to development. Climate
change may compound these constraints. In semi-arid regions of
Africa, drought episodes have been directly responsible for major
human disasters. Research undertaken during the first decade
of the WCP and through other international and national pro-
grammes has improved drought early-warning systems, including
FAOs Global Early Warning System, and increased the reliability
of climate impact analyses. But much more remains to be done.
Intensified efforts are required to refine further our ability to
predict short-term climate variability, anticipate climate impacts,
and identify rational strategies to mitigate or prevent adverse
effects. The threat of climate change brings new challenges to
the future well-being of people. This requires greater efforts to
understand impacts of climate change. Mitigation and adapta-
tion strategies are also essential. Immediate steps to be taken
include:
(a) national and regional analyses of the impacts of climate
variability and change on society, and study of the range of
response and adaptation options available;
(b) closer co-operation and communication among natural and
social scientists, to ensure that climate considerations are
accounted for in development planning;
(c) significant increases in resources to carry out impact/adapta-
tion studies.
10. Improvements in energy efficiency and non-fossil-fuel energy
technologies are of paramount importance, not only to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions but to move to more sustainable devel-
opment pathways. Such advances will require research and devel-
opment, as well as technology transfer and co-development.
11. A specific initiative would create a network of regional,
interdisciplinary research centres, located primarily in develop-
ing countries and focusing on all the natural science, engineer-
ing and social science disciplines required to support fully inte-
grated studies of global change and its impacts. These cen-
tres would conduct research and training on all aspects of glo-
bal change and study the interaction of regional and global
policies.
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D. Public Information
People need better information on the crucial role climate plays
in development and the additional risks posed by climate change.
Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organi-
zations should give more emphasis to providing accurate public
information on climate issues. The public information and edu-
cation and training component in the wep and IGBP must also
be expanded.
Appendix VI
Possible Elements for Inclusion in a Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change*
Preamble
In keeping with common treaty practice, including the format of
the Vienna Convention, the Climate Change Convention would
contain a preamble which might seek to address some or all of the
following items:
• a description of the problem and reasons for action (need
for timely and effective response without awaiting absolute
scientific certainty);
• reference to relevant international legal instruments (such as
the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol) and declara-
tions (such as UNGA Resolution 43/53 and Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration);
• recognition that climate change is a common concern of
humankind, affects humanity as whole, and should be ap-
proached within a global framework, without prejudice to the
sovereignty of states over the air space superadjacent to their
territory as recognized under international law;
• recognition of the need for an environment of a quality that
permits a life of dignity and well-being for present and future
generations;
• reference to the balance between the sovereign right of states
to exploit natural resources and their concomitant duty to
protect and conserve climate for the benefit of humankind,
in a manner not to diminish either;
• endorsement and elaboration of the concept of sustainable
development;
• Extracted from IPCC
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• recognition of the need to improve scientific knowledge (e.g.
through systematic observation) and to study the social and
economic impacts of climate change, respecting national
sovereignty;
• recognition of the importance of the development and transfer
of technology and of the circumstances and needs, particu-
larly financial, of developing countries; need for regulatory.
supportive and adjustment measures to take into account
different levels of development and thus differing needs of
countries;
• recognition of the responsibility of all countries to make
efforts at the national, regional and global levels to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and prevent activities which
could adversely affect climate, while bearing in mind that:
most emissions affecting the atmosphere at present origi-
nate in industrialized countries where the scope for change
is greatest;
implementation may take place in different time frames
for different categories of countries and may be qualified
by the means at the disposal of individual countries and
their scientific and technical capabilities;
emissions from developing countries are growing and
may need to grow in order to meet their development
requirements and thus, over time, are likely to represent
an increasingly signifIcant percentage of global emissions;
• recognition of the need to develop strategies to absorb green-
house gases. i.e. protect and increase greenhouse gas sinks;
to limit or reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions;
and to adapt human activities to the impacts of climate
change.
Other key issues which will have to be addressed during the
development of the preambular language include:
• Should humankind's interest in a viable environment be char-
acterized as a fundamental right?
• Is there an entitlement not to be subjected, directly or indi-
rectly, to the adverse effects of climate change?
• Should there be a reference to the precautionary principle?
• In view of the interrelationship among all greenhouse gases,
their source and sinks, should they be treated collectively?
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• Should countries be permitted to meet their aggregate global
climate objectives through joint arrangements?
• Should reference be made to weather-modification agree-
ments such as the ENMOD Treaty as relevant legal instru-
ments?
• Is there a common interest of humankind in the develop-
ment and application of technologies to protect and preserve
climate?
• Does the concept of sustainable development exclude or
include the imposition of new conditionality in the provision
of financial assistance to developing countries, and does it
imply a link between the protection and preservation of
the environment, including climate change, and economic
development, so lhat both are to be secured in a coherent
and consistent manner?
• Should the preamble address the particular problems of
countries with an agricultural system vulnerable to climate
change and with limited access to capital and technologies,
recognizing the link with sustainable development?
• Is there a minimum standard of living which is prerequisite to
adopting response strategies to address climate change?
Definitions
As is the practice, definitions will need to be elaborated in a
specific article on definitions. The terms which will need to be
defined will depend on the purpose of the Convention and thus
the language used by the negotiating parties.
General Obligations
Following the format of such treaties as the Vienna Convention,
an article would set out the general obligations agreed to by the
parties to the Convention. Such obligations may relate to, for
example:
• the adoption of appropriate measures to protect against the
adverse effects of climate change, to limit, reduce, adapt to
and, as far as possible, prevent climate change in accordance
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with the means at the disposal of individual countries and
their scientific and technical capabilities; and to avoid creating
other environmental problems in taking such measures;
• the protection, stabilization and improvemenl of the compo-
sition of the atmosphere in order to conserve climate for the
benefit of present and future generations;
• taking steps having the effect of limiting climate change but
already justified on other grounds;
• the use of climate for peaceful purposes only, in a spirit of
good-neighbourliness;
• co-operation by means of research, systematic observation
and information exchange in order to understand beller and
assess the effects of human activities on the climate and the
potential adverse environmental and socioeconomic impacts
that could result from climate change, respecting national
sovereignty;
• the encouragement of the development and transfer of rel-
evant technologies, as well as the provision of technical and
financial assistance, taking into account the particular needs
of developing countries to enable them to fulfil lheir obli-
gations;
• co-operation in the formulation and harmonization of policies
and strategies directed at limiting, reducing, adapting to and,
as far as possible, preventing climale change;
• co-operation in the adoption of appropriate legal or adminis-
trative measures to address climate change;
• provision for bilaleral, multilateral and regional agreements
or arrangements not incompatible with the Convention and
any annex/protocol, including opportunities for groups of
countries to fulfil the requirements on a regional or subregional
basis;
• co-operation wilh competent international organizations effec-
tively to meet the objectives of the Convention;
• the encouragement of and co-operation in the promotion of
public education and awareness of the environmental and
socioeconomic impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and of
climate change;
• the strengthening or modification if necessary of existing legal
and institutional instruments and arrangements relating to
climate change;
• a provision on funding mechanisms.
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Other key issues which will have to be addressed in the process of
elaborating this article include the following:
• Should there be a provision selling any specific goals with
respect to levels of emissions (global or national) or atmos-
pheric concentrations of greenhouse gases while ensuring
stable development of the world economy, particularly sta-
bilization by industrialized countries, as a first step, and
later reduction of CO2 emissions and emissions of other
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol?
Such provisions would not exclude the application of more
stringent national or regional emissions goals than those
which may be provided for in the Convention and/or any
annex/protocol.
• In the light of the preambular language, should there be a
provision recognizing that implementation of obligations may
take place in different time frames for different categories
of country and/or may be qualified by the means at the dis-
posal of individual countries and their scientific and technical
capabilities?
• Should there be a commitment to formulate appropriate
measures such as annexes, protocols or other legal instru-
ments, and if so, should such formulation be on a sound
scientific basis or on the basis of the best available scientific
knowledge?
• In addressing the transfer of technology particularly to devel-
opment countries, what should be the terms of such trans-
fers (i.e. commercial vs. non-commercial, preferential vs.
non-preferential, the relationship between transfers and the
protection of intellectual property rights)?
• Should funding mechanisms be limited to making full use
of existing mechanisms or also entail new and additional
resources and mechanisms?
• Should provision be made for environmental impact assess-
ments of planned activities that are likely to cause signifi-
cant climate change as well as for prior notice of such
activities?
• What should be the basis of emission goals, e.g. total emis-
sion levels, per capita emissions, emissions per GNP, emis-
sions per energy use, climatic conditions, past performance,
geographic characteristics, fossil fuel resource base, carbon
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intensity per unit of energy, energy intensity per GNP,
socioeconomic costs and benefits, or other equitable consid-
erations?
• Should the particular problem of sea-level rise be specifically
addressed?
• Is there a link between nuclear stockpiles and climate change?
Institutions
It has been the general practice under international environmental
agreements to establish various institutional mechanisms. The
parties to a Climate Change Convention might, therefore, wish
to make provision for a Conference of the Parties, an Executive
Organ and a Secretarial.
The Conference of the Parties may, among other things: keep
under continuous review the implementation of the Convention
and take appropriate decisions to this end; review current scientific
information; and promote harmonization of policies and strategies
directed at limiting, reducing, adapting to and, as far as possible,
preventing climate change.
Questions that will arise in developing provisions for appropriate
institutional mechanisms include:
• Should any of the Conventions institutions (e.g. the Confer-
ence of the Parties and/or the Executive Organ) have the
ability to take decisions inler alia on response strategies or
functions in respect of surveillance, verification and com-
pliance that would be binding on all the parties and, if
so, should such an institution represent all of the parties
or be composed of a limited number of parties, e.g. based
on equitable geographic representation?
• What should be the role of the Secretariat?
• What should be the decision-making procedures, including
voting requirements (eg. consensus, majority)?
• If a trust fund or other financial mechanism were estab-
lished under the Convention, how should it be adminis-
tered?
• Should specific and/or other bodies be established on a
permanent or ad hoc basis, to provide advice and make rec-
ommendations to the Conference of the Parties concerning
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research activities and measures to deal with climate change?
• Should the composition of the above bodies reflect equitable
climatic or geographic representation?
• Should there be a provision for working groups, e.g. on
scientific matters as well as on socioeconomic impacts and
response strategies?
• Is there a need for innovative approaches to institutional
mechanisms in the light of the nature of the climate change-
issue?
• What should be the role of non-governmental organiza-
tions?
Research~ Systematic Observations and Analysis
It would appear to follow general practice to include provision for
co-operation in research and systematic monitoring. In terms of
research each party might be called upon to undertake, initiate,
and/or co-operate in, directly or through international bodies, the
conduct of research on and analysis of:
• physical and chemical processes that may affect climate;
• substance, practices, processes and activities that could modify
the climate;
• techniques for monitoring and measuring greenhouse gas
emission rates and their uptake by sinks;
• improved climate models, particularly for regional climates;
• environmental, social and economic effects that could result
from modifications of climate;
• alternative substances, technologies and practices;
• environmental, social and economic effects of response strat-
egies;
• human activities affecting climate;
• coastal areas with particular reference to sea-level rise;
• water resources; and
• energy efficiency.
The parties might also be called upon to co-operate in establish-
ing and improving, directly or through competent international
bodies, and taking fully into account national legislation and rele-
vant ongoing activities at the national, regional and international
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levels, joint or complementary programmes for systematic moni-
toring and analysis of climate, including a possible worldwide
system; and co-opcrate in ensuring the collcction, validation and
transmission of research, observational data and analysis through
appropriate data centres.
Othcr issues that will arise in developing this provision include:
• should consideration be given to the establishment of panels
of experts or of an independent scientific board responsible
for the co-ordination of data collection from the above
areas of research and analysis and for periodic assessment
of the data?
• should provision be made for on-site inspection?
• should there be provision for open and non-discriminatory
acccss to meteorological data developed by all countries?
• should a specific research fund be established?
Information Exchange and Reporting
Precedents would suggest the inclusion of a provision for the trans-
mission of information through the secretariat to the Conference of
the Parties on measures adopted by them in implementation of the
Convention and of protocols to which they are party. In an annex
to the Vienna Convention, the types of information exchanged
are specified and include scientific, technical, socioeconomic,
commercial and legal information.
For the purposes of elaborating this provision, issues hav-
ing to be addressed by the negotiating parties include the fol-
lowing:
• Is there a need for the elaboration of a comprehensive interna-
tional research programme in order to facilitate co-operation
in the exchange of scientific, technological and other informa-
tion on climate change?
• Should parties be obliged to report on measures they have
adopted for the implementation of the Convention, with the
possible inclusion of regular reporting on a comparable basis
of their emissions of greenhouse gases?
• Should each party additionally be called upon to develop
a national inventory of emissions, strategies and available
technologies for addressing climate change? If so, the Con-
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vention might also call for the exchange of information on
such inventories, strategies and technologies.
Development and Transfer of Technology
While the issue of technology has been addressed in the section
on General Obligations, it might be considered desirable to
include separate provisions on technology transfer and techni-
cal co-operation. Such provisions could call upon the parties
to promote the development and transfer of technology and
technical co-operation, taking into account particularly the needs
of developing countries, to enable them to take measures to
protect against the adverse effects of climate change, to limit,
reduce and, as far as possible, prevent climate change, or to
adapt to it.
Another issue which will arise is: should special terms be
attached to climate-related transfers of technology (such as a
preferential and/or non-commercial basis and assured access to,
and transfer of, environmentally sound technologies on favourable
terms to developing countries), taking into consideration the pro-
tection of intellectual property rights?
Settlement of Disputes
It would be usual international practice to include a provision on
the settlement of disputes that may arise concerning the interpre-
tation or application of the Convention and/or any annex/proto-
col. Provisions similar to those in the Vienna Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer might be employed, i.e.
voluntary resort to arbitration or the International Court of
Justice (with a binding award) or, if neither of those options is
elected, mandatory resort to conciliation (with a recommendatory
award).
Other Provisions
It would be the usual international practice to include clauses on
the following topics:
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• amendment of the Convention;
• status, adoption and amendment of annexes;
• adoption and entry into force of, and amendments to, proto-
cols;
• signature;
• ratification;
• accession;
• right to vote;
• relationship between the Convention and any protocol(s);
• entry into force;
• reservations;
• withdrawal;
• depository;
• authentic texts.
Annexes and Protocols
The negotiating parties may wish the Convention to provide for
the possibility of annexes and/or protocols. Annexes might be
concluded as integral parts of the Convention, while protocols
might be concluded subsequently (as in the case of the Montreal
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Protection of the Ozone
Layer). While it is recognized that the Convention is to be
all-encompassing, the negotiating parties will have to decide
whether greenhouse gases, their sources and sinks, are to be dealt
with individually, in groups, or comprehensively, in annexes or
protocols to the Convention. The following, among others, might
also be considered as possible subjects for annexes or protocols to
the Convention:
• agricultural practices;
• forest management;
• funding mechanisms;
• research and systematic observations;
• energy conservation and alternative sources of energy;
• liability and compensation;
• international emissions trading;
• international taxation system;
• development and transfer of c1imate-change-related technol-
ogies.
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Issues that will arise in connection with the development of
annexes and protocols include:
• Timing, i.e. negotiating parties advocating a more action-
orientated Convention may seek to include specific obliga-
tions in annexes as opposed to subsequent protocols and/or
negotiate one or more protocols in parallel with the Conven-
tion negotiations.
• Sequence, i.e. if there is to be a series of protocols, In what
order should they be taken up?
Appendix VII
The Bellerive Initiative on Alpine Action
Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan proposed the following ten priority
points for immediate action at the conclusion of the Conference
held in Geneva on 28 February 1989;
1. An urgent review of current know\cdge and future scenarios
in key areas: e.g. forests, water, agriculture, tourism, community
development, etc.
2. The preparation of an Alpine Conservation Strategy, includ-
ing a Code of Ethics.
3. The preparation of a Master Plan for imp\cmenting degrees
of protection for ecologically sensitive areas.
4. The support of existing preparations for an Alpine Con-
vention rationalizing existing legislation and exploring new legal
instruments.
5. The establishment of a network of scientific monitoring cen-
tres with a common database and connected by on-line computers.
6. The promotion of printed and audiovisual materials for
educational and public information purposes.
7. The convening of regular conferences assessing the state of
the Alps organized by a focal institution and network.
8. The promotion of more effective local community manage-
ment, including the provision of independent technical advice on
the environmental and economic implications of development
activities.
9. The encouragement of the financial community to contribute
to conservation.
10. The creation of a fund to support an action group to animate
these activities.
Source: Pill, D. and Stone, P. Towards A/pille Action (Geneva: Bellerive,
1989)
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Alp Action
The Alps, still perceived as an unspoilt paradise, are being affec-
ted by pollution largely exported from the industrial regions of
Europe: one cannot place a dome over the Alps! Yet they are one
of the natural wonders of the Earth, the source of Europe's vital
hydrological system - four major European rivers, the Rhone, the
Rhine, the Po and the Danube originate in the Alps. Although
scientists disagree on the extent and causes of the environmental
degradation, there exists a general consensus on the problems
threatening the mountains - in particular deforestation, erosion,
pollution and climate change, the decline of local communities,
their agriculture and traditions.
The current situation in the Alps reflects almost every develop-
mental and environmental problem currently encountered in the
world. Alp Action was launched by the Bellerive Foundation as
part of the need to adopt a positive approach to the environment.
The fund is a real and mutually trusting partnership between the
corporate sector, the scientific and conservation communities, and
promotes projects designed to preserve the Alpine environment.
Taking into account the diversity of threats facing the Alps, Alp
Action was convinced, from the start, that only a large number of
small, targeted projects would collectively respond to the urgency
of the situation. Plenty of practical solutions are proposed -
reafforestation, the protection of species of flora and fauna and
their habitats, studies of the impacts of infrastructure in Alpine
regions, the stimulation of an authentic Alpine culture, education
and awareness campaigns. Activities such as soft tourism, for
instance, can be beneficial to the Alpine environment. In fact,
it is difficult to label any particular activity as abusive. Rather, it
is the way in which managers plan and implement tourist policies
that counts. The key to successful Alpine management is in
long-term thinking rather than short-term profit. Decentralization,
194 MOUNTAIN WORLD IN DANGER
small-scale technology and the philosophy of quality not quantity is
a healthier basis for economic growth.
Alp Action acts as a broker between business and environmental
organizations. Its role is to identify sponsors wishing to finance
selected projects that are part of the Alp Action portfolio, to
co-ordinate their implementation and to manage the media aspects
linked to these projects' achievements. The sponsors are closely
associated with the projects through information to the media.
This media feedback, and the sponsors' participation in positive
environmental action, often gets full support from the sponsors'
personnel. Finally, and most important, Alp Action partnerships
are the basis of international awareness campaigns, combining the
marketing efforts of companies with Alp Action's educational
programmes.
The International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis
is a nongovernmental research institution, bringing together sci-
entists from around the world to work on problems of common
concern. Situated in Laxenburg, Austria, IIASA was founded
in October 1972 by the academics of science and equivalent
organizations of twelve countries. Its founders gave IIASA a
unique position outside national, disciplinary, and institutional
boundaries so that it might take the broadest possible view in
pursuing its objectives:
To promole illlel'llaliollal cooperatio/l in solving problems aris-
ing from social, economic, technological, and environmental
change
To creale a lIelwork of illSlillllio/ls in the national member organi-
zation countries and elsewhere for joint scientific research
To develop alld formalize syslems a/lalysis and the sciences con-
tributing to it, and promote the use of analytical techniques
needed to evaluate and address complex problems
To illform policy advisors a/ld decisioll makers about the potential
application of the Institute's work to such problems
The Institute now has national member organizations in the fol-
lowing countries:
Austria
The Austrian Academy of Sciences
Bulgaria
The National Committee for Applied Systems Analysis and
Management
Canada
The Canadian Committe for IIASA
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Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
The Commillee for IIASA of the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic
Finland
The Finnish Commillee for IIASA
France
The French Association for the Development of Systems Analysis
Germany
Association for the Advancement of IIASA
Hungary
The Hungarian Committee for Applied Systems Analysis
Italy
The National Research Council (CNR)
and the National Commission for Nuclear and Alternative Energy
Sources (ENEA)
Japan
The Japan Committee for IIASA
Netherlands
The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO)
Poland
The Polish Academy of Sciences
Sweden
The Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research
(FRN)
Union or Soviet Socialist Republics
The Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
United States or America
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences
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The changing climate. the warming of the world and acid rain are among
the greatest problems facing us at the end of the twentieth century. This
book describes. for the first time. the effects of these phenomena on the
high mountains and the forests of Europe. Mountains and the frozen regions
(the cryosphere) not only playa major part in our climatic system. but are
also central to our water supplies. Yet our glaciers are shrinking. our lakes
and soils are becoming acidified. our forests are damaged and the whole
fragile ecosystem of ranges like the Alps and the Caucasus is threatened.
Nilsson and Pitt present the evidence and assess the probable effects of
these changes on mountain society. tourism. water. flora and fauna. They
also examine the uncertainties. Above all they look. too. at the best
possible strategies in response to what is happening and at what the next
steps should be.
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